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 This research examines the relationship between law, religion, and the state 
in the early Bangkok period (1782 – 1851). Specifically, it explores the usage of law 
by the state and rulers and assesses the effectiveness of law enforcement. In 
addition, it offers an alternative interpretation of pre-modern Thai history by making 
the distinction between the “monarch” and the “state”.   
The first chapter studies the Buddhist influences in traditional Thai law, and 
the cosmological concept that underpinned the authority of the laws and royal 
legislation. Chapter Two analyses King Rama I’s legitimation of his authority through 
legislations concerned with morality. It demonstrates the relationship between 
religion and the legitimation of monarchical power in the traditional Thai politics. 
The third chapter explores the three laws on the royal authority and analyzes factors 
that impacted the stability of royal authority.  
Chapter Four discusses the laws and offences against the stability of the 
state dealing with state affairs and officials. Chapter Five examines the laws and 
offences relating to social order. It examines offences that affected the living of 
people such as robbery, and offences concerning the security such as piracy and 
crimes relating to Chinese secret societies. The sixth chapter discusses the control of 
manpower through the laws on manpower and other problems concerning 
manpower. Examples both in the Ayudhyan and Bangkok periods provided in 
Chapter Two – Five show the state’s responses to the cases through revising old 
laws and promulgating new laws. Chapter Seven analyses the state’s establishment 
of authority over the Sangha through monastic laws.  
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This work reveals that religious conceptions of kingship influenced and 
shaped the nature of pre-modern Thai politics, especially the sacred authority of 
Thai king. However, it argues that, in practice, the king’s authority was not as 
venerated as it was supposed to be and the laws sometimes were broken. The 
ineffectiveness of the implementing of law and the repetitive nature of laws indicate 
that the scared status of the laws, and correspondingly, the authority of the Thai 
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There are various dating systems used in Thai sources. In the Three Seals Code, the 
dating systems are the Mahasakkarat (MS), an era originated in India and expanded 
to other Buddhist states, (+78 = CE), Chunlasakkarat (CS), or Lesser Era of the 
Burmese (+ 638 = CE). The era used in the records of early Bangkok is 






































This dissertation offers a new perspective on the history of early Bangkok, 
through studying the usage of laws. It studies the relationship between law, religion, 
and the state in early 19th-century Siam, and the use of laws by the state and rulers, 
to assess the effectiveness of law enforcement, and to offer an alternative 
interpretation of pre-modern Thai history by making a clear and consistent 
distinction between the “monarch” and the “state” as separate entities within the 
law.1 Because of the conceptual conflation between the monarch and the state in 
the nature of the early 19th-century state, previous Thai historiography has tended 
to study them as if they were indistinguishable. However, this dissertation argues 
that a distinction exists in traditional Thai law, implicitly though not explicitly.  
 
1. The “State” and “Monarch” in Early Modern Siam  
 
This dissertation, examining the usage of law in early modern Siam, attempts 
to offer an alternative interpretation in the study of Thai history during this period 
by making the distinction between the “monarch” and the “state”. The discussion in 
later chapters will proceed along differentiated lines – examining laws and offences 
relating to the monarch, and laws and offences relating to the state (state authority, 
                                                          
1
 In contemporary Thailand, there is a debate over the reformation of the institution of the 
monarchy; some want the monarchy to become like the British and Japanese monarchies – 
possessing no reserve powers, not involved in the running of the country, and playing an entirely 
ceremonial role. Also, some people have debated over amendments or an abolition of the Thai 
law of lèse majesté (Article 112 in the Thai Criminal Code). It should be emphasized that the 
distinction between the state and the monarch in this study is not influenced by these 




state affairs, and public order). The distinction, which is based on the contents of the 
laws, may raise questions as it departs from the prevalent approach towards early 
modern Siam, one that conflated the king and the state as analytical subjects. At the 
same time, aspects of the early Bangkok state do not correspond to the modern, 
Western-centric criteria of a state, in which the state is a self-governing political 
entity with internationally recognized territories, citizens, and sovereignty. Some 
historians would argue that the monarchy and the state were only separated after 
the 1932 Revolution, which changed the Thai ruling system from an absolute 
monarchy to a constitutional monarchy. They may argue that dating this separation 
almost 150 years earlier, as this dissertation does, is not valid.  
Previous historical studies concerning the Thai monarchy and pre-modern 
Thai history do not distinguish clearly between the monarch and the state. One 
problem is that many Thai scholars have generally used the Thai term “rat” in their 
discussions on Thai political history.2 This term bears ambiguity because it can refer 
to both the monarchy (insofar as it can be subsumed under the Marxist 
understanding of the state) and the state itself. Many scholars use the terms “the 
state” and “the monarchy” interchangeably, except when discussing the reign of a 
particular monarch.3 Studies of Thai history that adopt a Marxist approach look at 
                                                          
2
 Some examples of which include Seksan Prasertkul, “The Transformation of the Thai State and 
Economic Change, 1855–1945” (PhD dissertation (Political Science), Cornell University, 1989); 
Seksan Prasertkul, “Rat Thai nai Kotmai Tra Sam Duang” (Thai State in the Three Seals Code), in 
Kotmai Tra Sam Duang kap sangkhom Thai (The Three Seals Code and the Thai Society) (Bangkok: 
Samnak-ngan Watthanatham, 1992), 73-89; Chaiyan Rajchagool, The Rise and Fall of the Thai 
Absolute Monarchy: Foundations of the Modern Thai State from Feudalism to Peripheral 
Capitalism (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1994); and Manop Thawornwatsakun, Khunnang Ayutthaya 
(The Nobility of Ayudhya) (Bangkok: Thammasat University Press, 1993). 
3
 They include Akin Rabibhadana, The Organization of Thai Society in the Early Bangkok Period, 
1782–1873 (Ithaca, New York: Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, 1969); Lorraine 
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the state and the monarchy as equivalent, but focus on the state, subsuming the 
monarchy under the state.4 They have usually used the term “rat” in their 
discussion, which can be interpreted as both the government and the polity it 
governs.  
Thus, it first needs to distinguish clearly the two meanings of “state”: the 
administrative/power structure vs. the polity as an entity. This dissertation relies on 
the first meaning – the administrative structure. 
Most scholars do not talk about the “state” in pre-modern Southeast Asia. 
Heine-Geldern focuses more on kingship than on any idea of the state. Other 
scholars’ approaches and models, such as Wolter’s mandala and Stanley Tambiah’s 
galactic polity, refer to the polity as a whole entity and then focus on the nature of 
kingship within that polity. They do not discuss the “state” in terms of its 
administrative power. In fact, they seem to think that it did not exist.5 It may be 
argued that most scholarship on early modern Southeast Asia is “ruler-centric”, not 
“state-centric”. Conversely, some scholars such as Seksan and Chaiyan apply Marxist 
notions of state power to explain the pre-modern Siamese state. They focus on the 
administrative structure of the state and are not interested in the monarchy as a 
separate institution. Their approach is “state-centric”.  
                                                                                                                                                              
M. Gesick, “Kingship and Political Integration in Traditional Siam, 1767-1824” (PhD diss. (History), 
Cornell University, 1976); Walter F. Vella, Siam under Rama III, 1824-1851 (New York: Locust 
Valley, 1957); Klaus Wenk, The Restoration of Thailand under Rama I 1782-1809, trans. Greeley 
Stahl (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1968); and Saichon Sattayanurak, Phutthasatsana 
kap neokhit thangkanmueang nai ratchasamai Phrabatsomdet Phraphutthayotfachulalok 
(Pho.So. 2325–2352) (Buddhism and Political Notions in the First Reign (1782–1809)) (Bangkok: 
Matichon, 2003).   
4
 Seksan, “Transformation”, and Chaiyan, Rise and Fall. 
5
 O.W. Wolters, History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspective (Ithaca: Southeast 
Asia Program, Cornell University, 1999), 18. 
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Previous scholars also have different views in explaining the nature of the 
Siamese state in this period, and see it as an incomplete or one-sided concept. Some 
scholars have viewed it through the Buddhist-Hindu cosmological conception of 
state and kingship.6 The “state” – in the works of Lorraine Gesick and Manop 
Thawornwatsakun, for example – deals with the state as a polity.7 Other scholars 
have discussed the pre-modern Siamese state in terms of the criteria of statehood in 
modern definitions. Chaiyan Rajchagool, for instance, discusses the nature of the 
pre-modern Siamese state by comparing its nature with that of a modern nation-
state. He first looks at the issue of geophysical boundaries.8 From this view, the 
Siamese state in the early modern period could not be fully considered a “state”.  
Some scholars define the state in early modern Southeast Asia in familial 
terms. According to them, the forming of early modern mainland Southeast Asian 
states involved nobles running administrative affairs, a few powerful princely 
relatives which shared the king’s power, and competition among influential families 
and lineages. David K. Wyatt, for instance, studies power networks of powerful 
noble families in 17th and 18th-century Siam that had inherited important 
ministerial positions from their families or relatives.9 Barbara Andaya examines the 
importance of kinship and gender relationship for understanding political and 
economic relations in early modern Southeast Asia.10 The relationship between 
                                                          
6
 Robert Heine-Geldern, “Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia”, Far Eastern 
Quarterly 21, no. 2 (1942); Gesick, “Kingship”, 46-53, 78-122; Manop, Khunnang, 46-57. 
7
 Gesick, “Kingship”; Manop, Khunnang. 
8
 Chaiyan, Rise and Fall, 2-3. 
9
 David K. Wyatt, “Family Politics in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Siam”, Studies in Thai 
History (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1994), 98-106. 
10
 Barbara Watson Andaya, “Political Developments between the Sixteenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries”, in The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Vol 2, From c.1500 to c.1800, ed. 
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rulers of early states was managed through kinship relations. Official rituals were 
performed to represent their relations. Andaya also observes the role of women or 
gendered relations of power. Her work reveals the significance and the role of 
women in the competition of power between families. Tony Day examines the 
importance of families for understanding the histories of states in pre-modern 
Southeast Asia.11 Reviewing various definitions of “families” in previous studies, Day 
then argues that in the study of state and relations of power in early modern 
Southeast Asia, families, men, women, children, and ancestors also formed 
“states”.12  
These studies demonstrate the significance of kinship and family politics in 
the process of state formation, and help one understand gender and power 
relations in this region. They encourage us to view the “state” in another way, in 
which families completed for power and their actions influenced the formation of 
the state. These studies are applicable partly in the study of legal transformation in 
the Early Bangkok period. They help us to understand better the competition for 
power between political figures and influential families in Thai history, their abuse of 
authority, and their violations of law to gain or maintain their power. These 
practices were explicitly prohibited in Thai laws, thus reflecting the Southeast Asian 
context studied by the aforementioned scholars.  
                                                                                                                                                              
Nicholas Taring (Singapore: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Barbara Watson Andaya, The 
Flaming Womb: Repositioning Women in Early Modern Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University of 
Hawai’i Press, 2006). 
11
 Tony Day, “Ties that (Un) Bind: Families and States in Premodern Southeast Asia”, Journal of 
Asian Studies 55, no. 2 (May 1996): 384–409; Tony Day, Fluid Iron: State Formation in Southeast 
Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2002).  
12
  Day, “Ties”, 405. 
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In the Early Bangkok period, there was no clear distinction in political 
discourse or terminology between what we now consider the “state”, i.e. the 
administrative structure consisting the institutions and apparatus of governance, 
and the institution of the “monarchy”; the two were conflated and treated as the 
same (and all of the terms used referred to the ruler as an individual rather than to 
the institutions and structure through which he governed). In other words, the king 
was “the state” as well as “the monarchy”. This can be seen in the terms used to 
address the king and in royal titles – terms which are still used to this day. The king 
is called “Phrachao Phaendin” which means “the lord of the land”, and Chao Chiwit, 
or “the lord of life”. In the royal titles of Rama I and Rama II, there is the term 
“thoranin trathirat”, which combines the terms thoranee (land), the god Indra, and 
ratchathirat (the great king). This term literally means “the great king of the land”; 
the king is akin to the god Indra.13 By contrast, there are several terms used to refer 
to the country. They are “prathet” (country), “anachak” (realm, kingdom), 
“phaendin” (land, state), and “banmueang” (country, state).14 
Furthermore, it is to be noted that in the Early Bangkok period, there was no 
word in the Thai vocabulary like “rat” or “ratthaban”, which meant “government”, 
and no word like “sathaban phramahakasat” or “the institution of the monarchy”. 
There were only the words “phramahakasat” or “phrachaoyuhua”, meaning “the 
king”, and the phrase “ngan ratchakan”, which literally meant “the king’s affairs”. 
                                                          
13
 Chaophraya Thiphakorawong, Phraratchaphongsawadan Krung Rattanakosin Ratchakan thi 1 
(Royal Chronicle of the First Reign of the Bangkok Era) (Bangkok: Krom Sinlapakon, 2002), 1 
(hereafter referred as PRP.R1); Chaophraya Thiphakorawong, Phraratchaphongsawadan Krung 
Rattanakosin Ratchakan thi 2 (Royal Chronicle of the First Reign of the Bangkok Era) (Bangkok: 
Krom Sinlapakon, 2003), 13 (hereafter referred as PRP.R2). 
14
 “The Ayaluang”, Articles 12, 13, the TSC, Vol.2, p. 385. 
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Also, the term used for an official was “kha ratchakan”, which literally meant “the 
king’s servant”; there was no word like “government employee” or “civil servant”. 
Thus everything was semantically linked to the ruler.  
Phillip Gorski, in his study of the rise of the state in early modern Europe, 
proposes that there are other ways to define statehood than relying only on state 
theories. For example, a state can be defined in terms of its functions, as early 
modern states levied their resources to support and create organizations such as 
schools and workhouses. He proposes that states could be “pedagogical, corrective, 
and ideological organizations”; they were not only “administrative, policing, and 
military organizations.”15 Some scholars agree with his notion. A scholar, J. M. 
Gullick, who studied the Malay political system before the colonial period, analyzes 
Malay politics as “a working system of social control and leadership”.16 According to 
the proposals of Gorski and Gullick, it may thus be argued that we can discern a 
“state” from both its ideology and its function. The early modern Siamese state was 
evidently a state both in the form of an administrative and ideological organization.  
In the two areas of ritual and law in particular, there is a case to be made for 
the distinction between the “monarch” and the “state”. Max Weber’s conception of 
charismatic authority can be applied to understand political thought and behavior 
during the Early Bangkok period. Charismatic authority is a form of leadership in 
which the legitimacy of the ruler comes from the virtuous personality and leadership 
qualities of an individual regarded as superhuman or divine, set apart from ordinary 
                                                          
15
 Phillip Gorski, The Disciplinary Revolution: Calvinism and the Rise of the State in Early Modern 
Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 165–166. 
16
 J.M. Gullick, Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya (2nd edition) (London: Atlantic 
Highlands, 1988), 42-44. 
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people. The personal qualities and extraordinary insight of the charismatic power-
leader inspire obedience and loyalty from followers.17 This concept fits very well 
with the nature of kingship in pre-modern Southeast Asia, especially in kingdoms 
sharing an “Indian” culture, and it helps us to distinguish the ruler from the state.  
However, it should be kept in mind that Weber’s concept of charisma only 
allows us to make a partial distinction, not a complete one. Nevertheless, the use of 
Weber’s framework will illuminate this partial distinction between the “monarch” 
and the “state” in the Early Bangkok era.  
Scholars such as Clifford Geertz and O.W. Wolters have applied Weber’s 
ideas on the role of religion and culture in shaping political thought and behavior in 
pre-modern Southeast Asia.18 Geertz’s Negara concept applies Weber’s idea of 
charisma and the cosmological approach in Heine-Geldern’s Conceptions of State 
and Kingship, as well as other philosophies, in developing a model of the “Indic 
State” in 19th-century Bali. In Geertz’s view, the state was a weak or loose 
organization, and was centered upon the king who represented power and 
legitimacy through ritual behavior and religious belief.19 In Negara, Geertz’s 
approach is “ruler-centric”. 
Weberian conceptions of charisma and the cultural model of state formation 
can also be found in O.W. Wolters’s History, Culture, and Religion in Southeast Asian 
Perspectives. In Wolters’s view, the political practices of early Southeast Asia were 
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connected to the king and ceremonial practices; the personal and leadership 
qualities of the individual had an important role.20 Hinduism was used by rulers of 
Southeast Asia to perpetuate divine power, kingship, and mandala (sacred, centered 
spaces). A ruler was a “man of prowess”, a significant agent in the establishment of 
a cultural entity.21 Wolters’s approach is “ruler-centric”.  
By applying Weber’s concept of charisma, the approach of this dissertation is 
“ruler-centric”. Culture and religion played major roles for the kings of the Early 
Bangkok period. Using Geertz’s definition of the “theater state”, the Siamese state 
can also be defined as such. Various royal, state and religious rituals were 
performed and the king was the major actor. Royal rituals were set for all 12 months 
and described in detail in the Palatine Law.22 These rituals helped establish and 
demonstrate the king’s power, legitimacy, and dignity.  
Significant rituals concerned with the authority and dignity of the king 
include the Coronation Ritual, the Oath-Taking Ceremony, the Royal Procession on 
land and by boat, the drinking of the Water of Allegiance, and the Ceremony of the 
Viewing of the Troops and the Royal Elephant. Some are agricultural ceremonies 
such as the Ploughing Ceremony and the Brahman Water-Lowering Ceremony. 
Buddhist ceremonies were also significant as the king was the head of Buddhist 
patrons. In these rituals, the king was the major actor and central figure.  
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In addition, the royal processions by land and water were performed during 
annual rituals or on special occasions. The royal procession was an essential 
performance as it exhibited the pageantry and sovereignty of the king to the people. 
Paraphernalia of rank, royal vehicles, and barges were decorated for this purpose. 
The appearance of the king in the processions signifies the rule of the Universal 
Monarch over the entire world.23 These rituals showed and emphasized the 
significant and leading status of the king as an individual. The king was represented 
as the main performer of the “ritual state” – and indeed he effectively manifested 
and personified the state itself.  
Moreover, the laws also reflect the king’s important status as an individual 
ruler. It needs to be emphasized that this dissertation relies on the manner in which 
traditional Thai law treats the laws and offences relating to the “monarch” and the 
“state” separately in order to argue for the distinction between the “state” and the 
“monarch”. Arguably, the distinction exists only in the laws, and it is implicit rather 
than explicit. Two laws dealing directly with the authority, security and stability of 
the ruler are Kot Monthianban (the Palatine Law) and Phra Aiyakan Kabotsuek (the 
Law on Rebellion and War). Two other laws which can be understood as dealing 
more specifically with the state include Phra Aiyakan Ayaluang (the Law on Crimes 
against the State) and Phra Aiyakan Ayarat (the Law on Civil Offences). They deal 
with what we can consider as state authority, state affairs, and social order.24 Thus, 
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this research demonstrates how the king and state are understood within legal 
texts. 
The first law on royal authority is Kot Monthianban, translated as “the 
Palatine Law” (in conformance with European traditions and literally meaning “rules 
for protecting the king’s residence”). The Kot Monthianban institutes the code of 
conduct for those who enter the palace. It lays down regulations for nobles and 
courtiers in serving the king, in celebrating royal honors, in providing protection for 
royalty, and in performing royal rituals.  
The second law on royal authority is Phra Aiyakan Kabotsuek. This law is 
usually translated as “the Law on Treason”25, but a more accurate meaning will be 
“Law on Rebellion and War”. Kabot refers to all acts attempting to overthrow either 
the king’s or the state’s authority, namely rebellions, mutinies, treason, revolts, 
sedition, uprisings, espionage, and coups; suek means “war”. This law focuses on 
maintaining royal security and preventing acts aimed at overthrowing, undermining, 
or weakening the king’s authority. The Kabotsuek also regulates decrees related to 
military discipline. It gives instructions both in the learning and practice of proper 
conduct during wartime.  
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The Kabotsuek extends beyond the issue of overthrowing royal authority. 
The term “kabot” or “treason” in the law was defined in a much broader way than 
its present meaning. Generally, the term “treason” refers to the betrayal of a 
political authority, be it an individual ruler or the state. The direct translation of the 
law, “Law on Treason”, does not cover all main issues of the law. Thus, we will use 
the Thai term “Kabotsuek” in referring to this law, so as to avoid misinterpretations.  
Furthermore, the Kabotsuek declares several crimes to be capital crimes, 
such as patricide, matricide, destroying monasteries and Buddhist symbols, injuring 
or killing monks, doing harm to infants and children, as well as committing arson. 
These crimes were not related directly to the king’s security and authority. They 
were threats to social stability and order as they undermined society’s moral 
decorum. These capital crimes impacted the king’s duties in ensuring social order, in 
providing security to his subjects and in punishing criminals. The king’s failure to 
prevent such crimes and to punish criminals affected his legitimacy, authority and 
the loyalty of his subjects. Thus, these crimes were defined as dangerous crimes and 
were clearly declared in the Kabotsuek.  
The third law, which is more closely related to state authority, is Phra 
Aiyakan Ayaluang. Aya means “authority and penalty”. Luang means “royal, great, 
and public”. In previous works, the Ayaluang was translated in English as the “Law 
on Crimes against the State”.26 This translation comes from the main substance of 
this law which focuses on offences against state authority, particularly in the area of 
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state affairs. Numerous decrees in the Ayaluang focus on state authority and 
regulations concerning state affairs, such as conduct of officials, betrayal of public 
trust, and corruption. In some decrees, offences against royal authority, such as the 
obstruction of a public official’s work, officials’ abuses of their authority on matters 
concerning social order, contempt of court, and the counterfeiting of official 
documents, are included. However, these offences involved the officials more than 
the ruler, hence this dissertation’s argument is that they constituted offences 
against state authority. 
Some offences in the Ayaluang are similar to the decrees mentioned in the 
Kot Monthianban and the Kabotsuek, especially acts relating to the stability of the 
king’s authority. Among them are prohibitions of private meetings and private 
conversations between nobles and princes, as well as prohibition of the use of royal 
property and the use of royal language without referring to royalty. It is possible to 
assume that all these overlapping prohibitions have existed since the Ayudhyan 
period, when officials worked on behalf of the king’s office and, at the same time, 
were at the service of his royal court.  
Another law on state stability and social order is Phra Aiyakan Ayarat. It 
focuses on disputes between individuals and between individuals and officials that 
violated or disregarded state authority. This law and the Ayaluang will be discussed 
together in a later chapter. The translation of the Ayaluang and Ayarat as “Crimes 
against the State” and “Law on Civil Offences” respectively should not be 
understood as reflecting the modern distinction between criminal law (Kotmai Aya) 
and civil law (Kotmai Phaeng). Aya or Atya in Thai means authority and punishment, 
14 
 
usually used for royalty, such as phraratcha-aya, which means the king’s or prince’s 
authority, or long phraratcha-aya, meaning “punishment from the king”. Today, 
khwampit aya means criminal or public offence, and lo long aya means suspension 
of judgment. The nature of the Ayaluang is similar to criminal law, but the core of 
Ayarat is different from present-day civil law. The Ayarat is translated as the “Law 
on Civil Offences” by a French legal scholar, Robert Lingat, in “The Thai Thammasat” 
by Ishii, and in the TSC Research Project, and therefore, that translation is used here 
for the sake of consistency.  
As mentioned above, this dissertation aims to examine the distinction 
between the “monarch” and “state” in Thai laws. The discussions above indicate 
much overlap between the two kinds of authority. In Chapter 3, the discussion will 
focus more on the distinct characteristics of “royal” authority, while the distinct 
characteristics of “state” authority will be examined in Chapter 4. 
 
2. The Study of Legal Transformations in the Context of Southeast Asian History 
  
The study of legal transformations in early modern Siam gives a broader 
insight into the nature of regional change and continuity in early modern Southeast 
Asia. The phrase, “early modern Southeast Asia”, is a periodization of Southeast Asia 
to study change and continuity in this region. Many scholars have long studied 
Southeast Asia in the early modern period. Harry Benda proposes the periodization 
of Southeast Asian history to reveal structural changes and impacts from its 
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relationship with other cultures.27 The edited volume Southeast Asia in the Early 
Modern Era demonstrates the social, cultural, economic, military, and political 
changes of Southeast Asia between the 15th and 17th centuries through case 
studies of some Southeast Asian states.28 In Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 
Anthony Reid links socio-political and commercial changes of Southeast Asian states 
to global economic shifts. He analyzes the emergence of centralized and absolutist 
states, urbanization in the region influenced by the increase in commerce in the 
Indian Ocean and from China in the 15th century, as well as the period of economic 
and cultural decline and political fragmentation, caused by a global downturn in the 
17th century.29 
The 16th and 17th-century laws concerning commerce, manpower, and 
relationships between indigenous female and male traders demonstrate that 
external factors impacted Siam as was the case for other parts of mainland 
Southeast Asia. The legislations reflect how high profits in overseas trade urged the 
ruling elites to increase their control over royal monopolies in trade and manpower, 
and consolidate their authority. Besides gaining benefits from royal trade, factors 
that contributed to the state’s growth of power were the possession of Western 
arms and foreign mercenaries. The spread of state law and law enforcement mirror 
the growth of the state’s centralized authority and combination of various ethnic 
groups. This phenomenon also occurred in other parts of the region. Therefore, the 
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study of legal transformation in Siam can be connected to the study of Southeast 
Asian patterns of integration, centralization, and homogenization raised by previous 
scholars. 
Also, Lieberman’s important study on integration in Southeast Asia, Strange 
Parallels, explores a variety of transformations as well as internal and external 
factors that influenced the developments of the region from the year 800 to 1830. 
Lieberman analyzes the acceleration of political and cultural consolidation of 
mainland states and the causes of these changes, such as writing systems, literature 
and rituals introduced by Theravada Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism. The cultural 
integration, according to Lieberman, influenced centralized administration, the 
developing uniformity of religious practices, and the development of religious texts, 
literacy, writing systems, and law. Economic control of the state contributed to the 
development of taxation, overseas trade under the royal support, patronage, the 
progress of military, urban trade, and irrigation.30  
This dissertation, studying legal transformations in pre-modern Siam, also 
more broadly reflects the nature of regional changes and continuity in early modern 
Southeast Asia. It demonstrates that Siam and other mainland states shared similar 
cultures and socio-political aspects such as Indic cultures, aspects of social 
stratification, the hierarchical society, and the client-and-patron society. According 
to Benda’s proposal of the institutional change and Lieberman’s study on integration 
in Southeast Asia, Indic cultures, especially Buddhism, was one of the main elements 
in creating and unifying the national culture of the Thais and other ethnic groups in 
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the Thai kingdoms of Sukhothai, Ayudhya, and Bangkok. Buddhism was utilized in 
uniting people in remote areas. Buddhism also influenced the authority and role of 
kingship in the region, the genesis of law, and the creation of legal texts. At the 
same time, the Three Seals Code was also clearly part of the broader process of 
consolidation for the mainland region, as described by Lieberman. 
Furthermore, Indic cultures, especially ideas in Hinduism and – Buddhism, 
influenced strongly the notion of power in Southeast Asia. Previous scholars have 
discussed the notion of power and the relationship between religion and state in 
this region.31 This study also analyzes Buddhist influences in traditional Thai law, and 
the cosmological beliefs that underpinned the authority of kingship, laws and royal 
legislation. It reflects the relationship between religion and state, and the role of 
kingship in other Buddhist states in the region, not just Siam. In Burma, for example, 
Buddhism had a crucial role in creating royal power and integrating society of 
various ethnic groups. Burmese kings claimed to be the cakravartin or the Universal 
Monarch.32 
 Robert Heine-Geldern talks about the religious and philosophical 
conceptions of state and kingship, especially Hindu-Buddhist ideas which shaped 
Southeast Asian traditional states. He discusses the idea of mandala – seven 
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mountains which encircled Mount Meru, the center of the universe and the 
residence of the god Indra – and practices of the Burmese court and the belief of 
being the devaraja, the God King in ancient Cambodia, which was based on Hindu-
Mahayana Buddhist belief.33 I.W. Mabbett also examines patterns of kingship in 
traditional Asia and analyzes the devaraja in Khmer Angkor.34  
In the Buddhist context, the nature of power has been considered in 
different ways. Power has been something that may be exercised across the 
supernatural continuum, as seen in Craig Reynolds’s article, “Power”. Reynolds talks 
about a belief of power in sacred objects, the supernatural, power in politics, and a 
mixture of power in Buddhist principles and the politics of political figures.35 The 
concept of “power” in his research was conceived from a political perspective in pre-
modern Thai Theravada Buddhist society. Therefore, this “power” was linked with 
Theravada political theory and charisma of the rulers which was based on their 
moral principles and secular accomplishments. 
Within the theoretical framework of traditional Thai politics, the king’s 
authority was utmost and his laws and commands could not be violated. Royal 
authority and royal laws carried a sense of saksit (possessing supernatural energy) 
based on Buddhist and cosmological principles. However, this dissertation argues 
that, in practice, the laws were violated occasionally and the king’s authority was 
not as venerated as it was supposed to be. The ineffectiveness of law enforcement 
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and the repetitive nature of laws demonstrated that the sacred status of the laws, 
and correspondingly, the authority of the Thai monarch, was undermined at times.  
Many previous works use a “king and battles” approach to history. This 
disseration studies history through law, which offers a different way of studying Thai 
history, as opposed to dynastic-based histories. It covers changes in society, the 
state’s concerns and policies, and problems dealing with state affairs and 
manpower. The study of law also answers debates concerning patron-client 
relations in early modern Southeast Asian societies. Laws on manpower, laws 
prohibiting the abuse of power, and the Laws of Royal, Civil, and Military Hierarchies 
demonstrate a client-and-patron society and social stratification in Southeast Asia. 
The hierarchical laws set the relationships between people in the society and the 
status of an individual, in which lower-ranking people were beneath higher-ranking 
people. 
Previous scholarship has debated patron-client relations in Southeast Asia. 
One early and important study is Akin Rabibhadana’s work on the social 
organization of Thai society in the Early Bangkok era. This study examines the social 
structure of traditional Thai society, the phrai36 and patron systems, and aspects of 
social stratification and social mobility through a socio-anthropological approach.37 
Akin’s study is focused on the Early Bangkok era, but is frequently used to study the 
Ayudhyan period as well. It indicates the significance of laws on social hierarchy that 
shaped the social structure of society. It utilizes a wide range of sources. The laws on 
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social hierarchy and manpower are used to explain the social organization of 
traditional Thai society. However, official documents, such as petitions and 
judgments, which reflect the relationships between people in society, seem to have 
been overlooked.  
An edited study, Slavery, Bondage and Dependency in Southeast Asia, 
examines the interaction of different concepts of servitude in Southeast Asia 
discusses slavery in many cultures.38 This work demonstrates the labor system of the 
region, based on the obligation of labor between a creditor and master. It also 
describes a form of bondage that the people recognized as slavery at that time. 
However, there were specific kinds of bondsmen in Southeast Asian society. An 
essay in this volume by B. Terwiel explores the relationship between slaves (that) 
and freemen (phrai) in the Early Bangkok era. It also provides details of dignity 
marks of slaves and freemen in the sakdina system, and the kinds of slaves 
mentioned in Phra Aiyakan Laksana That (Slavery Law) in traditional Thai law or the 
Three Seals Code.39 Slavery Law defines the kinds of slaves in Thai society, conditions 
of redemption, and conduct of masters. The law indicates that slaves were 
protected by the state by setting a code of conduct for masters. Masters were 
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3. The Three Seals Code  
 
The primary source-text examined in this dissertation is the compendium of 
traditional Thai law, the Kotmai Tra Sam Duang or the Three Seals Code (hereafter 
TSC). It is one of the most important sources in examining pre-19th century Thai 
legal texts, and in researching traditional Thai society as a whole. This code is a 
legacy of the kingdom of Ayudhya, and was also revised in 1805 in the reign of Rama 
I of Bangkok (r. 1782 – 1809). The TSC consists of laws on various subjects, such as 
the king’s authority, state administration, the division of manpower, judicial 
procedures, compensation, families, inheritance, debt, slavery, as well as marital 
relations.40 The TSC is structured into 27 sections that can be divided into several 
parts:  
1. Legal philosophy: Phra Thammasat, Inthaphat, Law of Procedure;  
2. Laws on the organization of the court of justice and procedure: Law on Judges 
and Delivery of Justice, Law on the Acceptance of Charges, Law on Evidence, 
Trial by Ordeal, Law on the Evaluation of Persons and Imposition of 
Punishments, and Law of Appeal; 
3. Laws on hierarchies and administrative structure: Laws on the Royal, Civil, 
Military, and Provincial Hierarchies; 
4. Law on the court affairs: Palatine Law; 
5. Laws on national security: Law on Rebellion and War, Law on Crimes against the 
State, Law on Civil Offences; 
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6. Laws on social organization; 
6.1 Organization of manpower: Law on the Organization and Control of Manpower, 
Slavery Law, Law on Husband and Wife; 
6.2 Control of violence: Law on Bandits and Gangsters, Law on Abduction, Law on 
Quarrels; 
6.3 Management of property: Law on Debt, Law on Inheritance, Miscellaneous 
Laws (Fields, Gardens, Deposit, Hire, Loan, Sale, Purchase, Gambling, Black 
Magic); 
7. Administrative laws of the Ayudhya period: the Thirty-Six Regulations, Old Royal 
Orders; 
8. Administrative laws of the Bangkok period: New Royal Orders Acts, The Sangha 
Laws.  
As is well-known, almost all manuscripts of the Ayudhyan kingdom were 
destroyed during the fall of Ayudhya in 1767. The laws that exist today were 
compiled and revised in 1805. This raises questions about the reliability of these 
laws as primary evidence for the legal history of Ayudhya or the Early Bangkok 
period.41 In a broad sense, the laws revised in 1805 can be regarded as belonging to 
the legal history of Ayudhya because their contents mainly dated from that period. 
However, because of its revision in 1805, the TSC cannot be considered as a 
distinctively or uniquely “Ayudhyan” source, which means that it can also be used to 
study the Early Bangkok period. Hence, the use of the TSC as a source requires 
caution, as well as the use of other sources for corroboration and verification.  
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Content analysis of the law texts is needed in the study of the TSC because 
the texts were revised without providing the dates of revision. The texts thus 
contain numerous historical discrepancies. For instance, the Kot Monthianban (the 
Palatine Law) gives the year Chulasakkarat (Minor Era) 720 (1358 CE) as the date of 
its redaction, but also refers to the naksat year42, the rat year – these two years do 
not match. Such discrepancies are not infrequent when dating ancient laws. In 
addition, some information in the laws do not match historical reality. The law, for 
example, describes Malacca as one of Ayudhya’s vassal states; however, Malacca 
could not have been Ayudhya’s vassal state in 1358 as it had not been founded yet. 
 In addition, detailed information in the laws indicates that the laws had been 
revised repeatedly throughout the Ayudhyan period, as seen in the Phra Aiyakan 
Ayaluang (the Law on Crimes against the State). This law includes five Acts of 
different dates. The Act of 1895 BE (1352 CE) lays down offences against the king’s 
authority. The Act of 1902 BE (1359 CE) enumerates the offences against the state 
administration, especially different types of corruption. The Act had clearly been 
revised subsequently as it mentions the sakdina scale of courtiers,43 which was first 
established in 1478 in the Law on Civil Hierarchies. 
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 The second Act of 1359 institutes the state tariffs that were to be collected 
from traders at the customs. The information in this Act presents a historical 
discrepancy because the Tariff Act, according to the Royal Chronicles of Ayudhya, 
was enacted only in 1585. The Act of 1890 BE (1433 CE) had also clearly been 
revised, given that it mentions the presence of the Dutch and British, who had not 
yet appeared in Ayudhya in the 15th century. The first Europeans, the Portuguese, 
came to Ayudhya only in 1511, while the Dutch and British came only in 1604 and 
1612 respectively. These discrepancies show that the laws were revised, but the 
dates of revision were not provided. Thus, the use of the TSC as a source requires 
verification with other sources.  
 
4. Research Questions  
 
 
This dissertation aims to answer three main research questions: 1) How the 
laws supported and maintained the state’s stability; 2) how and why the laws were 
enacted and applied in response to historical events and stimuli; and 3) how 
successful was the enforcement of the laws. 
In order to answer the first question, this dissertation examines the 
relationship between political and religious spheres in traditional Thai society by 
focusing on the Buddhist conceptions of kingship that underpinned the king’s legal 
authority and the divine sanctity of traditional Thai law. It examines the origins of 
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the authority of traditional Thai law, and the king’s legal authority, which can be 
traced to the influence of Theravada Buddhism.  
The second question concerns the enactment and application of the laws for 
the maintenance of royal and state authority, and in response to changes in Thai 
society. The last aim of the study is to examine the effectiveness of law 
enforcement. This will contribute to a better understanding of how the rulers used 
laws and how successful the laws were in achieving their aims. Sources used to 
assess the effectiveness of the laws include the laws enacted in the Ayudhya and 
Bangkok periods, petitions, court judgments, and official ministry documents.  
Moreover, this dissertation analyzes the overlap between royal and state 
authority in Thai laws. At first glance, it would seem difficult or impossible to 
separate the two kinds of authority. This is because Thai politics in the Early Bangkok 
period tended to regard the king and the state as one. In addition, the majority of 
traditional Thai scholarship does not and has not distinguished between the 
monarchy and the state, but this dissertation will argue that this is a valid 
distinction, to be elaborated more in later chapters. 
 
5. Literature Review  
 
This research studies the use of laws to strengthen state stability in the Early 
Bangkok era (1782-1851). This section reviews the relevant historical literature, i.e. 
works related to Thai legal history, the TSC, and the history of the Early Bangkok 
period, concerning the topic.  
26 
 
5.1 Studies of Southeast Asian and Thai Legal History  
 
 
The legal history of Southeast Asia has been studied by historians of 
Southeast Asia. Some crucial studies include A Concise Legal History of South-East 
Asia and Laws of South-East Asia, Volume 1, the Pre-Modern Texts.44 These works 
discuss the nature of Southeast Asian laws, explore legal texts, and examine the 
“borrowing” of Indian and Chinese cultures by indigenous Southeast Asian people to 
reveal the relevance of Indian, Islamic, and Chinese traditions to the legal history of 
Southeast Asia, as well as European-style laws in the colonial period. 
 Thai Law: Buddhist Law, a volume edited by Andrew Huxley, examines the 
origins of Thai law by discussing similarities and differences of Thai, Mon and 
Burmese Dhammathats. Three essays in the second part of this volume introduce 
collections of provincial law. One of the essays, “Lanna Customary Law”, provides 
basic knowledge of the ancient Lanna law, while the other two, “New Sources 
Material of the Siamese Kingdom” and “Legal manuscripts from Southern Thailand”, 
contain less analysis. They focus on catalogues of the legal manuscripts and the 
process of locating and collecting the manuscripts. The last essay, Michael Vickery’s 
“The Constitution of Ayutthaya: The Three Seals Code”, aims to define the dates, 
months and years in the Three Seals Code and allows for the understanding of 
Ayutthaya administrative structure throughout the Code. Vickery also examines 
                                                          
44
 M.B. Hooker, A Concise Legal History of South-East Asia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978); M.B. 




evidence regarding the structure of the Code and linguistics.45 This examination of 
the dating of law in this work helps to confirm the revisions of law in various times. 
This is very useful for researchers who use the TSC as a source.  
Moreover, there are studies that examine traditional laws of particular 
Buddhist states. Lingat developed a deep interest in Hindu culture and Sanskrit 
literature in his explanation of traditional Thai law; as a result, he examines the 
evolution of the conception of law in Siam and Burma.46 Paphatsaun Thianpanya’s 
work is a comparative study of the Sanskrit and Mon versions of the Manu 
Dharmasastra. The study has found differences in the features and principles of 
Buddhist and Hindu law. The Buddhist law modified the Hindu law, accepting only 
elements that were acceptable to Buddhism, and changed those which were 
contrary to Buddhist principles. For instance, no law concerning Hindu castes 
remained in Buddhist law.47  
Also, Dietrich Christian Lammerts studies Dhammasattha manuscripts and 
texts in pre-modern Burma. This study examines the local and regional histories of 
dhammasattha, the significance of Pali, and the vernacular genre of Buddhist legal 
literature in pre-modern Burma and Southeast Asia. It critically analyzes the dating, 
form, content, and function of dhammasattha texts in both Burmese and Pali 
manuscripts. It emphasizes the significance for Buddhist, South Asian and Southeast 
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Asian Studies, and historical and religious contexts of the development of local legal 
and textual practices.48  
The modern study of Thai legal history was pioneered by Robert Lingat, who 
lived in Bangkok from 1924 to 1940. He worked as a legal advisor to the Ministry of 
Law in the Thai government, and taught at the Faculty of Law at Thammasat 
University, Bangkok. Before Lingat, both Thai and foreign scholars were also 
interested in Thai laws. Their primary interests were the study and publication of 
law texts. It was in 1849 that the first volume of the TSC was printed privately by 
Phraya49 Kasapkitkoson (Mote Amattayakul), but it was considered an “illegal” 
publication. 200 copies were confiscated and many were ordered burnt because 
possession of laws was exclusive to the court and officials-in-charge then. Phraya 
Kasapkitkoson was punished. However, King Mongkut subsequently returned the 
remaining copies to him.  
In 1863, D.B. Bradley, an American missionary, published a set of laws based 
on the texts that Phraya Kasapkitkoson had made available. This version was not 
destroyed. This was during Mongkut’s reign, when relationships with Westerners 
were cordial and the learning of Western knowledge was supported. Later in 1901, 
towards the end of King Chulalongkorn’s reign, Prince Rajburi, the Minister of Law, 
published a set of laws in which he re-arranged parts of the texts and provided 
explanations for them. This version, called Kotmai Ratchaburi (The Rajburi Laws), 
was for the benefit of judges and lawyers. Before 1901, Luang Damrongthammasan, 
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the Chief Justice of the Criminal Court, also printed an edition of the TSC, called 
Kotmai Kao Mai (Old and New Laws).  
Subsequently, the law texts were continuously published in 1930, 1931, 
1939, 1940, 1952, 1972, 1978, 1983, 2005, and 2008. The 1939 edition was edited 
by Lingat and published by Thammasat University under the title Pramuan kotmai 
Ratchakan thi 1 Cho.So. 1166 (The Laws of the First Reign, 1805). Lingat had 
researched and edited the TSC by rechecking the original texts with earlier published 
versions. This edition was accepted as a complete version. The editions published 
after 1939 were based on Lingat’s. They were thus not different from each other. 
However, the 1972 and 1978 versions, published by the Kurusapha Business 
Organization and the Department of Fine Arts respectively, were said to contain 
many misspellings. The 1983 version, including three volumes, was published by 
Thammasat University. In 2005, Pridi Banomyong Institute republished the TSC.  
The latest published edition of the TSC is the Royal Institute edition, 
consisting of two volumes, printed in 2007.50 It is the only version that reproduced 
the original texts of 1805, especially the arrangement of laws. It also provides 
images of the 1805 texts for verification of the texts. This dissertation uses this 
edition as it is the latest and complete version. In addition, the TSC was utilized as a 
source for the study of Thai history and traditional society. Lingat was the pioneer of 
this approach. In 1935, he wrote four volumes of lecture notes under the title 
Prawatsat kotmai Thai (History of Thai Law) to teach graduate students of the 
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Faculty of Law at Thammasat University.51 They were first published in 1935 and 
republished many times until 1948. After that, Lingat’s books were replaced by 
those of Thai scholars. In 1983, Lingat’s books were reprinted.52 In the Preamble, the 
first volume, Lingat explored the backgrounds of law, brief knowledge of laws of 
some important cultures, sources for the study of Thai legal history, and Mon and 
Khmer influences on ancient Thai laws.  
The second volume, The Violation of Law, talks about the infringements of 
laws concerning individuals and property. The third volume, Contract, deals with 
various kinds of contractual arrangements (such as sale contracts, debt contracts, 
contracts of suretyship, and contracts regarding the sale of slaves). The fourth 
volume, Land Law, pertains to land ownership, important aspects of land ownership 
in the Ayudhyan period, and documents concerning land. In these works, Lingat’s 
sources included the TSC, the notifications of King Mongkut, and laws promulgated 
since the Fifth Reign. 
Moreover, Lingat wrote many articles, both in Thai and French, concerning 
Thai legal history and laws, as well as the legal history of other Southeast Asian 
countries. One of his outstanding works is a book in French on slavery in ancient 
Thai laws.53 However, this book has not been translated into Thai.  
Lingat’s work can be regarded as compulsory reading for those who study 
traditional Thai law. Lingat researched primary sources, especially law texts, to 
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analyze past Thai society and the development of Thai laws. He looked at socio-
economic changes from the development and promulgation of laws in different 
periods. His work contributes to a better understanding of traditional Thai society 
and is canonical in the study of Thai socio-economic history through Thai laws. 
Lingat also referred to laws of other ancient traditions to make a comparison in his 
analysis. Footnotes, references, and questions for future studies are provided. This 
book was mainly written for law school students. It discusses in-depth details of 
laws, while discussion of historical events is limited.  
In addition, H.G. Quaritch Wales’s Ancient Siamese Government and 
Administration is another pioneering work that used Thai laws as a source. It is 
considered compulsory reading for those who study the political history of Ayudhya 
and Bangkok. This book examines the administration of the ancient Thai state to 
contribute to a better understanding of the social structure of traditional Thai 
society.54 Quaritch Wales researched some laws within the TSC, such as laws on civil 
and military hierarchies and administration and laws on social organization, so as to 
reveal the workings of the state administration.  
It should be pointed out that Quaritch Wales was not a legal scholar, and 
was only interested in laws insofar as they helped to explain political and 
administrative history. Thus, his use of the laws was superficial. The contents of the 
laws were not deeply analyzed. In addition, his discussions on some points were 
unclear. For example, he proposed that the Thai Thammasat was derived from Mon 
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and Burmese, and also that the Palatine Law and the Sangha Laws differed from 
other laws, but did not provide reasons or evidence to support his comments.  
 
 
5.2  Studies on the Three Seals Code  
 
 
5.2.1 Studies on the Thammasat  
 
In Thai tradition, the basis of the authority of Thai kings, especially their legal 
authority, was mainly derived from Theravada Buddhism. Besides Buddhist 
conceptions of kingship, an ancient text, the Thammasat, which was derived from 
the Hindu Dharmasastra55, established and endorsed the legal authority of Thai 
kings. This text is a mixture of Hindu and Buddhist notions. It established the 
fundamental principles of traditional Thai law. Scholars have discussed the origin, 
importance, and contents of the Thammasat in their studies on Thai laws and 
conceptions of Thai kingship. Reviewing studies on the Thammasat will help to 
explain the concepts of law and kingship that contribute to the Thai king’s judicial 
power.  
An early and popular debate about the Thammasat centered on its origins 
and development. Scholars have examined the cosmological principles of the 
Thammasat and how the Hindu text was adapted into Theravada Buddhist society. It 
is accepted that the Hindu Dharmasastra is the origin of the Thai Thammasat, but 
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the Thais received it via either the Mon or the Burmese. Thus, Hindu influences were 
replaced by Theravada Buddhist ideas. However, there is no evidence for which 
versions of the text, be it from the Mon or the Burmese, were introduced to the 
Thais, and when.  
Prince Damrong, who is credited as the father of Thai history, proposed in 
1930 that either the Hindu Dharmsastra or the Burmese version of the Pali 
Dhammasattham were brought into Ayudhya during the 15 years of Burmese 
occupation from 1569 to 1584. This comment was accepted and spread by W.A.R. 
Wood in his work on Thai history.56 This hypothesis was later supported by a Thai 
historian Winai Pongsipian. His work points out similarities between the Thai and 
Burmese texts, such as the name of Manu which is referred to in the Thai and 
Burmese texts as Manosara and Manusara respectively, as well as similar details in 
both texts, such as the size of the Pali letters written on the boundary-wall of the 
world and the position of Manu as a counselor of King Mahasammata (see Chapter 
1). In addition, Winai suggests that the term “Ramanna” (Mon) was mentioned in 
the Thai Thammasat because Pegu, the old capital of the Mon, was then the capital 
of the Burmese kingdom. That was why the revised version of the TSC in 1805 
recorded that the Thai Thammasat was derived from the Mon.57 
Lingat argued against Prince Damrong’s suggestion, asserting that the Hindu 
text was not introduced to the Thais from Theravada Buddhist Burma. Instead, it 
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was either the Pali or the Burmese version. He proposed that the text was brought 
into the land of the Thais before the 16th century and it could be the Mon 
Thammasattham that was translated into Thai. The Thais living in the Chao Phraya 
delta would have been under the Buddhist Dhammasattham of the Mon, or of 
Dvaravati (or Thawarawadi in Thai), said Lingat.58 He also pointed to the Preamble 
of the Thai Thammasat, which stated that the original Thammasat was written by 
Manosara (or Manu in the Hindu text) and established in the Ramanna (Mon) 
country, and in the Ramana (Mon) language. Lingat proposed that the Thais might 
have several versions of the text, but they were later combined together to form the 
existing Thammasat in the TSC.  
Yoneo Ishii and David Engel concur with Lingat’s suggestion. Ishii’s “The Thai 
Thammasat” focuses on examining the structure of the Thammasat, and not its 
origins or religious influence. Although his explanation of the text’s origins is 
unclear, Ishii mentions in his conclusion that the Thai Thammasat was influenced by 
the Mon. Engel also agrees that the Thai text was derived from the Hindu code, but 
not directly, because its contents and principles differed from the Hindu version.59 
Andrew Huxley discusses the origins of the Thai Thammasat by comparing it 
with the Mon and Burmese versions. He examines the text as a historical source and 
demonstrates the influence of Theravada Buddhism from Mon and Burmese 
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traditions in the Thai text.60 Huxley assumes that learned monks of the Mon and 
Burmese influenced the new style of written law and there were many versions of 
the text in the Theravada Buddhist kingdoms of the Mon and Burmese.61 This work 
does not discuss the significance of the text in contributing to the authority of the 
monarch, but it indicates Buddhist influences in the text.  
Besides the origin of the Thammasat, scholars also examined religious 
influences that contributed to the sense of sanctity of the Thammasat. Engel 
discusses briefly how the Thammasat encapsulated the legal philosophy and 
authority of the Thai king. He states a distinction between the Hindu and Buddhist 
versions. The Hindu version emphasizes the divine basis of the rule of kings, while 
the Buddhist version describes the King of Righteousness, the Great Elect.62 Sisak 
Wanliphodom, a Thai scholar, argues that the Thammasat reflects the cosmological 
notions in Theravada Buddhism concerning the connection between the political 
and religious spheres, especially with regard to the authority of the righteous king to 
rule and pass judgment.63  
Channarong Bunnoon’s research on the Thammasat discusses the origins of 
the text, and the Theravada Buddhist influences that endowed the authority and 
legitimacy upon the Thai king. As a scholar of Buddhism, the author explores the 
similarities of legends in the Thammasat and in Buddhist canons, and also analyzes 
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the significance of the Pali texts in the Thammasat. He points out the inclusion of 
Pali texts within the Thammasat, although the translations of Pali texts were 
inaccurate in terms of vocabulary and grammar.64 He proposes that the inclusion 
was primarily aimed at endowing a sense of sacredness upon the Thammasat, since 
the Pali texts act as a legitimating index of Thai law.  
Furthermore, Paphatsaun Thianpanya’s study analyzes the cosmological 
ideas in the Thai Thammasat and argues that they form the ideological basis for the 
Thai monarch’s political and legal authority. The study shows that the Thai king’s 
political authority was based on: 1) the belief in the king as the great elect in 
Buddhism, 2) the Hindu belief that the king was a deity, and 3) the belief in the king 
as a victorious king in local tradition.65  
Most of the scholars of the TSC have discussed the importance of the 
Thammasat in the introduction of their studies. This is because it was the basis and 
foundation of Thai laws. Ishii’s The Thai Thammasat differs from previous works. His 
work scarcely addresses the issue of the text’s religious influences, but focuses more 
on the structure of the Thammasat which contributes to the understanding of the 
structure of the text as the root and the foundational text of traditional Thai law. It 
also provides briefly the main details of each law. 
In this dissertation, the discussion of the Thammasat in Chapter 1 focuses on 
its importance to the king’s lawmaking power and its fundamental principles. The 
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discussion will contribute to the understanding of the significance of the Thammasat 
and the relationship between the political and religious spheres. 
 
5.2.2 Studies on Traditional Thai Society and State  
 
Several scholars have used the TSC as a main source for their works on 
traditional Thai society and state. Specific issues examined by these studies include 
social structure, control of manpower, social hierarchy, the economy, and popular 
beliefs. Akin’s study on the social organization of Thai society in the Early Bangkok 
era indicates the significance of laws on social hierarchy that shaped the social 
structure of society. This work is an outstanding and important work on Thai society. 
It utilizes a wide range of sources, in particular the TSC. The laws on social hierarchy 
and manpower, including the Palatine Law and the Law on Crimes against the State 
are used to explain the social organization of traditional Thai society. However, 
official documents, such as petitions and judgments, which reflect the relationship 
between people in society, seem to have been overlooked.  
Seksan Prasertkun’s article analyzes theories of state, state administration 
and economic issues from the TSC. His main arguments are: 1) an absolute 
monarchy was not the ruling system of the Ayudhyan kingdom; 2) phrai (or 
commoners who registered under the state and individual masters) could possess 
land; and 3) phrai had influence on the economic policies of the state and the 
growth of private trade.66 In this article, Seksan provides a new perspective on the 
economic role of the phrai. According to his proposal, in the Early Bangkok period 
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the phrai had an important role in the trade system, and this was one of reasons 
that led to the end of the phrai system in the early 20th century. This was because 
the old system could not adapt to the growth of capitalism. Seksan’s use of the TSC 
is not extensive. He focuses mostly on a few laws that pertain to his arguments and 
does not deal with the laws in depth. However, his article is useful as it considers the 
state’s attempts in stabilizing the government.  
In addition, some works study cosmological and popular beliefs in the TSC. 
Sisak’s article examines the cosmological ideas evident in the Thammasat, and 
magical beliefs, such as sorcery, incantations, and curses, mentioned in 
Miscellaneous Laws (Laksana Betset) and Trials by Ordeal (Laksana Phisut). This 
article also shows that the state also applied spiritual beliefs in judicial procedures, 
such as forcing prisoners to make oaths to deities and spirits.  
Moreover, a few works examine the influences of Buddhism and 
supernatural beliefs visible in Thai laws regarding methods of punishment in Phra 
Aiyakan Kabotsuek (The Law on Rebellion and War). The theses by Manisa Piyasink 
and Montri Ngoensawat, in history and law respectively, and Siriporn Dabphet’s 
article, make the similar argument that religious and supernatural beliefs influenced 
methods of punishment in the Kabotsuek. Those methods were mentioned in the 
Tripitaka as punishments for sinners in hell. Severe punishments mentioned in the 
laws were meant to threaten, deter, or warn the people against committing crimes. 
They highlight that Thai laws demonstrate the dominant status of the king by 
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providing for his security.67 Siriporn’s work also analyzes the religious influences in 
the law texts that were applied to imbue the laws with a sense of sacredness. It 
proposes that the law reflects the significance of the king in accordance with 
conceptions of kingship.  
 
5.2.3 Studies on Specific Laws in the TSC  
 
The period from 2002 to 2008 saw an increasing number of contributions on 
the TSC. These works had been produced under the research project titled The 
Three Seals Laws: Thai Legal Code as a World Heritage, with the support of the 
Thailand Research Fund (TRF). The research project, headed by Dr. Winai 
Pongsipian, appointed a Senior Research Scholar by the TRF, mobilized 17 young 
researchers in different fields of study, such as history, literature, and law. They 
worked under 10 senior advisers in various areas of specialization, such as Professor 
Prasert Na Nagara, a leading scholar of Sukhothai history and etymology.  
In each research work, there were three main focuses in the study of a 
particular law: the significance of the law text, a content analysis of the text, and 
detailed explanations of the ancient terms and notions in the text. From 2002 to 
2005, there were about 30 research papers produced by the research project. 
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Almost all the laws in the TSC were researched, including the Thammasat,68 the Law 
on the Organization and Control of Manpower,69 the Laws on the Royal, Civil, 
Military and Provincial Hierarchies,70 the Laws on Judicial Procedure,71 and the 
Sangha Laws.72  
This section will review only the studies related to this dissertation – the 
legal foundation of state stability. There are few existing studies of traditional Thai 
law, in particular studies in English, which examine how royal and state stability 
were established through laws. Studies written in Thai are scarce. One is Siriporn’s 
research on the Kabotsuek. Other than examining the laws in thorough detail, this 
work explores the historical events that precipitated and triggered the use of the 
Laws. The article’s discussion is limited to only a particular law, the Kabotsuek. The 
analysis is hence incomplete and only emphasizes examples from the Ayudhyan era. 
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This dissertation goes further to examine all laws concerning state and royal 
authority across both the Ayudhyan and the Early Bangkok periods.  
Two other research papers on the laws on royal and state stability exist. The 
first is Pakdikul Rattana’s study of the Ayaluang (The Law on Crimes against the 
State). It proposes that this law institutes regulations concerning state affairs, social 
order, and the safety of the people.73 This work explains mainly the contents of the 
law, but fails to address the connection between the creation and enforcement of 
the law and historical events. However, the author provides some basic contextual 
information in connection with contents of the law, such as royal monopoly and 
taxation. In addition, a research article entitled “The Law on Civil Offences” analyzes 
the state’s attempts to resolve disputes, such as those pertaining to persecution, 
intimidation, and bodily injury between individuals, state officials and commoners.74 
This research also goes on to analyze the contents of the law and ancient terms. 
There is however little information about how the law was used in practice. 
These three existing works analyze the importance and contents of the law 
texts as well as explain ancient terms and ideas contained in the laws. The works 
also discuss the laws’ significance for the maintenance of state and monarchical 
authority. The study of the three laws on national security under the research 
project TSC was the first time that the three laws were individually studied in depth. 
However, each piece of research studied only one law. Due to the narrow focus of 
the studies, they do not connect the laws they each studied to a more 
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comprehensive analysis of the use of laws to maintain the social and political 
stability of the Thai state.  
Furthermore, the last two works focus mainly on the contents of the laws. 
Providing meaning of ancient terms and explaining in-depth the contents of the laws 
do help readers understand them better. However, it is inadequate to examine a 
particular law without connecting it to other laws and the studies may not be 
comprehensive and thorough. Thus, this dissertation tries to have conversations in a 
new direction by studying all laws pertaining to state and royal authority, and the 
state’s role in laying the legal foundation for these during the Early Bangkok period. 
Examples from earlier periods will be examined to study the development of the 
laws. It also aims to examine the effectiveness of law enforcement. Historical events 
concerning laws on internal security and the connections between the laws will also 
be dealt with.  
In addition, there are studies on the Palatine Law. Some studies on it focus 
on the significance of the institution of the monarchy in relation to the divinity of 
the monarch. Winai Pongsipian’s article analyzes the cosmological concepts and 
ideas of the Thai king’s divinity in the Palatine Law.75 Woraporn Poopongpan’s two 
works examine the monarchy in the Palatine Law.76 The first presents an analysis of 
the Palatine Law in relation to stories of Siamese court life, cosmological ideas, the 
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king’s authority, as well as his divinity and charisma. The latter analyzes the Palatine 
Law and its reflection of Thai history from the Ayudhyan period up to 1805. The 
study shows that the Palatine Law most clearly illuminates three major topics. The 
first is the divinity or sacred status of the king as Buddha and a deity. The second 
concerns royal customs and ceremonies, including court protocol, all of which 
served to emphasize the king’s exalted status. The last pertains to the relationship 
between the king and his courtiers, which included issues of royal hierarchy, the 
relationship between the king and officials, and with the women of the Inner Court, 
as well as the duties of the courtiers towards the monarch.  
The studies of both scholars provide detailed analyses of the Palatine Law, 
the importance of the monarchy, the cosmological and religious conceptions of 
kingship in the law text, and measures to secure the king and maintain royal 
prestige. Winai and Woraporn reach a similar conclusion about the Palatine Law and 
other laws on royal and state authority. They propose that these laws were 
authentic Thai laws that were derived from, and reflected, Thai society and customs. 
This is because these laws were not found either in the Hindu Dharmsastra, the 
textual “ancestor” of the Thammasat, or in other versions of Burmese and Mon 
texts.  
Winai’s article does not discuss the Palatine Law in detail. Instead, his main 
focus was to use the Law and other ancient literature to discuss the status, authority 
and duties of the Thai King. Conversely, Woraporn’s study focuses on the Palatine 
Law and the monarchy. However, the studies do not consider other laws on royal 
and state stability. This dissertation will expand these existing studies by exploring 
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all laws on royal and state authority and examining historical contexts that 
influenced the enactment of the law.  
 
 
5.3 Studies of the History of the Early Bangkok Era  
 
 
The Bangkok era began in 1782 when Rama I established the Chakri dynasty 
in Bangkok. The early years of the Bangkok period were greatly unstable, with the 
new kingdom facing a range of internal and external problems concerning national 
security, economy and politics. Besides the risk of war with its strong neighbor, 
Burma, the Thais were also worried about the unstable political situation during the 
transition from the previous kingdom, Thonburi, to Bangkok. The numerous 
rebellions throughout the Ayudhya period also influenced the Chakri rulers, leading 
them to devote much attention to judicial measures taken to ensure their own 
stability and security. This was attempted through passing strict laws which 
sanctioned violent punishments to reinforce the monarchy’s power and achieve 
peace in the realm.  
Taking this unstable situation in the Early Bangkok period as a focal point, 
this dissertation examines questions of the importance of law and kingship in state 
formation, the relationship between law and religion, as well as the use of law. This 
work studies how Thai rulers of the Early Bangkok era established and maintained 
their authority through laws.  
The Early Bangkok era is generally understood to include the reigns of the 
first three monarchs who ruled from 1782 to 1851. Historical studies concerning the 
Thai monarchy and the state in the Early Bangkok period are less numerous, 
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especially texts in English. Earlier studies that focus on the history of each reign 
include works by Walter Vella and Klaus Wenk about the reigns of Rama III and 
Rama I respectively.77 Using the “king and battles” approach to history, these works 
discuss only royal biographies and accounts of state matters. They lack analytical 
depth and did not consider traditional Thai law as their sources.  
Another work on Rama I is David Wyatt’s article which argues that Rama I 
legitimized his authority in a rational and subtle way.78 Wyatt terms Rama I’s 
innovations “the subtle revolution” because the king changed old traditions and 
created new practices, such as giving rational explanations for his actions, even 
though none of the institutions or formal structures were changed. Primary and 
important sources examined in this work include traditional Thai law, a religious 
historical writing written in the First Reign, and other contemporary records.  
Lorraine Gesick too examines the nature of Thai kingship, the relationship 
between the Thai court and its peripheries and neighbor states in the late 18th to 
early 19th-century Thailand.79 Her work is highly significant in that it presents the 
significance and relevance of religious concepts of kingship and royal authority. 
However, the author over-emphasizes the Buddhist notions of kingship in discussing 
the successful and unsuccessful affairs of the monarchs, while other possible 
explanations seem to be overlooked.  
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One outstanding book on the Early Bangkok era is Nidhi Eoseewong’s Pen & 
Sail, which analyzes changes in Thai society then. Nidhi proposes that these changes 
were influenced by the expansion of overseas and internal trade. Changes included 
that in values, beliefs, artistic tastes, and the worldview of the upper class. Nidhi 
argues that the changes in this era led to the birth of a new culture called 
watthanatham kadumphi or bourgeois culture.80 This work, written in 1980s, is a 
pioneering work in Thai studies that uses literature as a main source to examine 
societal and cultural changes.  
Achara Kanchanomai’s thesis studies the revival of Buddhism in the Early 
Bangkok period. It shows the leading role of the state in the revival of religious texts, 
the organization of the Sangha administration, monastic studies, as well as the 
control and punishment of monks. The author argues that the leading role of the 
state was not good for the Sangha as the administrative structure of the Sangha 
became similar to that of the state. Although the hierarchical administration 
supported the rule of the Sangha, giving ranks to the monks ran contrary to 
Buddhist teachings that preached contentment and the rejection of earthly 
desires.81 
Furthermore, Saichon Sattayanurak, a scholar of Thai intellectual history, 
studies the Buddhist influences and political notions of Rama I.82 Similar to Wyatt’s 
views, Saichon proposes that Rama I legitimized his authority and built the 
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relationship between the monarchy and society through his rationalistic emphasis 
on the humanism of Buddhism. According to Saichon, Rama I emphasized the 
humanism of Buddhism as the unifying principle of Thai society. This was because in 
the past, people had different religious practices and beliefs, and also blended 
Buddhism with magical practices. The Bangkok elites hence stressed and built the 
rationality of Buddhism as the principle of a new society, to decrease the people’s 
belief in superstitions, especially in phumibun or holy men, and to inculcate an 
accurate knowledge of Buddhism in monks.83 However, Saichon points out that the 
Bangkok ruling class took advantage of the religious concept of kingship, even as 
they focused more on the humanistic aspects of Buddhism.  
Saichon’s study provides an interesting perspective on the relationship 
between Buddhist and political notions in the First Reign. However, the author’s 
premises raise some questions. For instance, she proposes that members of the 
Bangkok ruling class emphasized the rationality of Buddhism as the principle of 
society to unite people and to organize society; the king referred to Buddhist 
doctrines in his laws to prevent the people’s violations of the law. The author 
broadly uses the term “chonchannam” or “ruling class” in her discussion, even 
though her sources – the laws of Rama I, contemporary writings by a senior monk, 
and the Royal Chronicle of the First Reign – make no reference to the perspectives 
of the ruling elites.84 Hence, there remain questions of the real extent to which 
these rationalist beliefs were prevalent among the elite.  
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There are few studies on the Early Bangkok period in Thai or English and 
most of the Thai historians writing on this period have focused on royal affairs and 
political, social, economic, and cultural issues, but not legal history. Almost all of 
them used royal and foreign records as their main sources. Unlike these previous 
studies, this dissertation studies the state’s use of law in building and maintaining its 
stability, using Thai legal texts as a prism to look into Thai history. 
 
6. Sources and Scope of the Study  
 
 
The scarcity of sources for the study of the Early Bangkok era is a challenge 
that has made the study of this period, be it by Thai or Western scholars, unpopular. 
Nevertheless, this dissertation will deal with the challenge. Besides the TSC, other 
primary sources used in this dissertation include historical records and foreign 
sources both from the Ayudhyan and the Early Bangkok periods. Foreign sources for 
the Ayudhyan period include the published records of Jeremias van Vliet, a Dutch 
representative in the 17th century, and the records of foreign missionaries, envoys, 
and travelers.  
Primary sources for the Early Bangkok period include inscriptions from the 
first three reigns. These inscriptions provide accounts of cases that reflect the social 
order and social conditions of the time. Some cases relate to the state’s authority 
and dignity. Many details in these unpublished inscriptions are not mentioned in the 
Royal Chronicles of the Early Bangkok era and almost all details are rarely provided 
and seldom used in previous studies either in Thai or in English. Other unpublished 
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documents, such as the official documents of ministers, pleadings of plaintiffs, and 
judgments, are also utilized. This work will examine these archival documents. The 
in-depth research of these sources in this study may add new historical insights to 
our knowledge and understanding of Thai history in the Early Bangkok period. 
The Early Bangkok period was the time of the establishment of a new Thai 
kingdom, Rattanakosin, or simply called the Bangkok kingdom. Rama I of Bangkok (r. 
1782 – 1809) established the Chakri dynasty in 1782, announced Bangkok as the 
capital, and claimed to be the successor of the Ayudhya kingdom (1350 – 1767). The 
Early Bangkok era was the time of the revival and reorganization of all socio-political 
aspects and institutions of society after the fall of Ayudhya. It was also a period of 
transition and rationalization. Buddhism and religious practices were revised to 
make them more rational. The law code was revised and new laws were issued. An 
interesting point is that the kings of the Early Bangkok era made it a point to explain 
their rationale for their legislation, which was unprecedented. These points will be 
discussed in subsequent chapters.  
Also, law enforcement in the Early Bangkok period can be studied to analyze 
Bangkok’s control over outlying regions before the period of centralization in the 
late 19th century. In the first reign of the Bangkok period, Bangkok’s control over 
the south, the north, and northeast was not solid. Bangkok’s power was strong 
specifically in Bangkok, surrounding cities in the central region, and significant cities 
in the south, such as Nakhon Sithammarat, and in the lower north, such as 
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Pitsanulok. On the contrary, its control in the north and northeast, whose rulers 
were Yuan (northern Thai) and Lao, was weak85.  
However, historical sources in the Third Reign show that at that time, cities 
in the northeastern region were under Bangkok’s authority. The strengthening of 
Bangkok’s authority in this region arose from the rebellion of Chao Anouvong of 
Vientiane from 1826 to 1828, Bangkok’s expansion of authority into Laos and 
Cambodia, and the Siamese-Vietnamese war of 1833 to 1847. In the north, there 
was evidence that in the late years of Rama III’s reign, Bangkok controlled Chiang 
Mai, Lamphum, and Lampang. Men in these cities were conscripted and joined 
Siamese troops in the Siamese-Chieng Tung war of 1849. The study of legal 
transformation will help us to understand changes in the relationship between 
Bangkok and the provinces, and the relationship or competition of power between 
Bangkok and neighboring states. For example, the powerful contest between 
Bangkok and other states, especially wars with Vietnam and Chieng Tung, led to the 
increasing of Bangkok’s strictness in the control and conscription of manpower and 
taxation in the north and northeastern regions, a development clearly reflected in 
the laws. 
This research will delimit its scope within some crucial points. Firstly, it will 
focus on particular issues of Thai history that relate to the theme of the study – the 
establishment of state stability. Other issues and case studies are discussed in lesser 
detail. Secondly, the details of royal affairs are not central to this study. However, 
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this research will provide some examples of how the state used laws to establish or 
maintain stability.  
Other than the introductory and concluding chapters, this dissertation 
consists of seven main chapters. Chapter 1 discusses notions in traditional Thai law 
and the Buddhist conceptions of kingship which contributed to the authority of the 
Thai king. Chapter 2 examines King Rama I’s establishment of authority, especially 
through law, and analyzes the significance of law in the creation and maintenance of 
his authority. The discussion demonstrates the relationship between religion and 
the legitimization of monarchical power in traditional Thai politics.  
Chapter 3 begins by examining the laws on royal authority, then explores 
factors that impacted the stability of royal authority, and discusses examples from 
the Ayudhyan and Bangkok periods. Chapter 4 discusses the laws and offences 
against the stability of the state. Chapter 5 discusses the laws and offences relating 
to security and social order, such as offences concerning the illicit opium trade and 
uprisings by Chinese secret societies. It analyses the state’s responses to the cases 
through promulgating new laws.  
Chapter 6 examines legal measures to increase the effectiveness in the 
control of manpower and other problems concerning manpower, such as the 
misappropriation and escape of manpower. Chapter 7, analyses the state’s 
establishment of authority over the Sangha through monastic laws.  
 
______________________________ 
CHAPTER 1   
ORIGINS OF MONARCHICAL 
AND LEGAL AUTHORITY IN THAI TRADITION 
 
In pre-modern Siam, Theravada Buddhism provided legitimacy and legal 
authority to the kings. Buddhism had interacted with the political order of the day 
since the early times of Buddhism. As Craig Reynolds observes, Theravada Buddhist 
conceptions of sovereignty did not really differentiate between “political leadership” 
and “charismatic authority.”1 This is illustrated by the story of Emperor Asoka the 
Great (304 – 232 BCE) of the Maurya Empire, considered the first dharmaraja (king 
of righteousness), whose reputation and charismatic authority spread through the 
patronage of Buddhism and provided the basis for his leadership.2 
This chapter examines the interaction between religious conceptions of 
kingship and the legal authority of the rulers in Thai tradition. The notion of power 
and the relationship between religion and state in Southeast Asia have been 
discussed by many scholars, as mentioned in the Introduction. Earlier scholars 
studied the influence of Theravada Buddhism and the Sangha’s role in pre-modern 
Thailand. Some important works are Stanley L. Tambiah’s World Conqueror and 
World Renouncer, Yoneo Ishii’s Sangha, State, and Society: Thai Buddhism in History, 
and Craig Reynolds’s “The Buddhist Monkhood in Nineteenth-Century Thailand”.3  
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Tambiah’s work contributes to our understanding of the Buddhist influence 
of kingship in Siam, in which the king was regarded as the dharmaraja. However, 
Hinduism also influenced the sacred authority of the Thai king. Tambiah’s 
examination of the links between the ecclesiastical and political hierarchies as well 
as between ruling elites and prominent monks shows the significance of the Sangha 
and Buddhism in the support of royal authority.  
The relationship between the Sangha and the state, mentioned in Ishii’s 
work, reveals a primary understanding of the socio-political significance of 
Buddhism in Thailand and the kings’ religious patronage. Ishii’s discussion of the 
influence of the Thammasat to the dhamaraja concept provides a better 
understanding of the genesis of Thai kings’ authority and the sense of sanctity of 
traditional Thai law. Reynolds’s work is useful as it provides a historical background 
of the importance of Buddhism in Thai politics, talks about socio-political conditions 
in the 19th century that contributed to the attempt to revive the Sangha in the Early 
Bangkok era, and discusses the Sangha reformation through the establishment of a 
new sect, the Thammayut, in the mid-19th century.  
These three works are important and useful for this dissertation as this 
dissertation also examines the influence of Theravada Buddhism to conceptions of 
kingship in Thai tradition and the relationship between Buddhism and the legitimacy 
of Thai kings. However, this work differs from previous scholarship as it focuses 
mainly on Buddhist and Hindu notions in traditional Thai law and the origins of the 
Thai monarchs’ legal authority. It also examines how these were influenced by 
Buddhist conceptions of kingship. Moreover, this work will discuss the Sangha and 
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laws which are mentioned partly in Reynolds’s work. However, the discussion in this 
study will go beyond previous works as it examines all Sangha laws and contents of 
laws to analyze the state’s control and revival of the Sangha through Sangha laws. It 
will also demonstrate the result of the enforcement of the Sangha laws. 
 
1.1 Notions in Traditional Thai Law  
 
Law is a body of rules of conduct. Laws, in Max Weber’s view, are “physical 
or psychic sanctions aimed to compel conformity or to punish disobedience, and 
applied by a group of men especially empowered to carry out this function.”4 The 
establishment and effective application of laws have historically remained the 
significant aims of states and rulers, an essential apparatus to bring order and 
stability to the society and state. In this dissertation, I treat law as a vital state tool in 
establishing and controlling state authority. This section discusses notions in 
traditional Thai law that contributed authority to the law and the ruler. 
 Traditional Thai law was derived from Indian law, like other cultures in 
Southeast Asia, such as Burma, Cambodia and Java.5 It was a structured code based 
on Theravada Buddhist influences.6 The traditional laws of these cultures shared the 
same cosmological bases and Hindu origins. The similarities included its cosmic 
origins, borrowing the name of the Hindu Dharmasastra and the 18 items of laws, 
and the use of Sanskrit terms. However, Thai law increased the items of law from 18 
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to 29 (see 1.2.2). Also, similar to the laws of the Burmese, Mon, and Lao, the origin 
of traditional Thai law was linked with the Theravada Buddhist legendary King 
Mahasammata, the King of Righteousness (dharmaraja) mentioned in the Tripitaka. 
It should be emphasized that traditional Thai law was regarded as a sacred 
text. This created and enhanced the authority of the law and the ruler. Brague’s The 
Law of God proposes that law itself produced a belief in its own sacredness; linking 
law with religion increased the sense of sanctity towards the law and towards the 
holder of political power, the king, and aided in his lawmaking.7 This benefited the 
enforcement and establishment of state authority.8 The sacredness of Thai law was 
based on its supposed cosmic and Hindu origins, its connections with Buddhist 
legends, and Buddhist teachings provided in the law. In addition, the Siamese rulers 
actively endowed the law with a sense of sacredness. Access to the law texts was 
limited to the king, royalty, and officials in charge of judicial duty. Commoners could 
not access the texts. The copying of law was disallowed. When the state issued new 
laws, officials read them out to villagers. In the Early Bangkok period, after the 
revision of the law in 1805, the state made three copies of the law code. They were 
kept at the royal library, the king’s chamber, and the office of judicial officials. These 
practices created and reaffirmed a sense of sacredness of Thai law. Other than this 
purpose, the state also wanted to prevent the misuse of law by unfaithful people.  
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In societies that embraced Theravada Buddhism, the religion was a strong 
influence on the law. Buddhist ethics were applied in their laws to provide justice 
and order. Moral values, such as adhering to justice and honesty, became essential 
qualities of judges. In the Buddhist conception of kingship, the king’s legitimacy 
came from his great merit and righteousness. Section 1.2.2 discusses clearly the 
close relationship between merit and leadership in Thai tradition. They show the 
king’s awareness that the basis of his political and legal power relied on moral 
justification.  
In addition, other parts of the Three Seals Code, such as the Lak Inthaphat 
(the instructions of the god Indra), a sermon on the forms of judicial bias, and the 
Law on Judges and the Delivery of Justice, use explicit Buddhist teachings as the 
basis for rulers’ and judges’ conduct as well as for prescribed punishments. For 
instance, judges needed to adhere to the Five and Eight Buddhist Precepts9 and 
avoid the four prejudices or the “four wrong courses”, namely, being biased because 
of love, rage, fear, fascination – biases that would unfairly benefit or harm litigants. 
These instructions were meant to ensure that judges avoided greed and bias in 
administrating justice. The Law on Judges prescribes that the violation of these 
instructions constitutes a capital offence, which one could not redeem oneself from. 
Even if the offender was the king, possession of great merit would not conceal or 
wipe off this capital offence. If the transgressor was a judge, he would become a 
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hungry ghost after death. Such an offender would be guilty of an offence worse than 
“killing a thousand guiltless women” or “murdering a hundred Brahmans”.10  
Moreover, traditional Thai law displays the belief in the law of karma and 
the beliefs in sin and punishments that extend beyond a human life. The law of 
karma is the law of actions and consequences, of reward and retribution according 
to all deeds, whether in the present life, in the next life, or in lives ahead. According 
to the laws, the most severe crimes and the worst sins include patricide, matricide, 
murdering a monk, and destroying Buddhist symbols. Besides receiving physical 
punishment, the laws mention that the fate of the sinner would be to suffer a worse 
life in his next life; he could end up entering the womb of an animal, receive severe 
punishments in hell and being a hungry ghost.11 This belief is also described in the 
Hindu Dharmasastra.12 
In addition, there were 21 punishments that were derived from Buddhist 
sutras and followed the Pali texts of these sutras word by word. The punishments 
are extremely severe, such as pouring hot oil over offenders from head to toe, 
pouring salt on wounds, and 11 common punishments, such as torture, whipping, 
and execution. It is possible that these severe punishments were not really used 
because the methods were extremely cruel. They could have been no more than 
psychological tactics or strategies to scare Buddhists who regularly saw the murals 
of Buddhist Jataka at temples and were familiar with stories in Buddhist scriptures 
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that depicted such punishment. Contemporary records do not mention these 
methods of punishment. Therefore, it can be deduced that the inclusion of those 
religious teachings in the laws was to establish the sense of sacredness of the laws 
and to create fear.  
The belief in the supernatural was also applied to Thai law, to strengthen the 
sense of sacredness, and also to the conduct of judicial procedures. During a trial, 
there were methods of ordeal that were based on supernatural and religious beliefs. 
Laksana Phisut (the Law on Trials by Ordeal) requires litigants to make an oath to 
Lord Buddha, deities, the God of Death, and spirits to prove their sincerity. For 
instance, before taking on an ordeal such as fire walking, litigants took the oath by 
asking ghosts and angels to be witnesses of their sincerity and to protect them. 
During interrogations, a curse and an oath were commonly used as means to 
persuade or force a suspect to tell the truth and to keep his promise. Judges were 
also proved their integrity through oaths.  
According to features of traditional Thai law mentioned above, it can be 
argued that traditional Thai law displays some analogous features with a variation of 
natural law theory, in which law and morality are one, and an eternal and universal 
law conferred by a deity or higher power is comprehended through revelation or the 
exercise of reason.13 The root of traditional Thai law, the Thammasat, originated 
from the Hindu Dharmasastra, and was linked with Buddhist legends mentioned in 
the Tripitaka. Linking the origins of the Thai Thammasat to the Hindu Dharmasastra 
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and Buddhist legends imbued the text with authority. Laws that opposed the 
Thammasat would be hence considered invalid.  
 
1.2 Buddhist Conceptions of Kingship and the King’s Legal Authority  
 
 
The dharmaraja framework is a widely accepted idea of kingship among Thai 
monarchs – even in the present day – and has been used politically and culturally 
throughout all Thai kingdoms. This section discusses three Buddhist conceptions of 
kingship, and focuses in particular on the relationship between Buddhist kingship 
and the legal authority of the Thai monarch. It also examines the two ancient texts, 
Traiphumikatha and Thammasat, which stabilized and spread the notions of the 
morality and legal authority of the Thai king.  
It should be noted that different scholars have conceptualized different 
understandings of the dharmaraja kingship. Some works have classified the figures 
of the Thai king within dharmaraja and devaraja frameworks, as seen in previous 
studies, especially studies in Thai. In most Thai texts, the traditional conceptions of 
Thai kingship can generally be classified into three aspects: paternalistic kingship 
with the king as a father figure (believed to be characteristic of the Sukhothai 
period), the devaraja framework from Khmer Angkor which gave the king demi-god 
status, and the dharmaraja concept. A significant and primary study of Thai 
interpretations of kingship which covers these three aspects is Prince Dhani’s “The 
Old Siamese Conception of the Monarchy”. This explanation has been supported by 
subsequent writings of famous and royalist scholars, such as M.R. Kukrit Pramoj’s 
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Sathaban Phramahakasat and M.R. Thongnoi Thongyai’s “The Role of the Monarchy 
in Modern Thailand”.14 
Some foreign scholars, for example, Peter Skilling in his work titled “King, 
Sangha, and Brahmans…”, have divided figures of the king into the dharmaraja and 
devaraja conceptions of kingship. In his classification of the dharamaraja kingship, 
the king was seen as bodhisattva,15 Buddha, and cakravartin.16 Skilling’s typology is 
derived from the royal titles of the kings described in various sources, such as 
Sukhothai inscriptions, royal eulogies, chronicles, and the TSC.17 However, this 
dissertation differs from these previous studies. It focuses only on the dharmaraja 
kingship and categorizes it into three facets: the king as King Mahasammata, 
cakravartin, and bodhisattva.18 It should be noted that Skilling does not mention the 
king as Mahasammata, though it is one of the conceptions of Thai kingship, and this 
name had also been used in the royal titles of Thai kings (such as King Mongkut [r. 
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 Prince Dhani Nivat, “The Old Siamese Conception of the Monarchy”, in Collected Articles 
(Bangkok: The Siam Society, 1969), 91-104; M.R. Kukrit Pramoj, Sathaban Phramahakasat (The 
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are mainly working on the assumption that because Ayudhyan kingship was influenced by 
Angkor, thus Ayudhya kingship must have included the notion of devaraja. In fact, there is 




1851-68]), or in referring to some Thai kings in other documents such as in 
chronicles and eulogies.  
 
1.2.1 Three Aspects of the Dharmaraja Kingship  
 
According to the dharmaraja framework, the Thai king is broadly regarded 
as King Mahasammata (in Thai: Mahasommutirat), cakravartin (in Thai: 
chakkraphatdirat), and bodhisattva (in Thai: phothisat). These three conceptions of 
kingship are broadly similar and share the same belief, that is, the ruler’s 
accumulation of great merit makes him worthy of the crown. However, there are 
some differences among these three concepts.  
The first concept of dharmaraja is the king as “Mahasammata”, which 
means the “Great Elected”. A Buddhist sutra, Agganna sutra, tells the origin of 
Mahasammata, regarded as the first king of the present Buddhist world. According 
to the sutra, a great man resolved the disorder and conflict between people in 
society. The people hence chose him to be their leader to perform the functions of a 
judge and of an administrator. He was called Mahasammata. Mahasammata 
possessed great merit and justice. He was praised as the King of Righteousness, who 
provided a code of law and owned the authority in judgment.19  
In accordance with Buddhist ideology, the Thai monarchs are regarded as 
the successors of King Mahasammata and inherited the legal authority and great 
merit of Mahasammata. The king is the supreme judge in his dominion. His 
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 Maha Makut Rajwitthayalai, Phra Sutra lae phra atthakhatha (Buddhist Sutra and 
Commentary) (Bangkok: Maha Makut Rajwitthayalai, 1988), 145–161. 
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legitimacy comes from accumulated merit in his past life, which makes him worthy 
to be the king in the present life. He is a benevolent king, and uses his great virtue in 
the creation of social justice and the support of Buddhism. Because of his great 
merit, the king is considered to maintain the relationships both between men and 
between men and the cosmos.20 
The second concept is based on the Buddhist cosmological conception that 
the king is a “cakravatin” or a “Universal Monarch”. This term means a ruler who 
sets rolling the wheel of dharma and rules over the world through kingly virtues21; 
the alternative meaning comes from a military perspective, in which a ruler proves 
his power through warfare.22 In Buddhist ideas, the cakravatin, Lord Buddha, and 
the bodhisattva are regarded almost equally because their great qualities are rare in 
the real world.23 
The cakravatin conception stresses the position of the king at the apex of 
authority, and it also stresses the great merit of the Buddhist king who bestowed 
dharma (righteousness and justice) to all inhabitants in his kingdom and to all lords 
of other kingdoms. In this conception, the authority of a Universal Monarch spread 
through his virtue; a physically and clearly demarcated territory was not necessary. 
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 Wyatt, “Subtle Revolution”, 10. 
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 Tambiah, Buddhist Conception, 1; J. Gonda, Ancient Indian Kingship from the Religious Point of 
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This concept of kingship came to influence relations among traditional states in 
mainland Southeast Asia and shaped characteristic and administrative forms of the 
state.24 It was linked with an idea of mandala, or monthon in Thai, which was 
applied in the organization of state administration, layout of palaces and monastic 
architectures, as well as the relationship between a capital and its peripheries.25 The 
relationship between states was a tributary relationship. Because of virtuous 
qualities of the Universal King, all lords of other kingdoms accepted his authority 
and virtue. They thus presented him tribute and respect. O. W. Wolters proposes 
that this concept dealt considerably with the personal relationship between the 
Universal King and lords of other states. This relationship was unstable because 
vassal states usually sought protection from other strong states as well.26 
The Universal Monarch concept probably became popular among Thai rulers 
since the time of the Sukhothai kingdom. Evidence of the existence and the spread 
of this idea can be found in numerous passages in literature, especially the 
following: a cosmological writing, the Triphummikatha (Discourse on the Three 
Worlds); inscriptions; in the title of kings such as the royal title of King Maha 
Chakkraphat of Ayudhya (r. 1548 – 1568); in rituals and customs such as the 
coronation ritual;27 and in cosmologically-linked architecture such as palaces and 
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 Heine-Geldern, “Conceptions”, 15–30; Traiphummikatha, Phraratchaniphon Phraya Lithai 
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temples, where the palace was compared to Mount Meru, the center of the 
universe and the residence of the god Indra.28 
The third conception of Buddhist kingship is the king as the bodhisattva. In 
Theravada Buddhism, the Pali canon describes the bodhisattva as a person who is in 
the cycle of birth and death and has been accumulating merit to become 
enlightened in the future. The term “bodhisattva” is used in Pali canons to refer to 
Lord Buddha himself, both in his past lives and in the life before he attained 
enlightenment. According to the Thotsachat, the legends of Lord Buddha’s 10 
previous lives in Buddhist Jataka, Lord Buddha had been born 10 times, either in 
human or animal form, to gain merit before his enlightenment. The Jataka calls 
these 10 forms of Lord Buddha’s past lives as the bodhisattva. 
In Thailand, the most famous story of the bodhisattva is the legend of 
Vessantara (in Thai: Vessandorn). Vessantara is the last past life of the bodhisattva 
who later became Lord Buddha. In this life, Vessantara performed the virtue of 
perfect charity by giving away all his possessions, including his wife and children. 
The Vessantara Jataka became popular in Thai society when King Trailok of Ayudhya 
(r. 1448 – 1488) ordered the composition of a narrative in Thai in 1482 called 
Mahachat Khamluang (The Great Birth Sermon). The Thais believed that listening to 
this Verse on the Buddhist holy day would increase their merit. This belief made the 
Vessantara Jataka the most famous Jataka, and the conception of the king as the 
bodhisattva became well accepted in society.  
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Just as the bodhisattva accumulated, sustained, and promoted his merit, the 
essential duties of Thai kings include patronizing Buddhism, providing Buddhist 
teachings, ruling with righteousness, and bringing welfare to the populace. In 
addition, there is the belief that the king is full of virtue (or bunbarami in Thai). 
There are two different meanings of “bunbarami”. The first is referred as karma 
(action) or Buddhist merit. In the Buddhist concept of karma, a man becomes king 
because of his utmost merit in his previous life, which is superior to others. 
Buddhism is a significant factor contributing to the king’s charisma. A righteous king 
is regarded as the bodhisattva who holds great merit. The second is understood as 
charisma which inspires people’s respect and admiration, including fear. This 
charisma can be held by the kings and also by monks and political leaders. 
Historical sources show that it was indeed the Thai king’s privilege to be 
conceived as the bodhisattva. As a record of van Vliet, a Dutch East India Company 
(VOC) representative, King Songtham (r. 1611 – 1628) was praised as the 
bodhisattva because of his integrity, his care for the people’s well-being and his 
support of good people and Buddhism; in the testimony of the Ayudhyan people, 
they considered King Songtham as the dharmaraja because of his virtuous qualities 
and his proficiency in Buddhism.29 In the prologue of the laws enacted by Rama I, 
the king proclaimed his aim of reaching phra phutthiphum phothiyan, or “to become 
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 Jeremias van Vliet, Van Vliet’s Siam, trans. and eds. Chris Baker, Dhiravat Na Pombejra, Alfons 
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fully enlightened”.30 These examples show that Buddhist virtues were a source for 
demonstrating the legitimacy and legal authority of Thai kings.  
The three conceptions of Buddhist kingship are similar and interlinked. They 
emphasize the king’s virtuous authority. Royal legitimacy is linked with his merit. 
The king’s lack of righteousness lessens his legitimacy. Buddhism enhanced the 
king’s authority to punish wrongdoers and wield punishments mentioned in the law. 
In Buddhist perspectives, kings have the essential duty of carrying out punishment, 
because the king was chosen to perform the duties of administration, maintenance 
of justice and the prevention of all immoralities that may occur in society.31 The king 
must bring dharma or justice to society and punishment is a method to preserve 
justice and maintain social order.  
The application of Buddhist principles and moral values were most 
important for the king’s authority. As David K. Wyatt states, “the concept of 
devaraja was modified to make the king the embodiment of the Law, while the reign 
of Buddhist moral principles ensured that he should be measured against the 
Law”.32 The king’s commands without virtuous purposes would not be acceptable; 
the real power of the ruler to achieve success was based on dharma or virtue.33  
These ideas also contributed to the acceptance of usurpation in traditional 
Thai politics as a way of selecting a new ruler. The right of usurpers to rule was 
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supported by their claims of merit and the lack of righteousness of the ruler they 
replaced. 
 
1.2.2 The Significance of the Traiphum and Thammasat to the King’s Legal 
Authority  
 
The concept of the relationship between the king’s merit and his legitimacy 
is underlined and repeated throughout the Traiphum and the Thammasat. The 
Traiphum (literally “three worlds”) is best known in Thai as Traiphum phraruang 
(Three Worlds according to King Ruang) or the Triphummikatha (Discourse on the 
Three Worlds). It is a cosmological text in Theravada Buddhism, and is believed to be 
composed by King Lithai of Sukhothai (r. 1347 – 1368 or 1374). The Thammasat is a 
codification of the fundamental principles of traditional Thai law. These two works 
provide political and legal influences that strengthen the authority of the Thai 
monarchy.  
The Traiphum is the cosmological text that deals with the Three Worlds, 
which are divided into 31 realms, and the diverse beings staying in these realms. 
These diverse beings and their places are classified by their merit, such as ghosts in 
the lowest level of hell, as well as deities and Brahmins in different levels of 
heaven.34 Religiously, the Traiphum expresses and emphasizes the Siamese’s 
Buddhist perspective of the existence of various beings such as ghosts, demons, and 
deities. Siamese Buddhists were taught, via this text and murals portrayed on 
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monastery walls, that their making of merit helped liberate the ghosts of their 
departed relatives from hell.35  
In addition, the Traiphum influenced the belief in the king’s possession of 
great virtue and legal power. The legend of Mahasammata underpins the legitimacy 
and virtuous authority of the Thai king as the descendant of Mahasammata. The 
bond between the bodhisattva and Mahasammata supports the king’s accumulation 
of merit. That is, it signals the people to aid in the king’s accumulation of merit by 
paying taxes or becoming laborers to support the king’s patronage of Buddhism.36 
The Traiphum depicts the duties of the dharmaraja in the Buddhist kingdom, 
namely, educating people about morality, supporting Buddhism, and taking care of 
people’s livelihoods. The text also mirrors the notion of Universal Monarch. It 
mentions the king’s duty in the expansion of Buddhism to all lords of other 
kingdoms. It should be noted that the Traiphum revised in the First Reign of the 
Bangkok kingdom reaffirmed the king’s status as the bodhisattva and cakravartin. It 
also emphasizes the king’s essential duty of maintaining the kingdom and supporting 
Buddhism.37 
The Traiphum does not have an explicitly legal or legislative perspective, but 
it provides detailed information on various kinds of offences which could be 
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punished by legal means. For example, the sections of heaven and hell describe 
offences of sinners in hell that related to crimes in the secular world, and narrates 
that many hungry ghosts were dishonest officials in their previous lives. They had 
accepted bribes, slandered their opponents, threatened the common folk, and were 
biased in judgment; some hungry ghosts in hell had killed or harmed others.  
The most significant section of traditional Thai law is the Thammasat which 
provides the foundations for the authority of other law texts. The Thammasat is the 
codification of the fundamental principles, and it bequeaths legal and political 
authority to the Thai monarch. It is widely accepted that the source of Thai law is 
the Hindu Dharmasastra, but the Thais received it via the Mon or Burmese; in turn, 
Mon or Burmese legal specialists of Theravada Buddhism had modified the original 
laws of the Hindu Dharmasastra, as the Introduction has already discussed.  
Other Theravada Buddhist traditions such as those of the Mon and Burmese 
have various versions of their respective texts, while the version of the Thammasat 
in Thailand is the only existing one. The Mon people have four versions of 
Thammasattham.38 There are also various versions of the Burmese Dhammasattha. 
In Burma, Dhammasattha “was referred to and cited as authoritative in countless 
recorded legal cases from the 13th to the 19th centuries”,39 whereas the Thai 
Thammasat only talked about its legendary origins and the fundamental principles 
of law.  
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The Thai Thammasat is classified as the second section of the Three Seals 
Code. The text is divided into two parts: a) the cosmic origins of the Thammasat, 
and b) the 39 mulakhadi (or fundamental matters: “mula” means “root”; “khadi” 
means “a legal case”).  
The first part of the Thammasat tells of its cosmic origins, which relates to 
the legend of King Mahasammata mentioned in the Buddhist canon. This legend 
sanctioned the authority and legitimacy of the Thai monarch. The legend of 
Mahasammata is in the Buddhist sutra, the Traiphum and the Thammasat. In these 
writings, Mahasammata was the bodhisattva who stored merit in his previous life 
and was accumulating merit to become Lord Buddha in his next life. He helped 
resolve conflicts in society with his justice and abilities. Then, the people accepted 
him as king. Mahasammata’s counselor was Manu, who worked as a judge. This 
story was also found in the laws of other Southeast Asian states such as Burma, 
Mon, Cambodia, and Java.40 
As is just noted, the Mon and the Burmese have several versions of these 
manuscripts written in different periods. The only Thai version and the 17th-century 
Burmese dhammasatthas state that Manosara (in the Thai version) or Manusara (in 
the Burmese version) was promoted to a counselor by King Mahasammata, while 
the Mon versions referred to him as Manu and narrated that he, the first author of 
the Thammasattham, was a hermit.41 There are various accounts of the origins of 
Manu in Burmese versions, such as being a descendant of Mahasammata, and being 
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a counselor. In Burmese accounts written in the 12th or 13th century, Manu is 
referred to as King Mahasammata, but the 15th-century Burmese texts describe 
Manu as the law-giver and does not equate him with Mahasammata.42  
According to the legend, Monasara made a misjudgment because of his 
departure from Buddhist principles. He acknowledged his mistake, retired from 
duty, and then went to the boundary-wall of the universe where he found the Pali 
Dhammasattham43 written on the wall. In the Thai and Burmese versions, the size of 
the Pali script was as big as an elephant, while the Mon version portrays it as being 
the size of a calf. Manosara recorded the Thammasat and presented it to King 
Mahasammata for use as the law of the kingdom. On the other hand, the Mon 
version depicts Manu as a hermit who encountered the Dhammasattham at the 
boundary-wall of the universe and memorized the text. Later, the hermit and the 
god Indra composed the text together and it was entitled Manu Dhammasattham, 
after the hermit.44 The Thai Thammasat, however, portrays the Hindu god Manu as 
Manosara, the counselor of King Mahasammata. It was Manosara who went to the 
wall of the universe and brought the eternal law back to present to King 
Mahasamata for the benefit of mankind.45  
The usage of the names Dhammasattham and Manu was meant to reify the 
secularized code within the context of Theravada Buddhist society.46 The story of 
Mahasammata invokes Theravada Buddhist cosmology in which the king is at the 
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apex of authority and virtue. This connection reaffirms the king’s highest status, his 
legal authority, and his position as the Universal Monarch.  
The Thammasat also emphasizes the special status of the king. It stresses 
that King Mahasammata and the bodhisattva were the same and that the king was a 
man of righteousness, great merit, and justice. This concept of kingship highlights 
that the fundamental authority of the Thai king comes from the Buddhist 
conceptions of kingship. Furthermore, the Thammasat supports the king’s legal 
authority by portraying it as being inherited from Mahasammata.  
The second part of the Thammasat narrates items of mulakhadi 
(fundamental matters), which were derived from the Hindu Dharmasastra, written 
in Pali and Sanskrit and translated into Thai. In the Thai Thammasat, there are 39 
mulakhadi refined to include numerous sakhakhadi (“sakha” means “branch”) or 
“branch” laws.47 Sakhakhadi are court judgments classified based on their structures 
into mulakhadi. In this way, the laws cover numerous cases and it is unnecessary to 
add new statutes.  
The 39 mulakhadi in the Thai Thammasat are further separated into two 
parts. The first part, mulakhadi heang phuphiphaksa lae kralakan (Items for the 
judges), is the 10 items concerning the morality of the judge and the judicial 
procedure, such as Lak Inthaphat, Laksana Rapfong (the Law on the Reception of 
Plaints) and Laksana Phayan (the Law on Evidence). The second part, called 
mulakhadi wiwat (fundamental heads of litigation), includes 29 items of litigation, 
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such as Laksana Wiwat (the Law on Quarrels), Laksana Kuni (the Law on Debt), and 
Laksana That (the Law on Slavery). 
Items of litigation in the Hindu, Mon, Burmese and Java versions consist of 
18 items48, while that of the Thai version consist of 29 items. Items of litigation in 
the Thai Thammasat that differ from the Hindu, Mon, Burmese and Java versions 
are those concerning corruption, fields and gardens, making war, treason, violation 
of royal commands, revenues, threats, abduction, trespass, causing harm or 
misfortune to others, laws concerning the limits of the ages of servitude and 
freedom, sorcery, loan and hire, and appeal.49 It should also be noted that only the 
Thai version includes mulakhadi dealing with the monarchy.  
The Thammasat became a sacred law because of the story of its origin and 
the Pali terms – the language used in Buddhist Scriptures – in the text.50 According 
to Thai legal tradition, the king possesses the authority to make orders and 
proclamations in the course of his reign, but legislations that violate the Thammasat 
are prohibited. The specific laws in each reign may be repealed or modified, but the 
Thammasat is unalterable. In that sense, it may be compared to a more perpetual 
constitution, as opposed to specific laws or legislation which can be changed.  
This notion gives a sense of sanctity to the law. The king was not the 
ultimate legislator, but his duty was the protector of dharma. This notion was a 
                                                          
48
 They include Fines, Homicide, Slaves, the Eight Varieties of Theft, Crimes of Violence, Sale, 
Mortgage, Debt, Pledge and Security, Dower, Marriage, Unlawful Sexual Intercourse, Inheritance, 
Insults, Assault, Quarrelling, Land, and Slander. (Hooker, Legal History, 40–41). 
49
 Paphatsaun, “Kansueksa”, Chapter 3–5; Channarong, “Phra Thammasat”, 102-109. 
50
 It should be noted that some Pali terms in the law texts may not link completely with the 
contents of the laws, but they built the sacredness of the laws. This indicates that the Thais 
borrowed some elements from Indian law and developed their own law based on Thai Theravada 
Buddhist tradition and Thai socio-political contexts. 
74 
 
Buddhist adaptation, because in Hindu tradition the Dharmasastra is regarded as 
god-given law. The king thus had no authority to enact law, but he acted as the 
judge. On the contrary, in the Thai legal system, laws were enacted by the king.51 In 
practice, Thai kings possessed full legislative power and could promulgate new laws. 
That is, the kings ordered the court pandit (scholar), who included both Brahmins of 
Indian ancestry and ethnic Thais, to revise and to classify the king’s judgments. After 
revision and classification, the judgments were added as royal decrees called Phra 
Ratchabanyat, or as articles called mattra, into the 29 items of litigation provided in 
the Thammasat. These judgments became perpetual laws, rather than being only 
valid for the reign of a particular king.52 These acts and articles could be revised, 
changed and cancelled to respond to changes in society, while the 39 fundamental 
principles of the Thammasat never changed. In this way, the Thai code contained 
numerous acts and articles that covered most activities of the people and the state 
as well as matched changes in society across various periods.  
To reiterate, both the Traiphum and the Thammasat emphasize the origins 
of the legal authority of the Thai king, a concept linked to the legend of 
Mahasammata. They refer to moral values in Buddhism to explain the penalties for 
committing crimes, in terms of punishment in the nether world. For example, an 
unjust judge can go to hell and become a hungry ghost if he is partial in his 
judgments. In addition, the Traiphum states that the king’s expansion of authority to 
govern other kingdoms means turning the wheel of dharma over the whole world of 
the bodhisattva. This idea links to the Buddhist kingly concept of the Universal 
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Monarch, where the king’s power was not to be obstructed by any boundary. Thus, 
these three concepts of kingship supported the expansion of the king’s authority 
both via Buddhism and warfare. Also, Buddhist conceptions of kingship and these 
two writings legitimized the legal authority of the Thai monarch.  
Regarding the issue of law, Thai rulers also applied the Brahman-Hindu belief 
system to establish the king’s divine authority. In Hinduism, Vishnu is a symbol of 
legitimacy and authority in the suppression of all evils. Thai kings linked their 
authority with that of Vishnu. (By contrast, Angkorean rulers were generally Saivite.) 
For instance, Thai kings were called “Rama”, “Phra Narai”, and “Phra Harirak” – 
words that referred to Vishnu, as seen in eulogies and royal chronicles. In addition, 
the kings were regarded as the god Yama, the Hindu god of justice and punishment. 
In the coronation ritual, one of the royal regalia was a mace similar to the mace used 
by Yama for punishment, because one significant duty of the king was to administer 
justice and punish wrongdoers. This connection with Hindu gods emphasized the 
sacred origin of the king’s judicial power and supported the king’s ultimate authority 
in meting out punishment. Furthermore, in 19th-century Siam, law was regarded as 
an important object reserved for royalty and the relevant officials only. This status 
of law contributed to respect towards the law. 
 
1.3 Conclusion  
 
The sources of the political and legal authority of the Thai monarch were 
derived from local traditions, Buddhism, and Hinduism. Local traditions constituted 
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an old form of established authority, whereby the person who was capable enough 
seized power and became a victorious king.53 Buddhism provided the idea of the 
righteous king. Hinduism gave the king a sense of divine authority. However, it is to 
be noted that much of the fundamental authority of Thai kingship was derived from 
Theravada Buddhist concepts of kingship. Also, the idea of Indian-derived law and 
linking with legends in Buddhism contributed to a sense of sacredness to both the 
laws and their upholder. They also provided the legal authority to Thai monarch.  
Buddhist conceptions of kingship provided a strong influence on the nature 
of Thai kingship and on the authority of the kings. According to the Buddhist legend 
of the King of Righteousness, Thai kings owned all the merits and possessed all legal 
authority. Furthermore, traditional Thai laws became a sacred text as they were 
linked with all the Buddhist legends and Hindu origins, along with all the moral 
values that formed the fundamental principles of laws and instructions to the law’s 
holders, the king and judges.  
The next chapter discusses the establishment of King Rama I’s legitimacy by 
referring to Buddhist conceptions of kingship and the usage of laws relating to 
morality. The discussion demonstrates the influence of Buddhist kingship in creating 
the king’s legitimacy and authority. 
_____________________ 
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CHAPTER 2  
THE LEGITIMATION OF KING RAMA I’S AUTHORITY 
THROUGH LAWS 
 
The Bangkok era in 1782 started ominously. Not only was the authority of 
the new king and dynasty shaky, it faced military threats from Burma. In this 
situation, it was difficult for the new ruler to consolidate the stability of the new 
dynasty and the security of the kingdom. This chapter analyzes King Rama I’s 
measures in building, legitimating and maintaining royal authority, especially 
through law. It discusses the king as an individual, and indicates the relationship 
between law, religion, and authority. The first key issue is the legitimization of a 
usurper’s authority in the First Reign of the Chakri Dynasty.  
The second issue is Rama I’s use of laws in accordance with moral precepts 
in Buddhism and his reference to his virtuous qualities to legitimize the authority of 
his rule and dynasty. The discussion examines how the legal structure provided for 
the legitimacy and maintenance of Rama I’s authority. Some laws during this reign 
tell us that the law was a significant tool the Thai ruler used to respond to various 
conditions. The legislations at the beginning of Rama I’s reign helped support his 
legitimacy. Once the king’s authority was affirmed, laws concerning social order 
were enacted to bring order to society.  
By examining the significance of Buddhist conceptions of kingship in laws 
introduced early in the reign of Rama I to support and legitimize royal authority, this 
chapter also aims to answer the questions of how Buddhism influenced Thai 
conceptions of kingship and how the political and religious spheres in traditional 
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Thai laws connected to each other in legitimizing and strengthening political 
authority.  
 
2.1 The Quest for Legitimacy After Rama I’s Ascension  
 
 
The Chakri Dynasty was established in 1782. Rama I, the founder of the 
dynasty, came to the throne as a usurper. He had no royal antecedents, but was a 
general of King Taksin of Thonburi (r. 1767 – 1782) who restored the Thai kingdom 
after the fall of Ayudhya in 1767. Rama I was one of Taksin’s key army commanders 
with the rank of Chaophraya Mahakasatsuek. His daughter, Chim, was one of 
Taksin’s favorite consorts. She had a son with Taksin named Prince Suphanthawong, 
who was later promoted to the position of Kromkhun Kasattranuchit.  
Taksin was overthrown in March 1782 by the Phraya San Rebellion. Phraya 
San was a noble sent by Taksin to suppress a riot at Ayudhya, but he returned to 
Thonburi and launched a coup against Taksin. At that time almost all of Taksin’s 
troops were marching to Cambodia, and important generals were not in Thonburi. 
Hence, it was a good opportunity to seize power. According to the “official record”, 
when the rebellion occurred, Taksin decided to abdicate to prevent a civil war.1 
Chaophraya Mahakasatsuek returned immediately to Thonburi when he received 
the news of the uprising. 
After the rebellion was suppressed, other nobles dissatisfied with Taksin’s 
rule asked Chaophraya Mahakasatsuek to replace Taksin as king. The general 
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acceded and became Rama I of the Chakri Dynasty. He later put Taksin to death.2 
The Annals of the Thonburi period revised in the First Reign of Bangkok record that 
Taksin was executed because of his neglect of dharma3 and justice, and for his 
improper conduct, which brought trouble to the kingdom and its inhabitants. The 
crimes he was guilty of were unpardonable.4 
As a usurper, the new king inevitably faced the question of legitimacy. Rama 
I was born a commoner and was not a legitimate successor of Taksin. These two 
points might threaten the security of his position.5 He thus needed to legitimize his 
authority and justify the end of Taksin’s reign and Taksin’s loss of legitimacy.  
 
 
2.1.1 The Legitimization of Rama I’s Ascension to the Throne  
 
 
As Taksin’s general, Rama I was supposed to uphold Taksin’s authority or 
return the crown to Taksin’s lineage. Although Thai political belief in the bunbarami 
(merit) of a leader accepted the usurpation of power, the legitimization of the 
usurpation was necessary. Rama I did so through four main ways: disassociating 
himself from the rebellion, emphasizing Taksin’s lack of legitimacy, stressing the 
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4
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legitimacy of his ascension and his personal merit, and appearing as the true 
successor.  
First, Rama I distanced himself from the rebellion by ordering the execution 
of Phraya San, the head of the rebellion, and his followers.6 The execution would 
show that he had no connection with the rebellion, or at least, he had not derived 
his position as king from it.  
Secondly, the new ruler legitimized his usurpation and made his ascension to 
the throne more acceptable by emphasizing the loss of legitimacy of Taksin via 
official documents. These official documents aimed at discrediting Taksin and 
highlighting Rama I’s authority. Thus, the reliability of these sources is in question. 
However, they are worth examining as they mirrored the politics of the time. They 
showed the significance of Buddhist kingly virtues in traditional Thai politics. The 
royal chronicles and other contemporaneous documents pointedly underlined 
Taksin’s lack of legitimacy. They blamed Taksin for his lack of righteousness and his 
misbehavior. In traditional Thai politics, a ruler’s merit and righteousness was vital in 
his right to rule. Slandering Taksin with these allegations decreased Taksin’s 
legitimacy, and made Rama I’s ascension more acceptable. Taksin was hence 
officially denounced through these documents.  
In the Annals of Thonburi revised in the Early Bangkok era, Taksin was 
blamed for being an “asat, la sucharit tham, phraphrut kanthutcharit”, which meant 
he was a dishonest and unjust king who abandoned dharma and justice and engaged 
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in improper behavior.7 The phrase “sia phracharit fanfuen” (or to become mentally 
unstable and insane) was used to stigmatize Taksin’s behavior.8 Some of his strange 
behavior included severely beating members of the royal family, discharging 
concubines of upper class families, appointing women of common stock to be his 
concubines, and claiming to be a sota-panna or sodaban in Thai, which means 
“stream-winner”, an advanced being who was in the first of four stages towards 
Enlightenment. This claim of spiritual advancement and his requirement that monks 
prostrate before him were unorthodox practices that had no precedent.9 
A record by a French missionary written in December 1782 also mentions 
Taksin’s behavior. It states that Taksin was insane and bad-tempered. He punished 
his consorts, sons, and nobles severely.10 However, the missionary was based in 
Phuket in the south and he got the story from other people. Hence, Taksin’s 
abnormal behavior was possibly made up, and rumors were spread to discredit him. 
In addition, the relationship between Taksin and French missionaries was not good 
as the king prohibited proselytism, and he was once angered by an incident when 
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have also been worried that Taksin was taking over the Sangha’s independent authority (see 
further discussion in Chapter 7). The dissatisfaction led to Taksin’s loss of political support and 
provided an excuse for Taksin’s deposition. 
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missionaries forbade Christian-Thai officials from participating in the traditional 
oath-taking ritual.11  
However, a contemporaneous record, written by a sister of the future Rama 
I, does not mention the insanity of Taksin. The author recorded only disorder in 
Thonburi that arose from Taksin’s harsh punishment of rice and salt junk traders to 
coerce taxes from them, and punishing officials of the Department of Royal Property 
for corruption.12 Nithi commented that the common methods of punishment were 
whipping or shackling. These punishments were thus normal practices.13  
The events recorded in the Annals tend to show that the Sangha and the 
kingdom were in confusion and disunited because of Taksin’s acts and unrighteous 
rule. Taksin was accused of abandoning thotsaphit ratchatham or the 10 kingly 
virtues, and because of his mistakes in judgment, caused disorder to his kingdom. 
These explicitly underline Taksin’s loss of legitimacy due to his lack of virtuous 
qualities.  
The Sanggitiyavamsa (the Chronicles of Buddhist Councils), a religious and 
historical work recounting the history of Buddhism within the Thai kingdoms from 
Sukhothai, Ayudhya and Thonburi to the First Reign of Bangkok, written by the monk 
Phra Phimontham in the First Reign, considers the last years of Ayudhya and Taksin’s 
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reign as Kali Yuga (Calamitous Age) and a period of athamma (without dharma).14 
The Kali Yuga is the final stage of the four periods of the universe’s existence 
mentioned in Hindu cosmological treatises. Hinduism interprets this period as the 
dark ages because of the decline of society due to abandonment of the teachings of 
the gods and rulers’ lack of justice. This decline will lead to the god Siva’s 
destruction of the present world to create a new one. The understanding of Kali 
Yuga in Hinduism was similar to that in Buddhism. Labeling Taksin’s reign as Kali 
Yuga and a period of athamma would lessen his legitimacy.  
It should be noted that there is no mention of Taksin’s insanity in the 
Sanggitiyavamsa. This text was written in Rama I’s reign to praise the virtues of the 
king and his brother. The author of the text, Phra Phimontham, was the monk 
punished by Taksin. We may thus suppose that he might mention Taksin’s insanity in 
his writing. However, he said nothing about this issue.15 Hence, it is possible that the 
rumors of Taksin’s insanity were made up by his political opponents. This issue has 
long been debated in Thai studies. Nidhi Eoseewong proposes that the rumors 
concerning Taksin’s insanity that spread in the later years of his reign might have 
been a conspiracy to disgrace him because the rumors disappeared after the 
establishment of the new dynasty.16 B.J. Terwiel also disagrees with the reality of 
Taksin’s insanity. Terwiel suggests that blaming Taksin might have been a method of 
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legitimatizing his successor.17 This dissertation agrees with Nithi’s and Terwiel’s 
proposals. It is also not important whether or not Taksin had mental problems in 
reality. His opponents could still levy such accusations upon him to lessen his 
legitimacy and to sanction his successor. The record of the French missionary 
mentioned above shows that the tales of Taksin’s misbehaviors had spread from 
Bangkok to the south.  
It was also vital to legitimize the rule of the new king in the eyes of vassal 
states and key provincial governors. Historical events show that resistance from 
vassal states and remote provinces tended to emerge during changes of dynasties 
and reigns. Hence, in Rama I’s royal letter to the king of Vientiane, sent in 1782,18 
and in the royal letter of appointment of the governor of Nakhon Sithammarat, the 
new king mentioned Taksin’s abandonment of virtues and his improper practices 
against the traditions.19 
In addition, erasing or replacing Taksin’s religious contributions was part of a 
larger effort to negate Taksin’s legitimacy and legitimize Rama I’s ascension. For 
example, the previous religious works of Taksin were replaced. Taksin had ordered 
the recopying of the Tripitaka and the Traiphum. Rama I went a step further and 
commanded another revision of Tripitaka and the writing of a new version of the 
Traiphum.  
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Thirdly, other than efforts to delegitimize Taksin, Rama I emphasized his 
personal virtues. Rama I could not claim royal descent or lineage, and the only way 
to legitimize his power was to emphasize his personal bunbarami in accordance with 
Buddhist concepts of virtuous kinship. At the beginning of his reign, the king 
frequently mentioned his personal merit. The legitimacy of his ascension was 
strengthened and emphasized in many records. The laws issued in the first few 
months of Rama I’s reign lauded his righteousness and qualities as a Buddhist 
scholar, of which some examples will be discussed below. In addition, in the Nirat 
Tha Din Daeng written by Rama I in 1785, he tells the story of his military campaign 
to fight Burma at Tha Din Daeng, mirroring his ruling ideology. He adds that the aims 
of his rule were to support Buddhism and protect the realm, the kingdom and his 
subjects.20 
The royal chronicle explains that Rama I’s ascension was at the behest of the 
nobles, and not because of his usurpation.21 Rama I’s virtuous qualities as 
dharmaraja were stressed to legalize his ascension. In an announcement, Rama I 
declared his ascension as symbolizing the restoration of dharma to the kingdom and 
its subjects. He also declared his support for Buddhism and the religious practices of 
the people.22 The Sanggitiyavamsa describes the establishment of the Bangkok era 
as the restoration of the kingdom from the dark ages and praised Rama I and his 
brother’s patronage of Buddhism. In a few laws, Rama I announced and emphasized 
his intention in bestowing dharma to the people and equated his ascension with the 
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merit-making act of a bodhisattva.23 Gesick notes that Rama I was careful to avoid 
excessive references to his own spiritual merit, as Taksin did.24 When referring to his 
virtue, Rama I claimed that his only virtue was to be dharmaraja and he avoided 
claiming to be enlightened, like Taksin did.  
Lastly, Rama I legitimized his usurped authority by seeking an appearance of 
continuity from the Ayudhyan kingdom and drawing differences between his 
kingdom and Taksin’s. Rama I’s first gesture was to move the royal premises from 
Thonburi across the river to Bangkok. He officially announced the city as the new 
capital of the Thai kingdom; although Taksin had moved the capital from Ayudhya to 
Thonburi, he had never announced Thonburi as the official capital. Rama I ordered 
the construction of the Grand Palace, palaces of royalty, forts, canals, and 
monasteries. He deliberately followed the city plan of Ayudhya, and many places 
were named after places in Ayudhya. King Chulalongkorn noticed that Rama I might 
have intended to build the new kingdom in the image of ancient Ayudhya so as to 
make the subjects feel like they were living in the time of muea krang ban mueang 
di (“the time when the kingdom was good”).25 
Chulalongkorn’s comments may have originated from the announcement of 
Rama I, who expressed continuity between his reign and Ayudhya by restoring 
Ayudhyan traditions and declaring that his reign followed that of Borommakot of 
Ayudhya (r. 1733 – 1758). The latter’s reign was a period praised as the golden age 
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or muea krang ban mueang di of Ayudhya, because it was a long period of peace, 
stability and prosperity.26 The announcement meant that he was intentionally 
disregarding Taksin’s reign, treating it as a historical aberration, and hence, 
emphasizing Taksin’s lack of legitimacy.  
These acts of Rama I meant to differentiate his reign from that of Taksin’s, 
and show that the Bangkok kingdom was the legitimate successor of Ayudhya. 
When the new royal insignia and Grand Palace were completed in 1785, Rama I 
performed the second consecration (equivalent to a coronation) and the celebration 
of the royal capital. The rituals were the full Brahman rituals similar to those 
conducted during the Ayudhyan period.27 These acts aimed to legitimize the new 
dynasty and to present the connection between the new era and the kingdom of 
Ayudhya to nobles and people.28 The splendid and sacred Brahman rituals also 
helped reaffirm the king’s authority and his divine status in the eyes of the subjects 
who witnessed these ceremonies.  
It should be noted that chiding Taksin for violating tradition was only a 
political strategy. It did not really mean that Taksin absolutely changed or 
discontinued court practices. Although some of Taksin’s practices violated Ayudhyan 
traditions, especially promoting lower-class people to become high-ranking nobles 
and consorts, Taksin’s court had followed most of the traditions of the Ayudhyan 
court, because it was the only court tradition the people acknowledged. Therefore, 
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it can be concluded that Rama I’s announcement and blame of Taksin’s reign were 
strategies to legitimize his reign as the reviver and successor of Ayudhyan traditions, 
and the reviver of dharma in the kingdom.29  
However, Rama I also went beyond the old traditions. There were some 
changes in state policy during his reign. For instance, he departed from tradition by 
giving rational explanations in his Buddhist teachings and in his legislation. It was 
uncommon for a Thai king to rationalize and explain his acts and commands.30 Many 
changes in the First Reign were conducted under the policy of the restoration of 
Ayudhya. Wyatt thus calls the changes the “subtle revolution” of Rama I,31 while 
Nithi notes that if Taksin had not been overthrown, his reign might have been seen 
as the “overt revolution”.32 This is because some of Taksin’s acts went against 
tradition.  
Hence, the virtuous qualities of the Thai rulers were the key to them losing 
or gaining legitimacy. Taksin’s abandonment of dharma and justice and Rama I’s 
restoration of dharma and justice had been emphasized in the records then. This 
emphasis demonstrated the significance of religious conceptions of kingship in 
traditional Thai politics. Both Taksin and Rama I came from the noble class and could 
be portrayed as usurpers, though for different reasons. The term used to describe 
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their enthronement in Thai official records is “prapdaphisek”, which literally means 
enthronement from the seizure of power.33 
There were similarities in the way both kings established their legitimacy. 
Blaming the previous ruler’s mistakes in administration, pointing out his lack of 
virtue, and proclaiming the virtue of the new ruler were commonplace. Both Taksin 
and Rama I criticized the mistakes of their predecessors. In Taksin’s cause, even 
though Ayuhdya had fallen, there were still some Ayudhyan princes trying to restore 
power, but Taksin defeated them. According to the Annals of Thonburi, Taksin’s 
escape from Ayudhya to Chantabun before the fall of Ayudhya was narrated as a 
case of Taksin recognizing the lack of dharma and justice of the Ayudhyan ruler and 
the people’s lack of dharma,34 whereas records in the First Reign blamed Taksin’s 
lack of dharma and justice.  
Taksin and Rama I also outwardly expressed their virtues to distance their 
dynasties and themselves from previous dynasties.35 For instance, they both shifted 
the capital to new places to disassociate themselves from the preceding era, and 
emphasized Buddhist virtues to legitimize their authority. However, they portrayed 
their respective Buddhist virtues in very different ways. Taksin focused on his 
superior spirituality, while Rama I avoided referring to his personal virtues and never 
mentioned his aim of attaining nirvana. He represented his suitability as the 
righteous king by teaching morality and Buddhist principles to his nobles and 
subjects through laws. Rama I emphasized that his bestowal of dharma and teaching 
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of morals to the inhabitants of the kingdom was meant to bring order to the 
kingdom and create good inhabitants. He also used law as a political apparatus in 
legitimating his Prapdaphisek.  
 
 
2.1.2 Religious Virtue and Its Impact on Rama I’s Legitimization of Authority  
 
Buddhist conceptions of kingship influenced traditional Thai politics. One 
essential quality of Thai kings is having great merit. Hence, being a patron of 
Buddhism is a compulsory duty of all Thai monarchs. Rama I performed religious 
deeds both to secure royal legitimacy and to revitalize Buddhism, the Sangha, and 
monastic education. Rama I began to address the decline of the Sangha and 
factionalism within the Sangha. He appointed a new supreme patriarch and 
demoted the previous one appointed by King Taksin. Some senior monks who had 
participated in the veneration of Taksin, as he demanded of them, were defrocked, 
but they were given positions in state departments as the king appreciated their 
Buddhist knowledge.  
It is interesting to analyze Rama I’s response to the monks who had caused 
the disunity of the Sangha and decided to prostrate before Taksin. His action was 
very gentle and totally differed from Taksin’s whipping of the monks and 
condemning them to hard labor. Rama I’s act can be interpreted as an effort to 
present his righteousness and justice to the Sangha, the nobility, and his subjects. It 
also shows his conflict management. The king was credited for his justice in 
restoring the positions of the former supreme patriarch and other senior monks; he 
was also praised for his righteousness and broad-mindedness in pardoning the 
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monks who had supported Taksin. In addition, the king might have thought that 
punishing the monks as Taksin did would have antagonized these monks and 
undermined his righteous image. Rama I needed the support of the Sangha in the 
legitimization of his authority. He thus compromised with the monks.  
In 1783, the king commissioned the compilation of a new version of an 
ancient cosmological writing, the Traiphum. The first version of the text was 
supposedly written in the mid-14th century by King Lithai of Sukhothai. This text was 
based on Buddhist canonical texts and local legends. It was important in installing 
and spreading the beliefs of karma and virtue, particularly in influencing political 
perceptions in Thai traditional society. It popularized the concept of the great virtue 
and legal power of Thai rulers as well as the concept of the king as the bodhisattva 
and the cakravartin. The revised edition was renamed the Traiphumlok 
winitchaikhata (the Consideration of Three Worlds).36  
In 1802, Rama I commanded a revision by explaining that, due to the 
contributions of many writers, the literary style of the text was inconsistent, and 
since 1783 many points in the text had been revised.37 The king appointed Phraya 
Thammapricha (Kaeo) to rewrite the text in order to produce the complete version 
of the Traiphum. Two main aims of the new text were to increase readers’ 
understanding of Buddhism, and strengthen their faith in Buddhism.38 Phraya 
Thammapricha was a former senior monk in the Thonburi period with the title of 
Phra Rattanamuni. He was one of monks who had prostrated before Taksin, and 
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hence was defrocked after Taksin was overthrown. However, because of his 
capability in literature and Buddhist knowledge, Rama I appointed him to work as a 
civil official in Krom Ratchabandit (the Department of Royal Scholars).39 
In this version of the Traiphum, the author emphasized the genesis of the 
bodhisattva king and cakravartin, and expanded on the two concepts in greater 
detail than in previous versions. The text also emphasizes the relationship between 
the king and the bodhisattva and narrates clearly the importance of a king as the 
center of the universe in cosmological notions.40 It is possible that this emphasis 
may be aimed at emphasizing Rama I’s virtuous quality which made him suitable to 
be king.41 
In 1788, Rama I also organized the revision of the Thai version of the 
Buddhist Tripitaka. He appointed a council to undertake the Tripitaka revision, in 
which 218 monks and 32 Buddhist scholars participated.42 Its duty included checking 
the accuracy of Buddhist Scriptures from the Lao and Mon versions of the Buddhist 
canon. The revised Tripitaka and other Buddhist texts were copied and distributed 
to monasteries for monastic study. This was the ninth Tripitaka revision completed 
in Theravada Buddhist history.  
According to contemporaneous sources, the Thais acknowledged eight 
previous revisions of the Tripitaka in the history of Theravada Buddhism. The first 
three occurrences were in India in 543 BCE, 443 BCE, and 308 BCE. The fourth to 
seventh revisions had been performed in Ceylon or Sri Lanka in 305 BCE, 110 BCE, 
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413 CE, and 1044 CE. The eighth revision was done in Chiang Mai during the reign of 
Tilokkarat of the Lanna Kingdom in 1477.43 It is interesting to see that the Tripitaka 
was not revised during the Sukhothai and Ayudhyan eras.  
Besides the purification of Buddhism, the revision of the Tripitaka in 1788 
may have been motivated by two crucial objectives. First, it advanced Rama I’s 
dignity since it was one of the most significant religious affairs of the new dynasty, 
and it was only the second time the Tripitaka was revised in the land of the Thai 
people. The king demonstrated his support for the Sangha and gained merit both for 
himself and for his subjects.44 Second, the revision signaled the newfound security 
of the new kingdom. In addition, Craig Reynolds proposes that Rama I’s support of 
the revision of the Tripitaka was meant to make merit for himself as the Universal 
Monarch and for his dynasty, and to reaffirm his legitimacy.45 
Other religious works were also produced in response to Rama I’s 
revitalization of Buddhism. In 1789, a senior scholar monk, Phra Phimontham (later 
promoted to Phra Wannarat), wrote the Sanggitiyavamsa. This writing tells the 
history of Buddhism contextualized within the history of Thai kingdoms. The author 
discussed substantially the virtues and capabilities of Rama I and his brother, the 
Front Palace Prince, and praised their restoration and patronage of Buddhism. 
Rama I also commanded the translation of Buddhist canonical texts written 
in Pali and Khom script into Thai in order to benefit the monastic study and religious 
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practices of the people. Prayers used in daily life and religious ceremonies, such as 
the Five and Eight Precepts, were also translated to increase the accurate 
understanding of Buddhists in performing religious practices.46 Pali and Khom were 
used in the Siamese Sangha at that time. Monks and laypeople whose language skills 
were weak could not read or completely understand most Buddhist texts. The 
translation was aimed at supporting the learning and practicing of Buddhism by 
monks and laypeople. For instance, in 1785, Rama I ordered a council of 
Phrarachakhana (high-ranking priests) to translate a Buddhist Jataka, Milinthapanha 
(The Questions of King Milin). This text discusses practicing the dharma in the form 
of a questionnaire. The questions deal with morality, belief in Buddhist teachings, 
and knowledge on Buddhism based on both Buddhist scriptures and ascetic 
practices.47 In 1803, Rama I ordered senior monks to translate the Khamphi 
pariyattitham (The Text of Dharma), which was a collection of Lord Buddha’s 
teachings. 
The discussion in this section has shown Rama I’s establishment of 
legitimacy at the beginning of his reign through a few ways. It can be seen that 
Buddhist kingly concepts provided the main basis for the legitimization of royal 
authority. Rama I’s religious affairs also reflected the significance of Buddhist 
conceptions of kingship in the support of royal authority. Besides these traditional 
ways of establishing royal legitimacy, Rama I used law as an effective tool for the 
establishment and strengthening of his authority, as will be discussed in subsequent 
sections. 
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2.2 Law as the Potent Tool of Rama I’s Legitimization of Authority  
 
 It can be argued that Rama I was unique in his usage of law on morality and 
Buddhism to directly legitimize his authority at the beginning of his reign. 
Traditionally, the legitimization of royal authority of Ayudhya’s kings was performed 
through the coronation ritual, which was the only and most important ceremony in 
authorizing their ascensions. Later, the construction of monasteries, the patronage 
of Buddhism and the Sangha, and the pursuit of justice and social order were 
conducted as the king’s essential duties. In the Ayudhyan period, many rulers gained 
the throne through usurpation, but no one had used the law in legitimizing their 
usurped authority as Rama I did. This point needs to be clarified – that is, in some 
ways, any new ruler who issued laws could be seen as attempting to legitimize his 
rule. However, Rama I was unique in using laws on morality to legitimize his 
authority. This section examines Rama I’s use of laws to cement his legitimacy and 
authority. 
  
2.2.1 Legislation on Morality at the Beginning of Rama I’s Reign  
 
 
It should be emphasized that no Ayudhyan laws mentioned the virtuous 
qualities of the kings and Buddhist teachings. The laws of Ayudhya only instituted 
that the Sangha’s affairs were the responsibility of the Krom Thammakan (the 
Department of Religious Affairs). The first law that narrated Buddhist teachings was 
a decree enacted in 1773 by King Taksin. This decree aimed at instructing monks and 
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laypeople to benefit their religious practices.48 This decree did not declare 
punishment for offenders. It was also the only decree dealing with religion by 
Taksin, although he was enthusiastic about addressing the decline of the Sangha and 
restoring Buddhism. This issue will be analyzed later in Chapter 7. 
In contrast to previous kings, it can be presumed that the law became a 
potential tool of Rama I in the establishment and legitimization of his authority. As 
already discussed, Rama I needed to legitimize his rule and the new dynasty as well 
as express his ruling ideologies to his nobility and subjects. Apart from gaining 
legitimacy through the traditional ways of Thai kings, Rama I illustrated the aims of 
his rule via laws. In the view of a political scientist, Sombat Chanthornwong, in his 
study of Rama I’s political aims, the law was effective in expressing the ruler’s aims 
to the ruled.49 One may question how the king’s aims in the laws were made known 
to subjects who were illiterate and lived in villages or remote areas. When the new 
laws were issued, they were copied and sent to provinces. Provincial officials read 
the laws out to villagers. In this way, nobility and common people both in the capital 
and in remote areas acknowledged the king’s aims and commands. The laws were 
not only legal documents, but they were also an effective political tool for the king. 
At the start of his reign, Rama I began to legitimize his authority and his 
status as the dharmaraja through laws concerning morality and Buddhist teachings. 
In these laws, the king expressed his moral teachings and his aim of bestowing 
dharma and order to his subjects. In the Three Seals Code, the acts promulgated in 
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this reign were classified under the title Phraratchakamnot Mai (The New Orders: 
PKM) and Kot Phrasong (the Sangha Laws). The PKM include 45 acts. 18 acts of the 
PKM and eight Sangha Laws were issued within the first three years of Rama I’s rule. 
A number of laws lead to the observation that Rama I was legitimizing his authority 
through laws. 
Within a few months in the first year of his reign, Rama I promulgated eight 
decrees of the PKM – Acts 1, 2, 3, 33, 34, 35, 36 and 37.50 These eight decrees can be 
formed into two groups: decrees dealing with the king’s security, royal dignity and 
social order (Acts 1, 3, 34 and 37), and decrees concerning Buddhist instructions and 
morality (Acts 2, 33, 35, and 36). Decrees in the first group instituted regulations for 
the king’s security in his royal procession by land and water (Act 1), laid down 
punishments for bandit’s accomplices (Act 3), prohibited the forging of royal 
commands (Act 34) and regulated the sin of adultery (Act 37).51 
Decrees in the second group concern the king’s aim to support Buddhism 
and bring dharma to his subjects, and teach morality to nobles and subjects.52 In Act 
2, which prohibited gambling and alcohol consumption by officials, officials were 
urged to adhere to Buddhist teachings and morality. The Buddhist Precepts were 
narrated in Act 36. In Act 3, the inhabitants of the kingdom were exhorted to 
observe religious precepts. The worship of lingas was banned, as stated in Act 35. 
Besides promulgating the laws relating to morality and Buddhism, Rama I 
enacted the laws concerning the Sangha in the first year of his reign. In the first 
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Sangha law, he emphasized his aim of bestowing dharma to his subjects, of fulfilling 
his religious duty as a patron of Buddhism, and of accumulating merit through his 
rule. The king also stressed the decline of the Sangha, especially with regard to the 
clergy’s lack of Buddhist knowledge and their abandonment of monastic rules. This 
law reflects the king’s exhibition of his Buddhist wisdom, which was useful for the 
legitimization of his authority. It also indicates the great decline of the Sangha at 
that time. Other issues concerning the Sangha Laws will be discussed later in 
Chapter 7.  
Sombat has analyzed the reasons for Rama I’s promulgation of the laws on 
morality and Buddhist teachings. According to Sombat, these laws reflect the king’s 
aim of legitimizing his usurped authority by demonstrating his virtuous quality and 
wise knowledge of Buddhism, and to show his intellect and quality both as a 
righteous king and a Buddhist scholar.53 This dissertation agrees with Sombat. 
Moreover, it needs to be noted that, apart from expressing Buddhist teachings in 
the laws, Rama I enacted the first Sangha Law in the fifth month of his reign, in 
which he narrated Buddhist teachings. As discussed above, there was no precedent 
of Ayudhyan kings promulgating laws on Buddhism. Various Ayudhyan laws had 
never made such explicit mention of Buddhist principles, even though they implicitly 
formed the foundations of the laws. 
The laws of Ayudhya and Bangkok used similar terms in referring to the kings 
who enacted the laws. For example, the kings were referred in the laws as the 
dharmaraja, Mahasammata, the cakravartin, and the bodhisattva. It was only in the 
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laws of Rama I that the king’s religious duties in bringing dharma to the people and 
supporting Buddhism were emphasized. The king’s role as the dharmaraja and 
protector of the people had been repeated many times in his laws. 
It can thus be analyzed that Rama I was demonstrating his vast knowledge of 
Buddhism through the explanation of Buddhist doctrines to legitimize his authority. 
This observation can be examined from the enactment of Acts 2, 33, 35 and 36 of 
the PKM. Acts 2 and 33, dealing directly with the morality of officials and all classes, 
were enacted in April 1782, seven days after the coronation ritual. In Act 33, the 
king authorized his lawmaking by referring to Buddha's address of bringing dharma 
to mankind and reiterated that it was also his desire. Rama I also provided an in-
depth explanation of Buddhist doctrines through the decree.  
Other than seeking to present an accurate understanding of Buddhism in Act 
35, which forbids the worship of Siva-lingas, Rama I referred to himself as righteous 
and depicted his enthronement as the bodhisattva making merit and bringing social 
order to the inhabitants of the kingdom.54 He presented his in-depth Buddhist 
knowledge by explaining Buddhist fundamental precepts in Act 36, instructing 
nobles to observe religious precepts, and setting up a form of making daily merit in 
the Grand Palace. Also, Rama I, in this Act, explained his main motivation was to 
bring dharma to his subjects through leading them in making merit to absolve 
themselves from sin, just as the bodhisattva helps and teaches morals to the 
people.55 In Act 35, the king expressed his aims to reach phra phutthiphum 
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phothiyan (enlightenment) and continue Lord Buddha’s desire of instructing dharma 
to people.56  
With reference to the king’s announcements, Davisakd Puaksom argues that 
Rama I was considering himself to be equal to Lord Buddha.57 However, it may be 
argued that the king did not equate himself with Lord Buddha, but simply pursued 
his essential duties in accordance with Buddhist conceptions of kingship. According 
to Theravada Buddhist kingship, the king is compared to the bodhisattva. The Pali 
canon describes the bodhisattva as a person who is in the cycle of birth and death 
and has been accumulating merit to become enlightened in the future. The king’s 
righteous rule, care for people’s livelihoods, and support for Buddhism and the 
people’s religious practices, represent his accumulation of merit to become 
enlightened, as the king is the bodhisattva. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that, although Buddhist principles and 
religious practices were described in the laws, the effectiveness of legal 
enforcement might not be their main aim. The main goal of enacting these acts is to 
legitimize the king’s ascension through presenting his virtuous qualities, his Buddhist 
knowledge as a Buddhist scholar, and his concern for the religious matters of his 
subjects. 
These laws concerning Buddhism may not have generated new ideas of 
kingship, because issues of the ruler’s merit or the king’s religious duty were 
common to previous rulers. However, a main difference was that no previous laws 
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explicitly mentioned Buddhist teachings or moral issues, with the exception of the 
decree of Taksin. This may be deemed as an innovation of Rama I. 
These laws provided no new ideas of kingship, but they introduced new 
ideas in religious practices. Throughout the laws, Rama I encouraged the people to 
view Buddhism in a rational way and explained that Buddhist doctrines focused on 
rationality. For instance, the king instructed that the people’s good conduct were for 
the good of the people themselves, and for society and the kingdom. He ordered 
monks to chant their prayers in Thai instead of Pali in order to enable laypersons to 
understand Buddhist teachings and their religious practices.58 These would help 
rationalize the people’s view of Buddhism. 
Moreover, it is interesting to observe that the king’s depiction of himself as a 
Buddhist scholar and dharmaraja was common in Thai tradition. However, 
presenting Buddhist teachings through laws which defined punishment for 
offenders might strengthen and increase the seriousness of the laws.59 
 
 
2.2.2 Laws on Administration and Social Order  
 
Sombat argues that, after the first few years of his reign, Rama I might have 
achieved the legitimization and stability he wanted of his authority. His later laws 
were thus not focused on morality and the image of devaraja. This assumption is 
partly true; however, Sombat may have overlooked the five Laws on the Sangha 
(The Sangha Laws number 2 – 6) that Rama I issued during the second year of his 
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reign. These Sangha Laws deal with the revival of the Sangha, the control of monks’ 
behavior, and the Buddhist practices of the monks and laypeople. Hence, it might 
not be necessary for the king to re-issue the laws on these points in the PKM. Thus, 
we will see that the later acts in the PKM concerned various issues of administration 
and order in the society rather than issues of Buddhism and morality. 
Legislated in Rama I’s reign, the PKM consist of 45 acts. Eight acts were 
enacted in the first and second month of his reign. Four of these eight acts focus on 
morality, while others also refer to the king’s righteous image. 37 acts in the PKM 
were promulgated in later years. These 37 acts cover 18 acts on criminal cases,60 six 
acts on the control of manpower,61 five acts on economics,62 three acts on customs 
and miscellaneous topics,63 and four acts concerning the king’s authority and 
dignity.64 As mentioned above, four acts, namely Acts 2, 33, 35, and 36 promulgated 
in the first month of the reign, emphasize Buddhist morals, the king’s virtue and his 
religious duty. They were aimed at legitimizing the king’s authority at the beginning 
of his reign, while the main focus of the 37 acts was not on morality. 
In addition, these 37 acts were explained and justified in a rational manner. 
As covered in the Introduction, the Early Bangkok period can be defined as the 
period of rationalization. As seen from practices of the kings, Rama I occasionally 
gave reasons for his legislation. This was unprecedented. Rama I and his successors, 
Rama II and Rama III, supported the rationalization of Buddhism, the reformation of 
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Buddhist practices, and the eradication of supernatural beliefs, which Chapter 7 will 
analyze further. Subsequent examples demonstrate Rama I’s explanations in his 
laws. They include reasons of why the laws were issued, why some practices were 
prohibited, and why he required his subjects to pursue, or to avoid, some activities.  
In most of the laws, the main reason for the king encouraging his subjects to 
follow the laws was to build and keep social order. An example that expresses the 
rationality of law in the First Reign can be seen in Act 42, the prohibition of 
cockfighting. The king declared cockfighting as tantamount to the sin of gambling. 
He warned the people that the methods of cockfighting were cruel and gamblers 
cheated to win, which frequently caused quarrels and disorder in society.65 
In Act 4, enacted in 1783, the king mentioned problems in management of 
the king’s manpower (phrai luang) and mistakes during the reign of Taksin. The 
interesting point is that, in referring to the mistakes, only the mistakes in 
administration or governance during Taksin’s reign were mentioned. Rama I did not 
refer to moral reasons or Taksin’s lack of virtue. According to the Act, in Taksin’s 
reign phrai luang suffered from overwork for the state and from official extortion. 
Thus, there were many cases in court concerning phrai’s suffering and the 
corruption of officials.66  
The decrees issued in the later years of Rama I’s reign focused on social 
order and people’s livelihoods, rather than immoral activities. The king explained 
rationally the benefits and disadvantages of following or neglecting the laws. It may 
be assumed that by then, the king’s authority and position were stable enough. 
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There was no longer any need to use laws to explain his enthronement. Thus, moral 
reasons were not emphasized in later laws. 
However, a few acts still mention morality, such as Acts 7 and 13. In Act 7, 
which increased the punishment for giving false testimony in court, the people who 
gave false testimony in court were considered greedy, shameless, and devoid of any 
fear of sinning. Potential offenders were warned that they would go to hell.67 In Act 
13, the king laid down punishments for the destruction of Buddhist symbols as this 
crime would send criminals to hell, according to Buddhist teachings. He thus needed 
to punish these people to protect Buddhism and Buddhists.68 Nevertheless, it may 
be analyzed that referring to hell might not be the king’s real reason, but to 
intimidate Buddhists from committing the crime as they feared going to hell more 
than the state’s punishment. This warning would be more effective than other 
reasons. 
 
2.3 Conclusion  
 
Analyzing the relationship between the political and religious spheres that 
influenced royal authority is one of this study’s aims. The discussion above shows 
that Rama I understood considerably the significance of the conceptions of Buddhist 
kingship in Thai politics and society. Since the beginning of his reign, Rama I applied 
Buddhist conceptions of kingship in legitimizing and stabilizing his authority. It is 
interesting to examine what influenced Rama I’s actions. 
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Previous studies have examined the various aspects of Rama I’s 
legitimization of his authority. Wyatt proposes that Rama I’s purification of 
Buddhism and efforts to explain his policies was “to be ‘better’ than his 
predecessor.”69 Sombat comments that Rama I represented his Buddhist learning 
and virtuous qualities as the dharmaraja through laws.70 Saichon notes that Rama I 
deliberately emphasized rational Buddhism as the principle of society in order to 
unite people of various beliefs at the beginning of the new kingdom.71 Moreover, 
the fall of Ayudhya destroyed the old social structure whereby only members of the 
ruling class could become nobility. In the Thonburi period, the nobility came from 
both commoners and members of the Ayudhya noble families. However, almost all 
of the high-ranking nobles in this period who were Taksin’s old followers came from 
humble backgrounds. On the other hand, many former Ayudhya elites worked as 
low-ranking officials or did not work in Taksin’s court.72 
It can be argued that these visible changes by the king would thus have an 
effect on the Buddhist belief of bun barami (merit) of the people. Buddhists had 
been taught that people’s karma and good or bad fortune depended on 
accumulating merit in their past lives. They should thus create merit and observe 
Buddhist precepts to have a better next life. The changes in society might increase 
the belief in bun barami because people saw Ayudhyan commoners being able to 
ascend to become nobility in the Thonburi period due to their merit. It may be 
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presumed that Rama I’s emphasis on his merit in Buddhism was to insist on merit as 
an important quality of the ruler. He who possessed the highest merit became king. 
Besides the traditional notion of the king as the bodisattva, the Thai court of 
the First Reign of Bangkok emphasized the king’s image as the dharmaraja 
throughout laws and literature. According to contemporaneous sources, the court 
stressed this image of the king more than the image of Universal Monarch. Rama I 
was praised as the dharmaraja in many records. Saichon comments that it was 
because the concept of the dharmaraja provided more benefits to the rulers than 
the concept of the cakravartin. The dharmaraja concept focused more on the king’s 
wisdom and righteousness. These two qualities supported the king’s duty of 
bestowing dharma to the inhabitants of the kingdom.73 The Bangkok rulers thus 
stressed their images as the dharmaraja more than other religious images of 
kingship. Through this image, the king was emphasized as the highest leader of the 
Sangha and the secular realm. This allowed the state to control the Sangha for its 
own benefit.74 
The laws promulgated at the beginning of the First Reign were significant for 
the legitimization of his usurped authority. However, the stability of the king’s 
authority was based on a number of factors. The law was a part of royal authority 
and reflected the lawmaker’s ideologies, ideals and expectations for his kingdom, 
authority, and subjects. The king’s subjects would have acknowledged the king’s 
intentions through the laws which were announced to them. The king’s objectives, 
such as representing his virtuous quality and merit as the dharmaraja, his morality 
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and legitimacy to rule, would be made cognizant to his subjects. The lack of any 
popular resistance in this reign may lead to the reasonable assumption that the 
king’s aim in the use of laws to legitimize and establish his authority succeeded. 
This chapter has examined the legitimization of the First Reign of Bangkok. 
The next chapter explores offences against the king’s authority, and the laws related 
to such offences. The discussion will provide a clear picture of the significance of the 




LAWS AND THREATS CONCERNING ROYAL AUTHORITY 
 
 
According to traditional conceptions of Thai kingship, the king was at the 
apex of authority. He assumed full responsibility for all state affairs; he was the head 
of the judiciary and the commander-in-chief. This status was also expressed through 
traditional Thai law. Laws concerning royal authority instituted regulations and 
prohibitions to establish and strengthen the king’s power and to provide protection 
to the king. These laws reflected the king’s considerable concern with and attempts 
at maintaining royal authority. The laws and historical events show that, apart from 
stringent laws, the security of royal authority depended upon the king’s ability and 
personality. If the king could control other political groups, his position would be 
secure. If he failed, the rigorous laws would be less useful in protecting his authority.  
Laws on royal authority dealt with different political groups. Some laws 
focused on the security and authority of the king, such as the decrees dealing with 
providing security for the king and royalty, and decrees prohibiting offences against 
royal authority. Other laws pertained to princes and nobility, such as the prohibition 
of private meetings between princes and nobles and the laws concerning the 
misappropriation of the king’s manpower. 
This chapter explores the laws to maintain royal authority and offences 
against royal authority mentioned in these laws. It also examines exemplifying cases 
during the Ayudhyan and Early Bangkok periods. The first and main part examines 
the contents of the laws on royal authority. The discussion indicates the distinct 
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characteristics of royal authority in these laws. The second part discusses threats to 
royal authority that also related to the laws. The issues deal with acts of opposition 
to royal authority, such as conspiracy, rebellion, and the writing of anonymous 
letters. This part analyzes the development of laws and demonstrates the ways in 
which the Thai rulers responded to these threats and how laws were used to 
maintain and secure their authority.  
Cases related to the promulgation of new laws in this period will contribute 
to a better understanding of the ruler’s use of laws to strengthen his authority. The 
new laws may reflect the kings’ thoughts. In addition, the discussion will 
demonstrate that the rulers had continuously attempted to increase the efficiency 
of laws by revising or cancelling old laws, promulgating new laws, and stiffening 
punishments.  
 
3.1 The Contents of Laws on Royal Authority 
  
The Kot Monthianban, Kabotsuek and Ayaluang instituted rules and 
prohibitions concerning royal authority. These three laws have some similar details. 
They contain four main sections: acts concerning royal prestige, acts on the security 
of royal authority, acts on military discipline, and acts on controlling the influence of 
princes and nobles.  
 
3.1.1 Acts Concerning Royal Prestige  
 
Most decrees in the Kot Monthianban dealt with the maintenance of royal 
prestige. This law set rules for court personnel in serving royalty, in maintaining and 
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representing royal dignity, and regulations for those who entering the palace. Some 
similar decrees for these concerns are also mentioned in the Ayaluang. Acts that 
were deemed crimes of lèse-majesté in these two laws include showing any 
disrespect to the king’s dignity, using royal language without referring to royalty, 
using or stealing royal property, impolite calling of the king’s name, using vulgar 
language to refer to royalty, and speaking ill of the king. In addition, the 
disobedience and forging of royal commands were prohibited.1 Penalties included 
whipping, forced labour or taphun ya chang,2 amputation, confiscation of property, 
and execution.  
For the organization of the court, Articles 3 to 8 in the Kot Monthianban set 
out the sakdina scale for the insignia of rank for royalty, and the rules for decorating 
insignia. Articles 56 to 76 instituted regulations for nobles, courtiers, and the 
palace’s guards in serving the king. Article 173 defined regulations and 
performances for celebrating the queen’s pregnancy. Articles 178 to 184 instituted 
the use of royal language and proper pronouns in addressing or referring to royalty.  
The Kot Monthianban regulated conduct for bureaucrats in showing respect 
to the king. It forbade disputes among officials, especially in the palace, because it 
was considered as a lack of respect to the king.3 Quarrels between nobles were 
regarded as a bad omen for the king and kingdom. It may be assumed that the 
actual reason of this prohibition was that such quarrels would lead to factionalism 
                                                          
1
 “Ayaluang”, Articles 1, 2, 7, and 72, the TSC, Vol. 2, 378-379, 381, and 402. 
2
 Duties of taphun ya chang included cutting grass for the royal elephants and the tending of the 
elephants. These jobs bore risks of exposure to poisonous animals such as snakes, and were 
heavy work because there were numerous elephants belonging to the king and the Department 
of Royal Elephants. The 1638 record of van Vliet reported more than 3,000 elephants belonging 
to the king. Reference: Van Vliet, Van Vliet’s Siam, 123. 
3
 “Kot Monthianban”, Articles 63–65, 139, the TSC, Vol. 2, 186–187. 
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and possibly rebellion. Hence, this prohibition was intended to prevent conflict 
within the court.  
The law also regulated the code of conduct and prohibitions for officials 
entering or staying in the palace. A list of prohibitions included gambling, consuming 
alcohol, carrying weapons, committing adultery in the palace, trespassing into the 
palace, kidnapping female courtiers, and stealing royal property. These offences 
warranted the capital punishment, which was execution.4 Another prohibition 
forbade the use of the feet – the most vulgar part of one’s body – to open the 
palace gates. Bricks or wood were also not to be thrown at the palace’s gate, wall, 
and the throne. An offender’s feet and hands would be cut off.  
Not every part of the law focuses on protecting the king’s authority, 
however. It is interesting to note that, although the king possessed the highest 
authority and was the lord of life, his ultimate power was controlled by laws, which 
in some respects attempted to prevent him from abusing his power. As instituted in 
the Kot Monthianban, if the king’s command was righteous and followed the rule of 
law and custom, all officials should follow his command. If he gave an unrighteous 
order, officials had to warn the king against doing so three times. If the king ignored 
all three warnings, officials could then carry out the command.5 Officials were also 
prohibited from giving the king a sword when he was angry, even if he demanded it. 
An offender was to be put to death.6 
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 Ibid., Articles 66–70, (page) 187. 
5
 Ibid., Article 106. 
6
 Ibid., Article 113. 
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 Royal rituals are important in representing and celebrating royal dignity. 
Although power is by no means supported by pomp alone, rituals are a tool in 
establishing, representing, and legitimizing power and the special status of political 
institutions.7 Royal rituals represent the superiority of the monarchy over other 
institutions. Some rituals are peculiar to the royalty. The Kot Monthianban declares 
the annual oath-taking ceremony as the most important ritual to ensure and 
represent the loyalty of the nobility. Missing this ceremony was akin to committing 
treason and one would be beheaded if the absentee had no proof of illness.8  
The Kot Monthianban describes detailed accounts of royal ceremonies that 
were to be performed during each of the 12 months in a year. These ceremonies 
aimed at maintaining and representing royal dignity and authority, such as the 
ceremony of the inspection of the troops and royal elephants in the fifth month. 
There were also rituals related to people’s livelihoods and agriculture, like the 
plowing ceremony in the sixth month, the lantern procession in the 12th month, and 
a ceremony in the first month to implore the water gods not to cause floods that will 
challenge crop cultivation. The decrees of royal ceremonies not only 
comprehensively detailed the manners in which the rituals were to be carried out, 
but also reflected the nature of traditional states in Southeast Asia, in which the 
monarch was the center of authority, and in which his authority and dignity were 
expressed via royal rituals and ceremonies.  
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 Catherine Bell, Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 
128. 
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3.1.2 Acts on the Security of Royal Authority  
 
The Kabotsuek mainly focuses on the stability of royal authority. This law 
describes offences against royal authority, such as overthrowing the king, 
assassinating the sovereign, and harming and poisoning the king.9 The law instituted 
rules and suggestions to avoid practices defined as rebellious. A list of examples is 
attached. Nobles and provincial governors had to get royal permission before 
visiting each other; anyone who heard of a conspiracy had to inform a minister.10 
Plotting and spreading rumors to undermine royal authority, providing information 
about civil and military affairs to enemies, conspiring with outside enemies to invade 
the kingdom or to harm the people, as well as writing and spreading anonymous 
letters were strictly forbidden.11 
One of the main focuses in the Kot Monthianban is setting safety regulations 
for the king and royal family members. In other words, the law protected both the 
princes from threats originating outside the palace, and the king from threats from 
the princes inside the palace. It instituted security measures for the king, the grand 
palace, and royal processions. The Kot Monthianban and Kabotsuek laid down 
prohibitions to prevent conspiracy among princes and nobles. Princes were 
prohibited to leave the palace at night in order to prevent them from conspiring.12 
Carrying weapons into the palace and the throne hall were disallowed. Princes were 
                                                          
9
 “Kabotsuek”, Articles 1, 4-7, the TSC, Vol. 1, 931-932. 
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 Ibid., Articles 4-6, (pages) 931-932. 
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 Ibid., Articles 2, 3, 5, 6, 10-13, (pages) 931-933. 
12
 “Kot Monthianban”, Article 119. 
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prohibited from carrying and receiving weapons from the king. Royal page carrying 
the king’s sword were forbidden from unsheathing the blade.13  
The Ayaluang, by contrast, has relatively little to say about royal stability or 
security. It focuses on preventing crimes dealing with state affairs, such as defying 
royal commands and counterfeiting royal seals or official documents. Offences listed 
in the Ayaluang will therefore be examined further in the next chapter.  
 
3.1.3 Acts Relating to Military Discipline  
 
According to the idea of the Universal Monarch, the Thai king was 
considered the protector of the people and the supreme commander. Providing 
protection to the subjects was regarded as one of the most significant duties of the 
king.14 Waging war was a royal prerogative which exhibited the king’s dignity. 
Military defeat meant the loss of royal dignity. Hence, preventing offences during 
wartime was one of the main concerns of the laws on royal authority, especially the 
Kabotsuek. Several decrees in the Kabotsuek dealt with military discipline, 
establishing rules, prohibitions, criteria for pardons and rewards, and punishments. 
For instance, abandoning one’s duty in the battlefield, gambling in the barracks, 
stealing armaments, and deserting the troops were akin to committing treason.15 
Soldiers were required to fight bravely, uphold security in the barracks to prevent 
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 Ibid., Article 117. 
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 Akin, Thai Society, 49. 
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 “Kabotsuek”, Articles 11-14, (page) 933. 
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espionage and accidents in barracks such as fires, and upkeep arms, horses and 
elephants.16  
The Kabotsuek and Kot Monthianban also instituted a similar code of 
conduct and behavior in the battlefield, and criteria for rewards, such as 
promotions, bestowal of precious objects, care for veterans’ families and decreased 
taxes.17 A list of examples is included. An infantryman who killed a cavalryman 
would be rewarded with a gold bowl and clothes. For a victor of a combat on 
elephants, the king would reward him with the highest official rank, a gold insignia 
of rank, and a wife.18  
Corruption during wartime was also a major offence. The Kabotsuek and 
Ayaluang both instituted that if military officers embezzled rewards or army 
provisions, they would be punished heavily.19 In the reign of King Ekkathat (r. 1758 – 
1767), corrupted military officers embezzled army provisions to sell and earn profits. 
No one dared inform the king because of the nobles’ high position. The case was 
then enacted as a play in court before the king to hint at the crime. After an 
investigation, the senior officers were found guilty and punished by having their 
foreheads slashed slightly several times, exposed for ridicule, and becoming 
enslaved. Some were also made to sell off all of their properties as a fine.20 This case 
illustrates the influence of the nobility, which was a usual source of worry to the 
rulers, who sought to control their influence.  
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 Ibid., Article 18, 437. 
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 “Kabotsuek”, Articles 15-25, the TSC, Vol. 1, 934–938. 
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 Ibid., Article 16, (page) 936; “Kot Monthianban”, Articles 47–48, the TSC, Vol. 2. 
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 “Kabotsuek”, Articles 20, 21, the TSC, Vol. 1, 938. 
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 François Henri Turpin, Prawatsat haeng Phraratchanachak Sayam (History of the Kingdom of 
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116 
 
3.1.4 Acts to Control the Influence of Princes and Nobles  
 
Various measures in the Kabotsuek, Kot Monthianban and Ayaluang dealt 
with preventing secret alliances between princes and high-ranking nobles who 
controlled the massive manpower. These laws not only give an example of the 
prohibitions the ruler made, but also provide some insight into court politics at that 
time. They illustrate that the king distrusted the princes and nobles. For instance, 
the Kot Monthianban and Ayaluang prohibited the meeting of princes and nobles, 
especially at night.21 During ceremonies such as weddings and funerals, nobles had 
to speak loudly with one another in case some tried conspiring with one another.22 
Nobles were disallowed from carrying out private conversations with foreign envoys 
without royal permission.23 Provincial governors were forbidden from visiting other 
towns without a royal command.24 Anyone who discovered a plot to usurp the 
throne was required to report it to the ministers.25 The misuse of manpower 
belonging to the court was seriously prohibited.  
Presumably, from the ruler’s perspective, the influence of the nobles was 
more dangerous than that of the princes, though in fact princes were usually the 
ones who staged revolts, and only four kings of Ayudhya had been usurpers of noble 
rather than royal blood.26 The reality was that without support and manpower from 
the nobles, it would have been difficult for a prince to seize power, and there were 
                                                          
21
 “Ayaluang”, Article 119, the TSC, Vol. 2, 395. 
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 “Kot Monthianban”, Articles 75-78, 188-189. 
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 Ibid., Article 79, 189. 
24
 Ibid., Article 77, 189; “Kabotsuek”, Article 8, the TSC, Vol. 1, 932. 
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 “Kabotsuek”, Articles 2, 4, 6, the TSC, Vol. 1, 931; “Ayaluang”, Article 96, the TSC, Vol. 2, 385. 
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 They were Khun Worawonsathirat (r.1548), Maha Thammaracha (r.1569-1590), Prasatthong (r. 
1629-1656) and Phetracha (r. 1688-1703). Though they were not princes, all of them came from 
families that connected to royal lineage. 
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considerably more nobles than princes. The power of the Ayudhyan nobility reached 
its peak in 1629 when the Minister of Military and the South became King 
Prasatthong (r. 1629-56). Afterward, the nobility’s power was reduced because of 
Prasatthong’s strict measures to diminish their influence.  
Prasatthong promulgated various decrees to control and weaken the nobles’ 
influence. Some of his decrees were continued during the Early Bangkok period, as 
evident in the TSC. These include the prohibitions of private meetings between high-
ranking nobles. Visiting the residence of other nobles required royal permission; 
otherwise, their lives and positions would be in danger.27 Some rules were short-
term policies enforced only during Prasatthong’s reign. There is evidence showing 
that these laws had really been implemented. As recorded by van Vliet, the VOC 
representative in Ayudhya from 1633 to 1641, high-ranking nobles were required to 
appear before the king in the throne hall every day, or three times a day; absences 
had to be explained and justified. If illness was the explanation given, the court 
physician was sent to perform a check-up; highest-ranking nobles had no real 
authority, in spite of their positions, because they were transferred after a few 
months from one office to another.28 It was hard for them to accumulate influence 
or build their networks. These measures reflected the king’s worry about the nobles’ 
power. (In fact, the similarity of several acts in the Kot Monthianban and Kabotsuek 
with laws mentioned in van Vliet’s contemporary records helps to clarify that these 
articles were originally legislated in Prasatthong’s reign.) 
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Furthermore, Prasatthong directly controlled important state departments 
and reduced the power of influential nobles. He limited the wealth of nobles by 
redistributing their assets after their death. The property of nobles who were 
beheaded was seized, which was then transferred to the king.29 When Prasatthong 
came to the throne, resistance occurred in Nakhon Sithammarat and Pattani, a 
Malay vassal state of Ayudhya, which rejected his usurped authority. These led to 
the strict control of provincial governors. The governors, especially of important 
provinces, were required to stay in the capital rather than visit the court at Ayudhya 
once or twice a year like before. However, these were short-term measures. After 
Prasatthong’s reign, provincial governors returned to their towns and gradually 
restored their influence. This was evident from uprisings that erupted in two major 
cities, Nakhon Ratchasima and Nakhon Sithammarat, in the two reigns after 
Prasatthong’s.  
Prasatthong’s strict measures temporarily weakened the nobility’s influence, 
but these measures caused long-term problems for state administration, and the 
weakening of Ayudhya’s authority over other provinces. The eradication of the 
influence of princes and nobles was a crucial policy measure of Thai kings. There was 
a high degree of power rivalry in the court during some reigns. The kings thus 
increased tight controls over power. A consequence was inefficiency of state 
administration, because numerous officials were removed, jailed or executed. The 
result was an inadequate number of experienced nobility working for the state 
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administration. The administration relied considerably on the king’s ability rather 
than the administrative system.  
Furthermore, there was no unity and trust among nobles. The palace 
teemed with slander against one another. The nobility competed for better 
positions and split into factions. In the late years of Ayudhya, the capital began to 
lose its authority over the provinces, because ministers who controlled the 
provinces had no real authority and were unable to entrench themselves in a 
particular post. Their positions were unstable and they were replaced frequently. 
This manifested in the last few months of Ayudhya when several townships broke 
away from Ayudhya’s authority and immediately became autonomous after the fall 
of Ayudhya. This reflected the lack of power of Ayudhya over its provinces.30 
 
3.2 Threats to Royal Authority  
 
The laws assumed the theoretical significance and sanctity of the monarch in 
relation to traditional conceptions of kingship. However, history reflects that other 
factors weakened or threatened royal authority in far more subtle ways, and the 
laws testify clearly to these factors. Laws concerning royal authority have been 
promulgated in different periods. Similar details in certain laws demonstrated the 
kings’ worries about the excessive influence of princes and nobles. This caused the 
rulers to attempt to regain their authority by enacting various laws to control the 
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power of nobility and princes. This section examines the threats to royal authority in 
the political context of Ayudhya. The discussion relates to laws dealing with these 
threats. It provides a better understanding of traditional Thai politics that influenced 
and reflected the king’s considerable attention on the maintenance of his authority.  
There were a few key factors that could potentially undermine the king’s 
authority. The first related to the belief of the great merit (bun barami) of the ruler. 
The second factor pertained to uncertain rules of succession which led to 
contentions and struggles for power. The third factor was the control of manpower 
by princes and nobles.  
 
3.2.1 Impact of the “Bun Barami” Conception  
 
The belief in Buddhist virtues or bun barami was a double-edged sword 
which either buttressed or weakened royal authority. According to the belief, one 
became king because of the highest virtue in his past life. Kings could claim that 
their personal virtues gave them the mandate to rule. Because of the karmic belief 
in individual merit, Thai political thought during the traditional periods welcomed 
usurpers. This ideology, on one hand, established and supported the king’s authority 
and legitimacy; on the other hand, it caused instability to the king’s authority 
because merit-based legitimacy was connected to the individual rather than to his 
family or lineage. It differed from Confucian monarchs such as in China and Vietnam, 
where legitimacy conferred by the Mandate of Heaven was linked more to a 
dynastic family than to an individual ruler.  
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A ruler’s bun barami could be undermined in very direct ways by a rival 
claimant to the throne. Other than the incumbent ruler, usurpers and rebels also 
applied these ideas to their advantage and in legitimizing their usurped authority. 
They claimed that because of the king’s lack of righteousness and loss of merit, he 
lost all legitimacy. For example, when Okphra Phetracha (r. 1688 - 1703) conspired 
to overthrow Narai (r. 1656 – 1688), along with his alliances, he spread rumors that 
calamities were occurring in the kingdom because of the king’s neglect of dharma 
and customs. The king hence lost his virtuous legitimacy to rule.31  
Bun barami was invoked in a more direct manner many times by political 
figures, monks, and folk scholars claiming themselves as phumibun or holy men, the 
implication being that they had greater merit than the ruler currently occupying the 
throne and thus could potentially supplant him. In the Ayudhyan period, the concept 
of the ruler’s merit was regularly mentioned. Rulers were fully aware of the threats 
to their authority from those claiming to be phumibun. In the late 1690s, during the 
reign of the usurper Phetracha, the leaders of two uprisings, the Thammathian 
Uprising and the Bunkhwang Uprising, claimed to be holy men. They also each 
claimed to be the late king’s brother who survived execution because of their 
spiritual powers.32 Their claims were effective in Thai society where people believed 
in supernatural powers and respected royalty. The uprisings thus got support from 
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 It was said that Phetracha’s son, who later became King Sanphet IV (Phrachao Seua), 
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ordinary people. However, they were suppressed and the leaders were eventually 
executed.  
In Thai history, many political figures claimed to possess bun barami to 
strengthen their power and weaken their opponents’ legitimacy. This belief can be 
considered to be the most important factor that affected the politics of Ayudhya, 
which had a history of coups d’état.33 It is to be noted that there was no law on holy 
men during the Ayudhyan period. Cases of rebellion by holy men are found in royal 
chronicles and contemporary records of French missionary priests. However, the 
Sangha Laws promulgated in the Early Bangkok period clearly mention the acts of 
holy men, as will be discussed in the final chapter.  
 
3.2.2 Vagueness of Succession Laws  
 
The vagueness of succession laws undermined royal authority and caused 
succession disputes throughout the period of Ayudhya. An obvious requirement to 
succeed to the throne was being a prince from the royal bloodline. The uncertainty 
of succession laws reside in the fact that either the king’s brother or son could 
succeed to the throne. The rank of the heir-apparent was the Upparat, or simply the 
Wang Na.34 The rank of Upparat was the highest assigned rank.  
In the Kot Monthianban, the king’s first son by the highest queen, called No 
Phraphutthachao, literally meaning the descendant of Lord Buddha, was regarded as 
the highest rank by birth among princes. The sakdina ranks of the Upparat and No 
                                                          
33
 Seksan, “Transformation”, 28. 
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 Wang Na means the “Front Palace”. It was an informal title used to refer to the Upparat 
because his palace was located in front of the grand palace, and in battlefield, the Upparat’s 
troops was in front of the king’s troops. 
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Phraphutthachao were equal, that is, 100,000 rai, but the royal rank of No 
Phraphutthachao was higher than the Upparat by one level.35 Nevertheless, this law 
did not ever stipulate that the No Phraphutthachao would necessarily be the heir-
apparent; which prince held the latter title was still determined by the ruler, not by 
birth. This meant that a prince could be No Phraphutthachao by birth, but he might 
not be appointed the Upparat; in practice, any brother or son of the king could be 
given the latter title and inherit the throne.  
There was, however, no guarantee that the designated Upparat would 
actually succeed to the throne once the ruler was dead, as was proven on numerous 
occasions in the history of Ayudhya. Six kings were succeeded by their brothers, and 
only two of these had been previously appointed the Upparat: Ekatotsarot (r. 1605 – 
1610) and Boromkot (r. 1733 – 1758). Although Boromkot was the official heir, he 
fought with his two brothers for the throne. 21 kings were succeeded by their sons, 
be it peacefully or violently; 14 of these had held the title of the Upparat. The 
ambiguity of the succession laws caused disputes, fights, coups, rebellions, and 
massacres throughout the Ayudhyan period. 15 rulers from the 34 kings of Ayudhya 
came to the throne by seizing power. Some monarchs were overthrown after a very 
short period of time spanning only a few days to a year.  
Historical facts tend to show that the accession and rule of Ayudhya’s kings 
relied very much on their individual qualities and authority. Seizures of power from 
rivals usually occurred when an incompetent individual ascended to the throne. The 
divine status and power of the reigning king, as well as heavy penalties laid down in 
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the laws for acts of treason, could not prevent seizures of the throne. As Jeremy 
Kemp mentions, “despite the absolutism and divinity of kingship, the court history 
of Siam in the 17th century is replete with intrigue, coups and vicious succession 
disputes.”36 
In both successful and abortive coups, the elimination of political opponents 
by the monarch normally occurred in the weeks following the coups. Besides 
building fear and suspicion among the people, such actions caused the deterioration 
of the kingdom in the long run. It is unlikely that the rulers of Ayudhya disregarded 
the cause of the problem, but it seems that the structured succession method was 
incompatible with the emphasis on individual bun barami in Thai political culture, as 
rulers who had not enough bun barami could still have been placed on the throne. 
Hence, it is possible that usurpations represented a way of natural selection where 
the most powerful and meritorious leaders were enthroned.  
The vagueness of the succession laws was remedied in 1886 in the Bangkok 
era when King Chulalongkorn (r. 1868 – 1910) abolished the rank of Upparat and 
established the rank of Siamese Crown Prince, based on the model of European 
monarchies. The new law confirms the king’s first son by the highest-ranking queen 
as the legal heir.  
 
3.2.3 The Structure of Administration and the Threat to Royal Authority  
 
The structure of manpower control was the third factor that had the 
potential to subvert royal authority. (Laws and problems concerning manpower will 
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be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 6.) Administrative power was divided 
among princes and nobles, and there were no positions that were monopolized by 
the former and inaccessible to the latter. Thus, they shared influence and wealth 
derived from the monarch. The basis of the power and wealth of the ruling class was 
the control of phrai (manpower). All phrai were required to register under both 
state and individual munnai/nai (masters, who were princes or nobles) to receive 
legal protection from the state, according to the Act of 1899 BE (1356) in the Law on 
the Acceptance of Charges. This was the state’s measure to control the phrai and to 
exploit the phrai in state affairs.  
There were two kinds of phrai: phrai luang (royal manpower) and phrai som 
(individual manpower). Phrai luang registered with the krom37 (departments of the 
state) and worked for the state six months a year. This form of obligatory service 
was called khao duean (being on duty). They could also pay taxes in kind or cash in 
place of their labor. Phrai luang living in remote areas could pay suai (tax in kind) 
instead of being on duty in state departments. They were classified as phrai luang 
suai.  
Phrai som registered under other munnai who were princes and nobles. The 
king distributed phrai to munnai instead of paying them an allowance. Phrai som 
worked as labor for their nai only, with the exception of wartime, when they could 
                                                          
37
 The Thai term “krom” was used for units of the state at all levels in the traditional period. 
However, in translation to English, this term can be translated as either “ministry” or 
“department”, depending on their levels of administrative system. Six krom that can be 
translated as “ministries” are Kalahom (ministry in charge of the south and military affairs), 
Mahatthai (ministry in charge of the north and civil affairs), Phrakhlang (ministry in charge of the 
east and finance), Wang (ministry in charge of the palace), Kasettathikan (ministry of 
agriculture), and Nakhonban (ministry in charge of the capital city). These were six main 
ministries of Thai traditional administration. Other krom are translated as “department” because 
they were subordinate units within larger ministries. 
126 
 
be mobilized for combat. The number of phrai som under each munnai was based 
on the sakdina grade. The higher the sakdina they had, the greater the manpower 
they controlled. For example, a minister of sakdina 10,000 controlled 400 men; a 
noble of sakdina 400 controlled 25 men.38 Also, princes and nobles controlled phrai 
luang through their state departments; however, that control would only be 
administrative rather than personal as with the phrai som.  
The number of phrai under the control of munnai was one of the most 
important factors that caused political conflict. The greater the manpower they 
controlled, the more power and wealth they had. This is because phrai were both 
free labor and guards for their nai. The great influence of munnai persuaded phrai to 
be under their networks. The substantial power of munnai impacted the king’s 
authority. If the king was incapable, his authority and position were insecure, and 
without a standing army, he was vulnerable to attacks from opponents with large 
supplies of manpower which could be mobilized on their behalf.  
As seen in the history of Ayudhya, many coups and revolts were staged by 
powerful princes with the support of influential nobles; powerful nobles sometimes 
could seize the throne, particularly since the boundary between “royalty” and 
“nobility” was very porous.39 Thus, various laws were promulgated to control their 
influence. Seksan illustrates the nature of Ayudhyan politics where the control of 
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manpower was significant for the king’s authority. He provides several examples of 
court factionalism, conspiracy, and dethronement.40  
 
3.3 The Use of Law in Maintaining Royal Authority in the Early Bangkok Period  
 
 
The laws of Ayudhya were reused in the Bangkok era. The kings of Bangkok 
kept many laws and decrees which were already in existence. These later decrees 
were copied and distributed to officials and people both in the capital and 
provinces. Provincial governments copied versions of laws that they needed to use 
in judgments. In villages, when new decrees were enacted, officials informed the 
villagers by reading the laws to them. This has been the practice since the Ayudhyan 
period. It ensured that all commoners either literate or illiterate acknowledged the 
laws so that they would not act against them.  
Conspiracy and treason during the Early Bangkok period posed relatively 
insignificant threats during its long history, as they were abortive and had no serious 
effect on the security of the king’s position or the state’s stability. Nevertheless, it 
can be assumed that they still posed a worry to the rulers. The bloody history of the 
Ayudhyan period would have been lessons for Bangkok rulers. This part discusses 
the laws against organizing opposition to royal authority. The issues deal with 
providing security for the king, preventing conspiracy, and prohibiting the use of 
anonymous letters. 
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3.3.1 Legislation Relating to Royal Security  
 
Rama I paid much attention towards securing his authority and was cautious 
in preventing the spread of conspiracies and resistance, as seen in his decrees 
concerning royal security. Noticeably, Rama I promulgated the new laws only when 
he had found that the existing laws had been violated. In all of his laws, he gave the 
reasons for their enactment and provided cases of each law’s violation to indicate 
the need to promulgate them. Rama I also introduced heavier punishments in some 
new decrees. This may have been done to instill fear in officials and people, to make 
them follow the laws and think twice before breaking them. A decree on the 
supervision of royal processions instituted in the first year of his reign shows the 
new king’s concern for his security. In the decree, Rama I complained of officials 
neglecting their duty. He commanded officials to follow the rules regarding the 
protection of the king that was set out in the Kot Monthianban. The law established 
the process and procedures of providing for the king’s security, the number of 
guards to be deployed, a list of entourages, and the duties of guards, such as 
preventing anyone or any boat from interrupting royal processions. He also 
emphasized punishments for offenders, both officials and commoners.41  
In 1785, a decree concerning security was repeated. In the decree 
prohibiting the possession of gun and gunpowder, an official traveling for trade 
could borrow a gun from his department, but had to return it upon his return; 
foreign traders coming to Siam were required to leave their weapons with the 
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officials of the ministry of Kalahom at Samutprakan located at the mouth of the 
Chaophraya River. According to Rama I, this prohibition was enforced since the 
Ayudhyan period in the Ayaluang. However, the law was regularly broken. He 
reinstated this law because a Chinese trader had broken it by carrying his gun into 
Bangkok, and the officials had also neglected to inspect the traders’ ships. The king 
emphasized that this was a serious offence. He thus commanded both officials and 
people to follow the law.42  
Except for laws revised in the first reign, only a few new laws dealing with 
the security of the king were promulgated in later reigns, namely, an 1814 decree on 
the prohibition of writing and presenting anonymous letters and an 1816 decree 
concerning regulations in presenting medicine and food to the king.  
In the decree of 1816, the king introduced regulations for officials in charge 
of providing him with medicine and food. This decree aimed to protect the king’s 
safety and prevent him from being poisoned. Unrelated officials were forbidden 
from carrying, preparing and staying in the same room with the king’s medicine and 
food; the king’s utensils were to be covered with white cloth and sealed. The king’s 
food and medicine had to be prepared in a clean and safe manner; if any mistake 




                                                          
42
 Ibid., Article 11, 717-718. 
43
 Satian Lailuk, ed., Prachum kotmai pracham sok: Kotmai Ratchakan thi 2 – Ratchakan thi 3 




3.3.2 Cases of Conspiracy  
 
Regarding the point of betrayal, during the Early Bangkok period, a few plots 
to seize the king’s power were committed, though none of them succeeded. The 
first conspiracy was committed in 1783 by two former monks who claimed to 
possess magical powers. They planned to assassinate the Upparat or the Front 
Palace Prince (Wangna), the heir-apparent. They persuaded a few officials of the 
Front Palace to join them by promising them royal ranks. The two men came 
secretly into the hall of the Front Palace to kill the prince, but their plan failed. They 
were arrested and executed.44 
One month after the event, Rama I promulgated the second Sangha Law 
which demanded that Buddhist abbots supervise the behavior of monks and novices 
in their monasteries to prevent them from committing any offences. He ordered the 
abbots to prohibit the monks from learning magic to prevent them from presenting 
themselves as phumibun.45 This command was most likely motivated by the 
conspiracy.  
Interestingly, this event might have also affected the revision of one 
particular article in the Kabotsuek. It seems difficult to identify the parts of the 
Ayudhyan laws that were revised during the revision of the Three Seals Code in 
1805. This was because the revised parts were integrated into the old laws of 
Ayudhya without any signs to identify them as amendments. Nevertheless, some 
treasonous activities mentioned in Article 10 in the Kabotsuek, namely, rebels 
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disguising and hiding themselves in the palace and the throne hall to injure the king, 
as well as joining the courtiers’ conspiracy, were activities that occurred during the 
1783 conspiracy.46  
The second conspiracy was started in 1803 by two sons of the Front Palace 
Prince and a few officials. The conspirators were arrested and executed on a charge 
of conspiring to overthrow the king. According to the Kabotsuek, the princes were 
stripped of their royal rank, put into red fabric sacks, and beaten to death with 
fragrant wood, while the others were beheaded.47 This event was the effect of the 
vagueness of the succession laws that usually threatened the stability of the rulers. 
It also reflected the competition within the court for power, especially between 
princes and officials of the Grand Palace and the Front Palace.  
Prince Damrong, the author of the Annals of the Second Reign, suggests that 
conflict between factions, which happened many times in the First Reign, might be 
acknowledged in the kingdom and other kingdoms.48 Hence, Emperor Gia Long of 
Vietnam, who had received Rama I’s patronage and had lived in Bangkok for many 
years, wrote a letter to Rama I, warning him about the disunity and suggesting him 
to appoint Chaofa Kromluang Itsarasunthon – who later became Rama II – to be the 
heir-apparent to prevent ambitious people from seizing power.49 The prince was 
appointed as the heir-apparent in 1806. However, the vagueness of succession laws 
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still caused problems over the next few reigns. Subsequent events that impacted 
royal authority will be discussed together with other causes in later sections.  
 Another case of conspiracy happened in Rama III’s reign in 1844. This case 
has never been mentioned in previous works of Thai history. It was a conspiracy 
within a conspiracy. Offenders infringed many acts of the Kabotsuek and Ayaluang. 
It happened in the northeastern region, which was close to Laos and Cambodia. This 
region was important as a military base for Bangkok because the war between 
Bangkok and Vietnam had been ongoing since 1833. Armaments were levied from 
this region and locals were conscripted for military service.  
The case first began as a conspiracy and subsequently implicated a high-
ranking and significant noble, Chaophraya Badindecha, who held the position of 
Samuhanayok (the Minister of Mahatthai) and was one of the most important and 
famous army leaders of Rama III, especially during the war with Vietnam from 1833 
to 1847. According to the testimonies of offenders, the conspiracy was plotted by a 
man called Saeng, and his followers. Saeng was a son of a provincial official in the 
northeast and used to work as a low-ranking official. He impersonated the son of 
Chaophraya Badindecha and presented a forged official document to the 
northeastern provincial governors, commanding them to gather manpower and 
prepare armaments. The false official document was seemingly certified by a fake 
seal of Chaophraya Badindecha, who was leading the troops against Vietnam. Thus, 




In addition, Saeng lied about being a courtier who received the king’s 
command to conscript manpower. He also set up a ceremony of oath-taking and 
invited officers and village leaders to participate to affirm their loyalty to the king. 
Provincial governors believed in the document, the seal, and Saeng’s words. The 
ritual increased their trust of Saeng. They gave Saeng arms, bullets, and elephants. 
Moreover, Saeng asked for money and precious objects for his own benefit. 
However, Phra Suriyawong, a provincial official, suspected Saeng and 
arrested him and his accompanies. According to the testimonies of Saeng and his 
followers, they confessed their guilt, but Phra Suriyawong urged Saeng twice to 
incriminate Chaophraya Badindecha of plotting with Laos to attack Bangkok. Phra 
Suriyawong reported to Bangkok that Saeng had accused the general. He also forced 
other governors to put down their names in the report sent to Bangkok. Later, in the 
inquisition by a council of the Lukkhun na sala, Phra Suriyawong confessed his plot 
of incriminating the general. However, the sources provide no reasons for why he 
wanted to accuse the general.  
It is interesting to note that the court judgment clearly underlined offences 
in this case which were in line with the Kabotsuek and Ayaluang. According to the 
Kabotsuek, officials had to be careful with information concerning warfare. If anyone 
lied about official affairs, especially warfare, he was to be beheaded.50 If anyone 
betrayed the king and plotted to do harm to the king and the kingdom, he and his 
clan were to be executed.51 As instituted in the Ayaluang, if anyone slandered other 
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people of conspiracy, he was guilty of treason and sentenced to death.52 If anyone 
was overly ambitious, acted beyond his official rank, and extorted from the king’s 
subjects, he was to be punished. The capital punishment was execution.53 If anyone 
counterfeited royal commands, official documents and official seals, he was to be 
punished by whipping, cutting off a hand, or beheading.54 If nobles issued orders 
that opposed the laws, anyone who followed the commands and refused to resist 
the illegal orders would be punished.55 
The judgment also clearly announced the offences of those implicated in the 
case. Saeng’s offences included conspiracy, forgery, altering official seals, false 
impersonation, and defamation of a high-ranking noble. The punishment for Saeng 
was flogging, public humiliation, and beheading. His followers were flogged and 
imprisoned.  
Phra Suriyawong would have gotten a reward of a promotion to provincial 
governor because he had exposed and arrested Saeng. However, he planned to 
frame the general and committed other offences, namely, embezzling revenues and 
arms, and extorting people’s properties. His offences warranted capital punishment 
which included removal from his official position, flogging, public humiliation and 
execution.  
Other governors who had added their signatures to the official document 
used to accuse the general were found guilty as accomplices. Their punishment was 
demotion, seizure of property and execution. The governor of Loei who released 
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Saeng was whipped 50 times and demoted to become a commoner. Governors who 
trusted Saeng were blamed for being careless in state affairs. They were flogged 50 
times.  
The judgment was presented to Rama III to make the final decision. This 
indicates the supreme authority of the king in judgment. Rama III agreed that the 
judgment was in accordance with the laws. However, he commented that the 
defamation of the general was the plot of Suriyawong. Thus, the other governors 
were omitted from punishment; however, they were flogged 50 times to make them 
realize their faults. The king also allowed them to remain in their positions. Later, 
senior monks asked the king to rescind the death sentences of Suriyawong and 
Saeng. The king agreed to grant an amnesty to them; they were then imprisoned 
and condemned to hard labor.56  
This case reflects the influence of the monks in state affairs. The Sangha did 
not interfere in the court judgment but interceded to protect human lives and to 
support the king’s accumulation of merit by avoiding killing. Moreover, there were 
many cases where the king eventually reduced punishments. Thus, punishments did 
not entirely follow the laws. Death sentences could be rescinded, except in cases 
connected directly to the king’s authority and security.  
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3.3.3 Laws Prohibiting Anonymous Letters  
 
The prohibition on anonymous letters was instituted in the Ayudhya period. 
As stated in the Kabotsuek, making, spreading, and reading anonymous letters in all 
cases were seriously prohibited and violators would receive capital punishment.57 
However, anonymous letters were still used to frame political opponents of crimes 
they did not commit. In 1809, a few days after the accession of Rama II (r. 1809 – 
1824), an anonymous letter was found. It accused Kromkhun Kasattranuchit, who 
was a son of Taksin and grandson of Rama I (whose daughter had married Taksin), of 
conspiring to overthrow the king.  
Before exploring this event, it is necessary to examine the context of the 
later years of Rama I’s reign and the period of Rama II’s ascension in order to 
understand the internal politics and the state of the kingdom at that time. The 
Burmese was preparing to attack the Bangkok kingdom because Rama I was very old 
and sick, and important generals had passed away. In addition, the internal situation 
in Bangkok had changed during the later years of Rama I’s reign. Senior princes and 
nobles, who held important posts in the state administration, especially in the 
military, passed away or were old. Factionalism in the court also contributed to the 
instability. Young princes grew up to become senior princes, but they and their 
officials were divided into cliques, especially groups of the Grand Palace and the 
Front Palace.58 These conditions disturbed the stability of the kingdom and the 
king’s position during the late years of Rama I’s reign and the beginning of Rama II’s.  
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Rama II, as the new king, realized the problems concerning the security of 
his kingdom and his position. He thus strengthened his authority immediately. Three 
days after the demise of Rama I in October 1809, a conspiracy was revealed and the 
plotters were arrested. It was assumed that the conspiracy was headed by Prince 
Kasattranuchit. Two other royals, 10 nobles and 30 subordinates of the prince were 
charged. They were executed, while the three royals were demoted from royal ranks 
before being executed.59 
A few interesting points of the conspiracy bear examining. First of all, this 
conspiracy was exposed by an anonymous letter found in the palace. Prince 
Kasattranuchit and two other royals, who were a son and a daughter of King Taksin, 
and a few nobles were pinpointed as the plotters. Writing anonymous letters was 
prohibited by law because it was an easy way to slander other people without 
responsibility and it caused disorder. The king felt that anonymous letters could be 
used to frame other people. In this case, it was impossible to conclude if the 
accusation against Kromkhun Kasattranuchit was genuine, even though he 
confessed. This could have been a plot to get rid of the prince, who was King 
Taksin’s son and Rama I’s favorite grandson.  
It should be noted that the prince was a direct descendent of Taksin and 
Rama I. He was Taksin’s son and his mother was Rama I’s daughter. He could use 
this lineage to lay claim to the throne. According to this point, it may be 
unimportant whether he actually started the plot or not. His status inevitably 
threatened the king’s authority. This was because those who were not loyal to the 
                                                          
59
 Ibid., 7–8. 
138 
 
king would take advantage of the prince’s status to undermine the stability of royal 
authority. Political conflicts among the princes during the Ayudhyan period would 
have been on the king’s mind. Hence, the king’s could have responded to the 
incident to prevent future conflicts and protect his authority.  
According to Krommuen Chetsadabodin – the head of the investigation and 
Rama II’s son who would later became Rama III – the plot was first hatched by a 
noble, Phra Intharadet, who urged the prince and other people to participate in it.60 
However, because the prince’s rank was higher than other plotters and he was 
influential, he was identified as the head of the rebels. The eradication of the 
plotters, especially the prince, would be a lesson to others.  
The second interesting point is that the prince might have indeed planned 
the conspiracy, but because of his influence, no one dared to stand out and publicly 
accuse him. An anonymous letter was thus used to reveal the plot. This was a result 
of the Act of 2327 BE (1784) that prohibited a petition to be made through a written 
document and allowed only oral pleading.61 In 1784, Rama I cancelled the Ayudhyan 
law of prosecution that allowed the plaintiff to draft a petition for his own case. The 
Laksana Rap Fong (the Law of the Reception of Plaints) revised in 1805 did not 
mention the Ayudhyan law as it had already been cancelled. However, other decrees 
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and Rama I’s comments show that in the Ayudhyan period, literate plaintiffs could 
write their own statements or asked other literates to write for them.62 
Rama I explained that he cancelled the old law because it seemed to give 
undue advantage to dishonest literates. They might want to earn money or receive a 
bribe by creating false information in the statement or changing an account for their 
client’s benefit. He cited a case when a retired official wrote an indictment 
statement for a commoner who sued his wife’s lover. However, it was discovered 
during the investigation that many testimonies in the statement were untrue. Some 
witnesses cited in the statement knew nothing about the adultery, but the writer 
quoted them as witnesses anyway. The judge also passed a careless judgment, said 
Rama I. A fresh investigation was made and the author of the statement was 
punished for giving false information. The king then repealed the old law and 
enacted a new law which prohibited plaintiffs from writing their own statements 
and allowed only oral petitions.63 
In this new law, Rama I permitted only oral petitions made at the state’s 
departments. In Bangkok, the people could make a prosecution charge at the 
Lukkhun na sala and Lukkhun na san luang,64 while in the provinces the people could 
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file charges with provincial officials on duty. The law permits only the officials-in-
charge to write the statements, and they had to write the statements in the 
presence of four or five officials. Statements written by others were not accepted. 
This law aimed at preventing slander and false testimony.65  
It should also be noted that Rama I promulgated two laws on the 
prosecution of cases in 1784. One was Article 6 of the PKM in the TSC. The other was 
classified in the chotmaihet (records) as Kotmai Ratchakan thi 1 (the laws of Rama I) 
in the title of Phraratchabanyat thunklao thawai dika (the Act of Petition to the 
Crown). None of the records provide reasons why the last Act was not included in 
the TSC in its revision in 1805.  
Other than the prohibition of written petitions, the other details of these 
two acts are different. Article 6 of the PKM focuses only on the point of this 
prohibition and provides an example to explain why the old law should be erased. 
The latter Act begins with the prohibition and the suggestion that statements be 
written by officials. Other details in this Act include regulations concerning the 
prosecution as mentioned in the Law of the Reception of Plaints, such as seven kinds 
of people who could not press charges and be considered as court witnesses,66 the 
duration of the trial in each case, and the provision of the plaintiff’s names in the 
statements.  
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A disadvantage of the reliance on oral petitions was that if an influential 
person was prosecuted, a plaintiff who was a subordinate or member of the lower 
class might be afraid of testifying against him, for fear of suffering reprisal. He might 
give up the case to avoid any retaliation. With regard to the aforementioned case of 
the use of an anonymous letter to expose a conspiracy, nobody would have dared to 
verbally accuse the influential prince. An anonymous letter would have been the 
safe way though it broke the law.  
Accusations through anonymous letters remained a practice though the law 
prohibited it. In 1814, five years after the case of Prince Kasattranuchit, Rama II 
made a decree to increase the punishment for making and spreading anonymous 
letters by basing the punishment on the ranks of the letters’ victims. Persons who 
defamed royalty and high-ranking nobility would be punished with 50 lashes, 
removal of official or royal ranks, and execution; those who slandered commoners 
would be beaten 50 times and imprisoned six months. Rama II also emphasized the 
decree of oral pleading instead of written pleading. He complained that the existing 
laws had been frequently neglected and anonymous letters had been used to 
defame royalty and nobility, which disturbed him and caused trouble.67 His 
complaints clearly reflected that the enforcement of the law against the use of 
anonymous letters was not very effective.  
The prohibition was violated again in 1816. An anonymous letter indicted 
two high-ranking princes: Chetsadabodin, the future Rama III, and his uncle 
Rakronnaret, Rama II’s brother. In the letter, the two princes were blamed for their 
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judgment in a case where three senior monks had sexual intercourse and bore 
children. The monks were found guilty and then imprisoned. After the judgment, an 
anonymous letter was discovered; the letter denounced the princes and asserted 
that their judgment would consign them to hell and that the kingdom was going to 
fall into the terrible period known as Kaliyuga.68 Rama II commented that the text 
was not only illegal but vulgar, especially in terms of what it said about the kingdom. 
He thus ordered an investigation. The letter was discovered to have been written by 
Prince Sisurainthorn, an adherent of a sentenced monk. He was arrested, but died 
before the case was tried.  
 
3.4 Conclusion  
 
The discussion in this Chapter reflects the king’s concern about his authority 
and the use of law in response to emergent situations. It also shows that strict laws 
and heavy penalties did not necessarily maintain the king’s authority or prevent 
conspiracies. Other factors undermined his authority. For instance, the idea of the 
king’s virtue could be used to support the legitimacy of the king on one hand, and 
that of his rivals on the other hand. The weakness of succession rules caused 
political struggles throughout the Ayudhyan period. The nature of the administrative 
system, especially the apportioning of manpower to princes and nobles, was one of 
the factors for political instability. Numerous decrees were laid down to control the 
influence of the princes and the nobility.  
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Nevertheless, political struggles involving the princes – who had the support 
of the powerful nobility – throughout the Ayudhyan period reflected that the laws 
alone could not protect the king’s authority. The king’s personality and ability were 
also important factors in the extent of support of his authority. As seen in history, a 
powerful king such as Prasatthong could steadily hold authority and suppress the 
power of the princes and nobility throughout his reign. This was because of the 
king’s strict and severe governance, his wisdom and tricks, and his absolute 
determination. He never hesitated to punish and execute anyone who threatened 
the security of his position and of the state.69 Although the king was regarded as 
cruel, his policies strengthened his authority. Thus, besides the strict laws, the king’s 
capabilities and characteristics affected his authority.  
The threats to royal authority that occurred in the Ayudhyan period were 
also present in the Bangkok period. The bun barami conception of royal authority, 
the vagueness of succession laws, and the influence of princes and nobles were 
threats to the authority of Bangkok’s rulers. The laws on royal authority instituted 
since the Ayudhyan period had been repeated, especially the laws concerning 
manpower. Although there were conflicts of power, conspiracies and accusations, 
politics in the Early Bangkok period was generally stable. Legislation concerning the 
king’s authority in this era support this observation. 
From these various laws, one can make a distinction between the stability of 
different political groups and of the state as a whole. Some laws related only to the 
stability of the king’s authority, such as laws on the provision of security during royal 
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processions, laws prohibiting treason, and laws banning the misappropriation of 
manpower. Other laws dealt with political stability within the elites, such as laws 
forbidding the writing and spreading of anonymous letters. Without these laws, 
framing of political opponents might have occurred frequently, causing political 
instability within the court. Anonymous letters would have become a political tool. 
These laws affected the elites more than the common people, because the majority 
of commoners were illiterate. They would not have been able to use anonymous 
letters to accuse others. The Miscellaneous Law and the Law on Quarrels indicate 
that common people regularly accused or slandered others orally.  
Moreover, some laws related to the stability of the kingdom as a whole, for 
example, laws defining soldiers’ proper conduct during wartime as mentioned in the 
Kabotsuek, and laws prohibiting officials’ abuses of authority laid down in the 
Ayaluang. The laws dealing with soldiers’ conduct in wartime related directly to the 
king’s dignity, because waging war was an expression of royal dignity in traditional 
conception of kingship, and also benefited the stability of the kingdom as a whole. In 
addition, the laws forbidding officials’ abuses of power were beneficial for the 
people.  
Some offences were cruel crimes that undermined social order and the 
morals of society. These severe offences included patricide, matricide, the murder of 
monks, destruction of Buddhist symbols, arson, cruel acts such as cutting victims’ 
bodies, and child abuse. These were stressed in the Kabotsuek and they arguably 
pertained more to “royal” authority than “state” authority in that the ruler, not the 
state, was linked to the moral basis of the social order. Offences in the Kabotsuek 
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seemed to be more serious and morally wrong than those discussed in the Ayaluang 
and Ayarat. This was because, other than affecting the social order and morality of 
society, these dangerous crimes directly impacted the king’s authority and 
legitimacy.  
With regard to the belief in the relationship between the king’s legitimacy 
and his merit in the traditional conception of Thai kingship, the king’s crucial duties 
were ruling with righteousness, bestowing dharma and social order to his subjects, 
and supporting Buddhism. Those severe offences reflected a lack of morality in 
criminals and undermined the main institutions of society – family and religion. 
Hence, the king’s failure to punish criminals or suppress the offences would impact 
his authority and legitimacy. It would be considered as the king’s failure in giving 
moral instructions to his subjects, in supporting Buddhism, and in bringing order to 
society. The king might be blamed for the lack of kingly virtues. His opponents might 
exploit the situation to destabilize the throne.  
Another point that should be mentioned is the comparison of the stability of 
the king’s authority between the Ayudhyan and Early Bangkok period. The 
discussion shows that the king’s authority during the Ayudhyan era was generally 
weaker. Political struggles and conspiracies to overthrow the king occurred 
frequently. Periods of peaceful transition of power were short. Although transitions 
of power in the Early Bangkok period were peaceful, it may be improper to compare 
with the Ayudhyan period because the Early Bangkok period included three reigns 
and 64 years, while the Ayudhyan era included 34 reigns and 417 years. This chapter 
focuses on the laws on royal authority and threats to royal authority. The next 
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chapter analyzes the king’s authority as the head of government. It focuses on the 
laws concerning state authority and offences against state authority dealing with 
state affairs. 
______________________ 
CHAPTER 4  
LAWS AND OFFENCES AGAINST STATE AUTHORITY 
 
 
The Introduction has already discussed definitions of the “state” examined 
by this study and other academics. Chapter 3, which focuses on royal authority, has 
discussed the laws and threats concerning the king’s authority. The main aims of the 
laws on royal authority, the Kot Monthianban and the Kabotsuek, were preserving 
and protecting royal prestige, the king’s safety, and the stability of the throne. The 
present chapter looks separately at the state as an administrative structure 
consisting of the institutions and apparatus of governance. 
The discussion in this and later chapters will show that threats to royal 
authority and threats to state authority were different. Topics that should be 
studied specifically for the “state” are threats to the authority of its organs, 
institutions, and officials, as well as crimes against social order. On the other hand, 
topics that specifically pertain to the “monarch” are issues of maintaining royal 
dignity and security, rebellion, and the control of the influence of princes and 
nobles. However, there are overlapping areas. For instance, the issue of manpower 
and the Sangha involve both state and king. The discussion in Chapter 6 and 7 
concerning the state’s management of manpower and the restoration of the Sangha 
respectively will examine both from the perspectives of the state and the king.  
According to Buddhist conceptions of state and kingship, the main goals of a 
state or a Buddhist king in governance were adhering to the conception of justice 
and bringing about social order and stability for people to pursue their livelihoods. 
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These ruling aims can be seen in the laws concerning state authority and social 
order, namely, the Ayaluang and Ayarat. Arguably, these laws reflect how the 
political ideals of the state were distinct from those of the king. The contents of 
these laws focus mainly on regulating the code of conduct for officials to provide 
justice, stability, and order to the inhabitants of the kingdom. They also prohibited 
the violation of state authority to maintain the conceptions of justice and state 
power. 
This chapter examines the use of laws in building the state’s stability. The 
discussion focuses on the distinct characteristics of state authority analyzed from 
the laws concerning state authority and social order, namely, the Ayaluang and 
Ayarat. The first section explains the terms “Ayaluang” and “Ayarat” to show how 
they specifically reflect the idea of state authority. The second section studies 
offences against the stability of the state, especially pertaining to state affairs and 
officials’ conduct. The maintenance of stability depended immensely on the officials’ 
exercise of authority, thus any abuse of authority was treated as a threat to the 
state on par with resistance to authority from the governed. Officials played 
important roles in the administration. They were the state’s representatives and 
served as an intermediary between the state and commoners. In traditional Thai 
states, ordinary people usually had little sense of political rights, and society was 
organized hierarchically, hence the integrity of officials was very important. The 
discussion covers both regulations and offences mentioned in the laws and historical 




This chapter also analyses the state’s responses to the cases through the 
promulgation of new laws to respond to the changes, improve judicial procedures, 
and bring as much justice to litigants as possible. The discussion makes use of official 
documents, testimonies, and statements of various cases in the Early Bangkok era. 
Besides cases dealing with state authority, these sources also reflect some parts of 
Thai society, such as people’s livelihood as well as the behaviors and attitudes of 
subordinates at the time. 
 
4.1 The Laws on State Authority: the Ayaluang and Ayarat  
 
The contents of the Ayaluang and meanings of the terms “Ayaluang” and 
“Ayarat” have already been examined in the Introduction and Chapter 3. Almost the 
entire Ayaluang is the code of conduct for officials to work righteously and the 
definition of offences against state authority, such as contempt of court, abuse of 
functions, corruption, disrespecting and counterfeiting official documents, and the 
obstruction of an official’s work.  
The Ayarat is the law concerning state authority and social order. The term 
“rat” is an abbreviation of ratsadorn, which means “the common people”.1 (This 
“rat”, with a long vowel in Thai, is not the same word as the “rat” with a short 
                                                          
1
 It should be noted that in the original law texts, all laws were named as separate titles, while 
the Ayarat was set as the final part of the Ayaluang. At the end of the Ayaluang, it is stated that 
it consists of 150 decrees separated into the 130 decrees of the Ayaluang and the 20 decrees of 
the Ayarat.  
Scholars usually refer to these two as separate laws. Editions by D.B. Bradley, first 
published in 1873, and by R. Lingat, who rearranged the law chapters in 1931, followed the 
original text of 1805 by including the Ayarat as a part of the Ayaluang. However, Bradley and 
Lingat provided a sub-heading for the Ayarat in the published texts, though not in their tables of 
contents. Subsequent publications of the TSC texts also followed this style. Nevertheless, the 
latest edition of the Royal Institute (Ratchabanditsathan) published in 2007 followed the 
arrangement of the original texts, which did not give a specific heading for the Ayarat. 
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vowel, meaning “state”.) The Ayarat is usually translated as the Law of Offences 
against the People2 or the Law on Civil Offences.3 This law focuses mainly on the 
state’s attempt to prevent and prohibit disputes in which a disputant disregarded 
state authority and laws by arbitrarily threatening or injuring his opponent. There 
are 20 acts in the Ayarat; 19 of these acts deal with disputes between commoners, 
while another act delineates the mistakes of officials in trying cases.4  
The law’s aim was to bring order to society and prevent people from 
harming others, because it meant the neglect and violation of state authority. The 
law enumerates various types of offences. For instance, it prohibited anyone from 
arbitrarily slandering, arresting, oppressing, abusing, or attacking his disputant. A 
man who abducted his own fiancée was to be punished; a creditor was forbidden 
from seizing or destroying the property of his debtor.5 The state wanted all cases to 
be tried by officials; taking justice into one’s own hands was prohibited, according to 
the law.6  
The main focus of the Ayaluang is state authority. Most of the decrees in this 
law deal with offences against state authority, especially crimes concerning state 
affairs and officials. On the other hand, the Ayarat is concerned with conflicts 
between individuals where the state’s authority was effectively ignored, as opposed 
to being actively violated. Although both laws focus on different issues, they reflect 
the traditional conception of the state, where the state possessed all administrative 
                                                          
2
 Quaritch Wales, Ancient Siamese, 169. 
3
 This translation is used in Ishii’s “Thai Thammasart” and the research project “The Three Seals 
Laws: Thai Law Code as a Word Heritage” under the support of the Thailand Research Fund (TRF), 
headed by Dr. Winai Pongsipian, 2002–2005. 
4
 “Ayarat”, Article 16, the TSC, Vol. 2, 420. 
5
 Ibid., Article 9, (page) 419. 
6
 Ibid., the Preamble and Articles 3–11, (page) 419. 
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and judicial authority. Acts that caused damage or injury to others, thereby 
disobeying or ignoring existing laws, were considered violations of state authority. 
Subsequent sections examine offences against state authority in these two laws. 
 
4.2 Offences Against State Authority in the Laws  
 
This section explores offences against state authority described in the 
Ayaluang, such as violating the law, abandoning official duties, neglecting state 
commands, corruption, counterfeiting and showing disrespect to official seals and 
documents, obstructing judicial procedures, and harming officials and commoners.7 
The Ayaluang classifies offences against the stability and authority of the state into 
four groups, called rawang (sections), namely, rawang lamoet, rawang amphrang, 
rawang bang-art, and rawang kanchok.  
Rawang lamoet literally means the violation of something such as laws or 
authority. Offences classified as rawang lamoet included 94 of the 130 Articles 
enacted in the Ayaluang. Most of them were offences concerning the violation of 
laws and state authority, threatening ordinary people, and officials’ abuse of 
authority.8  
Rawang amphrang literally means concealing, keeping secret, and 
suppressing the truth. Offences deemed as rawang amphrang included the 
falsification of evidence, concealing the truth during the judicial process, and 
                                                          
7
 “Ayaluang”, Articles 1–10, the TSC, Vol. 2, 377–383. 
8




fraudulent alteration of official documents or manpower lists.9 Rawang bang-art 
literally means disrespect and misbehavior. Rawang bang-art offences covered 
corruption and the embezzlement of state property.10 Rawang kanchok literally 
means extortion, blackmail, and threats, and extended to offences such as officials’ 
abuse of authority that cause harm to commoners.11  
It is to be noted that some offences spanned three different sections of 
crime. For instance, threatening common folk, violating laws and state commands, 
and misappropriating manpower were crimes charged as rawang kanchok, rawang 
lamoet, and rawang bang-art. The punishment composed of six different levels 
ranging from execution and confiscation of the offender’s house to lighter 
punishments such as fines.12 
 
4.2.1 “Rawang Lamoet”: the Violation of the Law  
 
Rawang lamoet in the Ayaluang prohibited the violation of laws and state 
commands. For instance, ministers were required to follow the laws conscientiously. 
If a noble gave orders that opposed the laws, anyone who followed the illegal orders 
and refused to defy them would be punished. If a noble gave a wrong order when 
handling state affairs, he would be punished with a fine. If a noble issued a valid 
command but his subordinates refused to obey, they were imprisoned (with 
possibility of parole).13 The law also shows that high-ranking officials were accorded 
                                                          
9
 Ibid., Articles 16, 17, 18, 41, 62, 64, 75, 76, 83, and 106. 
10
 Ibid., Articles 2, 22, 27, 29, 30, 35, 42, 46, 57, 63, 65, 69, 70, 77, 98, 107, 123, and 128. 
11
 Ibid., Introduction and Articles 12, 32, 34, 51, 54, 97, 101, and 124. 
12
 Ibid., Article 22, (page) 388. 
13
 Ibid., Article 89, (page) 404; “Phraratchakamnot Kao”, Acts 1, 2, 4, 12, the TSC, Vol. 2, 946–950, 
961–665. Phraratchakamnot Kao are royal decrees promulgated during the late Ayudhyan 
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huge responsibility. If they disregarded their responsibilities and assigned their 
subordinates or servants to carry out the tasks, they would be punished with fines 
and whippings.  
Offences in rawang lamoet included disregarding ministerial seals, official 
documents, and traphum khumham, an official document granting immunity from 
taxes and corvée. These offences were deemed tantamount to violating official 
commands.14 This was because the aforementioned objects were symbols of state 
authority that had to be respected. As instituted by the law, if a munnai disregarded 
an official document regarding the phrai under his command, he was to be 
punished.15 An example of this offence is illustrated in the Act of 2280 BE (1737 CE). 
Seven phrai of Sarapi Village in Saraburi province committed five murders. The 
governor of Saraburi was commanded to send the plaintiffs to Ayudhya, but the 
plaintiffs’ munnai, Khun Yukkrabat, an official of Saraburi, defied the command. 
Saraburi was a city under the administration of Krom Mahatthai. A sealed document 
from the Mahatthai was sent to the governor together with soldiers from Ayudhya 
to command the arrest of the plaintiffs and Khun Yukkrabat. An abbot who was 
close to Khun Yukkrabat obstructed the arrest. As a result, Khun Yukkrabat escaped. 
He was later arrested. During his trial, a judge pronounced the death sentence on 
him because of three main offences, namely, disregarding the seal of Mahatthai, 
obstructing officials from carrying out their duty, and evading arrest.16  
                                                                                                                                                              
period, hereafter referred as PKK. The first Act in PKK was enacted in 1717. 64 Acts in PKK have 
been left in their original forms. 
14
 “Ayaluang”, Article 79, (page) 403. 
15
 Ibid., Articles 25 and 81, (pages) 389, 403. 
16
 “PKK”, Article 8, the TSC, Vol. 2, 951-952. 
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Notably, the abbot was exempted from punishment because he was a monk. 
Later, a decree was issued to prohibit the intervention of monks in state affairs, but 
the offenders themselves would not be subject to punishment. Instead, their 
relatives would be punished in their place; laymen who encouraged them to get 
involved in secular affairs would also be punished.17 This decree was the state’s 
warning to the Sangha. This was because the administration of the Sangha was, at 
the time, insulated from the state’s power. This issue will be discussed later in Chapter 
7. Therefore, this act was the state’s measure to prevent the Sangha’s interference 
in state affairs.  
Offences concerning officials can be separated into offences committed by 
officials and offences against officials. Offences that officials could be guilty of 
included corruption,18 dereliction of duty, and the abuse of power and authority by 
bullying commoners. The laws were aimed at preventing officials from abusing their 
power, for example, extorting money and belongings from the common folk.19 The 
law also reflects the significance of manpower in the state’s view. As mentioned in 
the law, a noble who oppressed commoners, extorted their money and belongings, 
injured them, and compelled them to run away, was to be punished for causing the 
loss of manpower.20  
Noticeably, almost all laws were aimed at specifying the appropriate conduct 
of officials in the administration. Several laws prohibited the misconduct of officials, 




 The Ayaluang classifies corruption as rawang bang-art. Thus, the discussion about corruption 
will take place later in this chapter. 
19
 Ibid., Articles 23, 24, 31, 33, 48, 66, 88, 89, and 110, for example. 
20
 “Ayaluang”, Article 110, (page) 410. 
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especially in bullying or intimidating villagers. According to the laws, an official who 
oppressed common people,21 seized their properties,22 and abducted other people’s 
wives and daughters would be severely punished.23 If anyone failed to inform the 
state of these acts, he was regarded as an accomplice and would also be punished.24 
The laws were also issued to regulate the practices of provincial officials and central 
officials sent to work in the provinces. For instance, if an official sent to other cities 
did harm and disturbed villagers, he was to be harshly punished.25 Anyone who 
invaded other people’s houses and lands and snatched their property, would be 
heavily punished, be it an official or commoner.26  
The prohibitions concerning the officials’ abuse and misuse of their authority 
demonstrate the dynamics of social relations in Thai society which were based on 
the idea of a patron-client relationship between the phrai and the munnai. Some 
munnai abused their power and threatened phrai. In the provincial or remote areas, 
the local officials possessed great power. Van Vliet, the Dutch representative of the 
VOC, noted that local governors controlled paramount power in their towns and 
acted like little kings. Hence, they tended to misuse their power. Governors could 
change laws or judgments; petitions by commoners to the capital were frequently 
intercepted.27 Thus, the laws were not very effectively enforced. Although the laws 
prohibited the misuse of authority and the phrai could appeal to the state for help, 
                                                          
21
 Ibid., Articles 32, 51, 54,78, (pages) 392, 396-397, 402; “Ayarat”, Article 5, (page) 417. 
22
 “Ayaluang” Articles 12, 21, 32, (pages) 384-385, 388, 392; “Ayarat” Article 5, (page) 417. 
23
 “Ayaluang”, Article 49, (page) 396. 
24
 Ibid., Article 54, (page) 397. 
25
 Ibid., Articles 110, 124, (pages) 410, 413. 
26
 Ibid., Articles 101, 129, (pages) 407, 412-413. 
27
 Van Vliet, Ruambanthuek prawatsat ayudhya khong Van Vliet (Collections of Ayudhyan History 
of Van Vliet) (Bangkok: Krom Sinlapakorn, 2003), 92–93. 
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in reality, the power of the munnai prevented a phrai from suing his patron. A phrai 
who accused or sued his patron might be bullied; munnai might pressurize officials 
to distort the facts or pass a biased judgment, as seen in many cases.  
An example of an official’s abuse of authority happened in 1726. Luang 
Rongmueang and Khun Chamueang, whose duties dealt with legal procedures, 
arrested five villagers. The two officials accused the villagers of breaking the law and 
extorted money from their family members in exchange for their freedom. The 
officials were punished and an edict was issued to prohibit slander and arbitrary 
arrest.28  
Another edict issued in 1740 also demonstrates a case of abuse of power. An 
official ordered their subordinates to steal buffaloes from villagers and claimed that 
these cattle were stolen by robbers. The official asked for money as ransom from 
the buffalo’s owners. The law prohibited this offence and deemed the official to 
have committed robbery.29 There was yet another case where a group of people 
pretended to be officials to collect taxes, money and other belongings from villagers. 
The offenders were found guilty of forging official documents and impersonating 
officials to delude and threaten the people.30 
Obstructing an official from carrying out his duty and harming officials can 
be seen as offences against state authority. According to the law, anyone who 
impeded officials from arresting criminals and helped offenders escape was charged 
                                                          
28
 “PKK”, Article 4, the TSC, Vol. 2, 948-950. 
29
 Ibid., Article 9, (page) 953. 
30
 “Ayaluang”, Article 121, the TSC, Vol. 2, 413. 
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with breaking the law, like the aforementioned case of the official at Saraburi. The 
punishment was execution.31  
Also, officials’ abuse of authority in carrying out their judicial duties was the 
main problem that caused trouble to commoners. This offence was related to the 
abuse of power by princes and nobles who received or demanded bribes from 
litigants or their families to subvert the course of justice. Another problem that 
caused trouble to the people was long delays in the process of judgment. The legal 
procedure was the chief cause of delays in the resolution of trials. An accused 
person was first branded as the wrongdoer, and deemed guilty until proven 
innocent. Thus, during investigations, he might be tortured to make him confess. If 
the prisoner could not withstand the torture and pleaded guilty to avoid further 
torture, he would be punished in accordance with the laws. If he insisted on his 
innocence and there was no evidence to confirm his guilt, he would be released. 
This process took a long time. Some cases took a few months, others, half a year or 
a few years. Many accused persons were jailed many years while waiting for 
judgment, even though they had committed only minor crimes such as stealing. In 
many cases during the Bangkok era, prisoners were jailed one to two years, or even 
more than 10 years awaiting the outcome of their trials, even if the eventual 
verdicts were only three or six months’ imprisonment.32  
The long legal process was due to the large number of cases, and corruption. 
There were so many cases and so few nobles who performed judicial duties. 
                                                          
31
 Ibid., Articles 11, 50, 56, 81, 108, (pages) 383-384, 386, 398, 403, 409-410. 
32
 Van Vliet, Ruambanthuek, 110; see Walter E.J. Tips, Crime and Punishment in King 
Chulalongkorn’s Kingdom (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1998). 
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Corrupt, dishonest officials also delayed the cases to demand bribes from litigants or 
prisoners’ families. If they refused to pay or had no money to pay, the judgment 
would be postponed. The prisoners and their families were thus greatly 
inconvenienced. In the past, prisoners awaiting judgment were imprisoned near the 
houses of the adjudicating nobles. The prisoners’ families had to provide food for 
them because the state provided no food for prisoners. If the families lived in other 
towns, they faced problems in finding accommodation and earning a living. 
Sometimes, the prisoner’s relatives were bullied by nobles or wardens (called 
Thammarong). Female relatives of prisoners were raped by wardens. Thus, it was 
sometimes necessary for them to bribe nobles into bringing the cases to a speedy 
resolution. They paid money or gave gifts to the wardens in exchange for the 
prisoner’s safety or good prison conditions. These were problems that usually 
happened though the laws prohibited these acts.  
These offences occurred continuously and it was difficult for the state to 
prevent or address the offences as they implicated influential people like princes 
and nobles. The record of van Vliet in the 17th century and the laws issued in the 
18th century indicate that the same problem was prevalent throughout the time 
period. In van Vliet’s account, the unfaithfulness and greed of officials destroyed the 
effectiveness of judicial procedures and caused trouble to the people. Although the 
regulations in the laws were very good, influential and rich people usually won cases 
because of bribery.33 According to the Act of 2299 BE (1756), princes, princesses, 
and the ministers of Mahatthai and Kalahom were demanding bribes of between 10 
                                                          
33
 Van Vliet, Ruambanthuek, 14, 110. 
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tumlung and two chang34 from parties in lawsuits to address their cases.35 Another 
act also reveals that princes and nobles intervened in judgments to help their 
subordinates who were accused or found guilty; munnai gave bribes to officials to 
release their subordinates or reduce their penalties.36 Details in these laws 
corroborate a contemporary record by French missionaries describing how princes, 
princesses, and ministers demanded bribes from litigants in exchange for their 
intervention in court judgments.37 If the litigants refused to pay, their cases would 
be neglected and took a long time to be heard.  
In addition, revoking the testimonies of witnesses and convicts and 
concealing the truth were charged as offences against state authority and the 
obstruction of justice.38 Officials were prohibited from dereliction of their judicial 
duty and were warned to judge cases fairly.39 These offences reflect problems of 
judicial procedure, officials’ lack of honesty and the influence of the munnai.  
Besides laws, contemporary foreign records recount the same problem and 
indicate that powerful people usually broke the law. Clearly, the laws were not very 
effective in prohibiting the misuse of authority by officials.  
 
4.2.2 “Rawang Amphrang”: the Concealment of the Truth  
                                                          
34
 The standard unit of Thai currency is the baht. One tumlung = four baht; one chang = 80 baht. 
Hence, 10 tumlung = 40 baht; two chang = 160 baht. In the late Ayudhyan period, these were 
large sums of money for Thai commoners. The Law of Ayudhya, which set the prices of individual 
people, set the price of a 26 to 40-year-old man as 14 tumlung (56 baht). 
35
 “PKK”, Article 50, the TSC, Vol. 2, 1021-1026. 
36
 Ibid., Article 33. 
37










Offences in rawang amphrang included all acts of falsification or fraud 
through of the alteration of words and documents. They also included the telling of 
untruths during judicial processes, slander, as well as forging official documents and 
seals. Punishment for concealing news of treason or war was execution.40 An official 
who concealed the achievement of others and only boasted his own feats to gain a 
promotion would be punished. A person who defamed other people, especially by 
changing a court statement to accuse others, was to be whipped, have his fingers 
cut off, or fined.41  
These regulations and the case mentioned above indicate that there were 
cases of officials being bribed to falsify facts or perform personal favors for others. 
With the exception of some influential kings, the king did not directly manage 
judicial affairs. As the administration of the state grew, nobles and officials became 
more involved. While the state was developing, it was likely that there was some 
kind of “gap” between the king and the state.  The administration of the kingdom 
was conducted by nobles and officials, and they thus had chances to break the law 
for their own advantage.  
Although laws and heavy penalties were issued to prohibit fraud and 
falsifications, these offences occurred regularly. The lawbreakers included both 
royals and officials. It is possible that the prevalence of these offences was due to 
the weakness of law enforcement. Many cases happened, but only a few cases 
might be surfaced and punished. Thus, there was a small risk of being caught and 
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 “Ayaluang”, Articles 17, 18, the TSC, Vol. 2, 386, 387. 
41
 Ibid., Article 106, (page) 408. 
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punished for the culprits, who stood to gain a lot of benefits from their 
misdemeanors. Therefore, it was worthwhile, especially for officials, to take the risk. 
As will be seen in the next section, various types of corruption were prevalent due 
to the lucrative benefits. 
 
4.2.3 “Rawang Bang-art”: Misbehavior and Corruption 
 
Offences in rawang bang-art concerned various kinds of corruption, such as 
officials abusing their positions for personal benefits, bribery, embezzlement of 
royal property and taxes, misappropriation of manpower, and corruption in royal 
trade. Sources of state finance came from different kinds of taxes and royal trade, 
while the state incurred expenditure on the renovation and construction of temples, 
palaces, canals and city gates, as well as state and military ceremonies. Officials 
frequently managed both public revenues and state expenditure. Their duties 
included collecting revenues in kind and in money, working for the royal trade, 
managing the financial budgets for state projects, controlling and registering 
manpower, and serving in the palace and treasury department. Therefore, there 
were various ways in which dishonest officials could carry out corruption.  
Many decrees in the Ayaluang mention bribery as a kind of corruption. It 
caused problems in state administration and led to injustices in society. Officials in 
all state sectors, of both high and low rank, got involved in bribery. Problems from 
corruption also impacted the stability of the state. For instance, common people 
who suffered from unjust practices and oppression of officials would become hostile 
to the government and readily join revolts. This was evident in the uprisings that 
162 
 
occurred in the Ayudhyan period, which involved villagers who were subjected to 
excessive demands for corvée labour.  
The records of the late Ayudhyan period reflect many cases of bribery within 
the state administration and in the process of trials. In 1717, Phra Suthammaitri, the 
governor of Thonburi, was punished for accepting bribes to free prisoners.42 The Act, 
promulgated in 1723, also describe cases of corruption by the officials of Nakhonban 
(the ministry in charge of the capital city), namely, using prisoners as labor for their 
own matters, and receiving bribes to free criminals.43 An examination of prisoner’s 
lists was thus conducted.  
As discussed above, it was prevalent for officials to demand bribes from 
litigants to resolve their cases expeditiously.44 In 1726, two officials were punished 
for demanding bribes in the court cases they were officiating.45 The fact that there 
were many decrees prohibiting corruption shows that the state realized the bad 
effects of corruption and attempted to solve this problem. For example, the laws 
states that an official who received a bribe to free a criminal, and anyone who 
provided an official with a bribe in return for intervention in his court case, were to 
be heavily punished.46 
The laws illustrate various kinds of corruption. In taxation, officials 
embezzled state funds and faked a number of taxes collected from commoners.47 
Corruption also happened in the monopoly trade. The Ayaluang demonstrates that 
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 “PKK”, Article 1, the TSC, Vol. 2, 966. 
43
 Ibid., Article 11, (pages) 956-961. 
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 Van Vliet, Ruambanthuek, 110; PP Vol.39, 23. 
45
 “PKK”, Article 4, (pages) 948-950. 
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 “Ayaluang”, Articles 15, 33, 48, the TSC, Vol. 2, 386, 392, 396. 
47
 Ibid., Articles 27, 29, 35, 38, 42, (pages) 390-391, 393-395. 
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the state specified types of prohibited goods, such as ivory, sandalwood, and bird’s 
nest, which people were required to sell cheaply to the state.48 However, officials 
and commoners sold these goods to foreigners secretly because they could earn 
more money from them than from the state, as mentioned in the decrees and Dutch 
sources.49 Dutch traders also cooperated in this illicit trade because they could get 
lower-priced goods.50 According to a Dutch record, foreign merchants gave bribes to 
senior nobles in exchange for contraband goods; Dutch traders gave precious 
objects to nobles to get trade advantages; a Dutch merchant paid money to a noble 
for the right to purchase sandalwood.51  
Smuggling happened frequently because the profits were high. The laws 
clearly show that the state was fully aware of the causes of illicit trade. A solution it 
came up was passing legislation. Officials and commoners were prohibited from 
smuggling prohibited goods and sending prohibited goods to foreign traders. All 
custom points were ordered to strictly inspect cargoes to prevent the smuggling of 
prohibited goods and manpower.52 An interesting point is the issue of the smuggling 
of manpower mentioned in the laws. Manpower was significant because of 
underpopulation. It was possible that some people might have been kidnapped and 
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sent to other towns or other states. Other people might have been sold by their 
masters or families to become that sin thai (debt slaves). Apart from the Ayaluang 
and the Law of Abduction, other existing sources do not mention this point. The Law 
on Abduction prohibited kidnapping people for sale into slavery or for ransom. This 
law regulated punishments for abduction, unlawful restraint of individuals for 
ransom, and other offences related to kidnapping.53 However, it was also probable 
that some phrai escaped from registration or from their patrons to other cities by 
selling themselves to be slaves.  
These laws show that the state paid great attention to the control of 
monopoly trade and manpower, because the monopolies earned a lot of money for 
the state and phrai were free labor for the state. Although laws were introduced to 
forbid the crime and pronounce the death sentence for offenders, historical sources 
show this offence remained. As it seemed impossible for the state to change the 
trade system, laws became the best way to prevent this crime, though its efficiency 
was unpredictable.  
 
4.2.4 “Rawang Kanchok”: Abuses of Authority  
 
Rawang kanchok dealt with offences relating to officials abusing their 
authority and the misdoings of influential persons, such as threatening, harming and 
assaulting commoners, and the extortion of items, money and cattle from common 
folk. The Ayaluang and Ayarat illustrate the significance of commoners as corvée 
labor. The laws show that the state attempted to bring social order and justice to 
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ordinary people to prevent them from escaping into the jungle or moving to other 
states.  
The Ayarat describes conflicts between individuals which caused social 
unrest, such as disputes, hiring someone to injure others, and slandering other 
people. The main focus of the Ayarat was to prohibit the arbitrary penalization or 
misuse of power of individuals or officials, as it dealt with the order of the whole 
society. In addition, abuses of power meant breaking the law and defying state 
authority. The common folk were under the protection of the state and were also 
important sources of manpower. Abuses of power that caused bodily harm to them 
also symbolized disrespect towards state authority. 
 
4.3 The Laws Concerning State Authority in the Early Bangkok Era  
 
Since the Ayudhya period, the Thai state had attempted to assert its 
authority, especially over phrai or manpower. This was because manpower (be it 
civilian labour or soldiers) was crucial for the state’s authority. The state in the 
Bangkok period promulgated the laws concerning the conduct of officials and 
officials’ abuses of power. These laws prescribed proper behavior to officials and 
prohibited them from harming the common people. Soon after his enthronement, 
Rama I laid down the laws concerning morality both to legitimize his usurped 
authority and to instruct his officials to work righteously. In these laws, officials were 
encouraged to observe religious precepts in order not to abuse their power. Also, 
acts in the Ayaluang and the Ayarat, which set out the conduct of officials, were 
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continuously enforced. The laws reflect the state’s attempts to bring justice and 
order to society and solve problems concerning officials’ offences. 
However, the enforcement of officials’ behavior was less strict, especially in 
provincial areas where they were influential. Many cases and appeals concerning 
officials’ abuse of authority indicate that officials committed offences, as seen in the 
records of the Second and Third reigns which cover around 43 years. Nevertheless, 
these records also show the state’s attempts to uphold justice for commoners by 
punishing dishonest officials and re-opening cases involving them.  
The following section discusses various offences committed by officials that 
directly affected the stability of the state and people’s livelihoods, in particular, 
offences concerning judicial duty and official abuses of power. These two topics 
directly involved commoners, who were the state’s manpower, and officials, who 
were the state’s agents.  
 
4.3.1 Officials’ Offences Concerning Judicial Duty  
 
According to the Three Seals Code and historical records of the Early 
Bangkok era, offences committed by officials involved the abuse of power, 
dereliction of duty, bribery, and corruption. The sources indicate that offences 
dealing with officials’ performance in their judicial duties were in the first tier of 
offences and occurred occasionally. Related offences included dalliances in solving 




According to existing court cases, delays in judgment and bribery happened 
both in Bangkok and the provinces, but in the frequency of cases was higher in the 
provinces because administrative power was held mainly by provincial officials. 
Besides the provincial governor, there were a few officials with specific judicial 
powers who held the titles of Luang Yukkrabat, Luang Chamueang and Luang 
Phang. They handled cases sent to the provincial level. Thus, if there were many 
cases or if the officials dallied on the cases, litigants had to wait for their cases to be 
resolved. Although litigants could petition the lukkhun na sala, the council of high-
ranking nobles in Bangkok, they might face other problems such as threats from 
provincial officials and the expenses needed for their journey to Bangkok for the 
investigation. These challenges frequently obstructed attempts by litigants to seek 
redress. On the contrary, in Bangkok, all six main ministries, namely, Kalahom, 
Mahathai, Phra khlang, Wang, Kasettrathikan, and Nakhonban, had their own 
courts to judge cases concerning their responsibilities. Cases that occurred in the 
capital were diffused throughout these ministries, while those in the provinces 
relied on a few officials in charge.  
Contemporary records show that official abuses of judicial duty happened 
frequently. When ordinary people came into conflict with officials, they usually did 
not come out with any success. When commoners brought charges against officials, 
other officials tended to sympathize with their colleagues rather than uphold justice. 
Commoners thus needed to appeal to the lukkhun na sala at Bangkok. For example, 
in 1853 in Chainat province, a villager accused an official of committing adultery 
with his wife and injuring him. The governor of Chainat and other officials ignored 
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the case. The prosecutor waited six to seven months. He then complained to the 
lukkhun na sala. He accused officials of neglecting justice and sympathizing with 
each other. The lukkhun na sala commented that the official’s behavior was 
unacceptable. The case was brought to Bangkok for trial.54 However, there was no 
record of the judgment. It is still unknown if the commoner eventually had his case 
resolved. In the 17th century, van Vliet recorded that powerful and rich people 
usually won the cases in which they were implicated, and local officials often 
intercepted and obstructed commoners’ petitions to the capital city. It can be 
assumed that the situation in 19th-century Bangkok was similar to that in the past.  
A serious problem encountered by commoners was delays in the resolution 
of their cases. Delays caused troubles for prisoners and their families. Prisoners’ 
families needed to stay nearby so as to take care of their relatives. If an accused 
person disappeared or escaped, his family members were arrested in his place. For 
instance, a man imprisoned for cattle theft escaped, so his wife was then captured.55  
Causes of delays include the large number of cases, officials taking bribes, or 
plain malice on the part of the officials. Trials were conducted in the houses of 
nobles, near which prisoners were also jailed.56 Only a few cases were judged in a 
day. If there were many cases, prisoners had to wait for a long time. Some cases 
took many years to be resolved and litigants sometimes had to bribe the officials to 
consider their cases first. In addition, nobles had no monthly stipend. They received 
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an annual stipend, which was insufficient, and manpower to work for them. 
Accepting bribes seemed a normal practice. Historical sources show that officials 
normally demanded bribes from litigants or from their families. Refusal to pay 
meant that their cases would be delayed or carelessly assessed. Therefore, bribery 
became a way to accelerate the judgment.  
There were many cases concerning officials’ dereliction of duty. An official 
letter of the minister of kalahom sent to the governor of Nakhon Sithammarat in 
1813 shows the state’s concern about provincial officials failing to carry out their 
duties. The minister complained that officials failed in arresting criminals, received 
bribes to release criminals, delayed judgments, and rejected prosecution suits filed 
by people. These offences led to an increase of crimes, especially robbery. The 
minister instructed governors and officials to maintain security in their provinces 
and strictly prohibited the extortion of villagers and the taking bribes from 
criminals.57 Family members of criminals had a responsibility to monitor the 
criminals’ behavior to prevent them from reoffending. If they committed severe 
crimes again, they were to be beheaded and their family members were to be 
punished.  
A case that happened in 1853 illustrates officials’ dereliction of duty. Two 
villagers from Ayudhya province petitioned the lukkhun na sala. They charged the 
governor of Ayudhya and provincial officials for failing to discharge their duties. In 
the petition, these two men first accused Khun Si, a district chief officer, of receiving 
bribes from a robber, who stole cattle from the two villagers, and freeing him. 
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However, officials refused to entertain the case. Khun Si later charged the two men’s 
wives, and even though the accusation was not recorded, local officials still accepted 
the charge. The husbands who accused Khun Si were arrested as pledges to take the 
place of their wives. They were imprisoned for some time without their case being 
taken up. They thus appealed to the lukkhun na sala.58 This case alone involved the 
offences of bribery, corruption, abandonment of official work, abuse of power, and 
delay of judgment.  
 
4.3.2 The State’s Attempt to Prevent Official Abuses of Power  
 
Simply put, official abuse of power was one grievance the state was 
substantially concerned about. Although the improper conduct of officials may not 
have directly caused political instability since commoners did not participate in 
governance then and had no political rights, the latter’s grievances would still have 
had an indirect impact by reducing their loyalty to the ruler and the state. 
Consequently, commoners might join uprisings, follow holy men who promised to 
help them, or escape into the jungle. These caused problems to the state, as seen in 
cases mentioned in previous chapters.  
Numerous acts in the Ayaluang and Ayarat prohibiting official abuses of 
authority reflect the state’s concerns. Records of the Early Bangkok era continued to 
mention cases of official abuses of authority, such as extortion,59 injuring people,60 
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accusing villagers of cattle theft and passing judgments with insufficient evidence,61 
taking sides with a litigant, delaying judgment, and releasing convicts.62 Many 
distressed people sent their petitions to the lukkhun na sala. The reaction of the 
lukkhun na sala mentioned in the manuscripts indicate that they took a serious view 
of official abuses of power. They stressed that abuse of authority and judicial 
dalliances were serious offences since they caused people difficulty, resulting in the 
disturbance of social order and peace. The lukkhun na sala were also worried that 
officials might have been maligned. Therefore, they ordered cases to be sent to 
Bangkok instead for judgment.  
The state also stressed that officials should take care of people’s lives and 
uphold justice for them. In many official documents sent to provincial governors, the 
state emphasized that governors must pay attention to state affairs, surveillance, 
pacification and justice, and avoid threatening people. One example of such 
instruction is an official document of the minister of Kalahom sent to the governor 
of Nakhon Sithammarat in 1811. As the governor of the first-class mueang,63 Nakhon 




 NL, CMH R3/164 CS 1206. This record consists of five cases, all of which were involved in this 
offence, and NL, CMH R3/120, R3/123, R3/127 CS 1208. 
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and Phichai. Some of the fourth-class mueang were Saraburi, Lopburi, Kanchanaburi, and 
Nonthaburi. These mueang possessed autonomy in rule and supply of manpower; however, they 
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Sithammarat’s governor acted as the representative of the Bangkok government in 
governing other southern mueang and Malay vassal states. The minister of kalahom 
advised the Nakhon governor on various points:  
 
… The governor needs to inspect city walls, city gates, and forts to 
prevent an attack from opposing military forces, to carefully examine social 
order within Muslim cities under our control, to carefully ensure the accuracy 
of lists of manpower, and to patrol territorial waters to defeat pirates. If 
pirates attack ships in territorial waters under the control of Nakhon 
Sithammarat, the governor will be punished. The governor must regularly 
check the accuracy of the laws, rule rightfully, judge lawfully, adhere to moral 
standards, and avoid receiving bribes and threatening ordinary people. The 
governor should instruct officials to be united, to govern kindly and rightfully, 
and to work faithfully. The governor should support religion and instruct 
officials and people in observing Buddhist Precepts, making merit, preventing 
elephants from being killed for their ivory, and avoiding the destruction of 
valuable animals.64 
 
The document also shows that opium and smuggling were big problems at 
that time. The minister commanded the governor to prohibit officials and people 
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from opium consumption and smuggling.65 Other official documents sent to 
provincial governors in the Early Bangkok era had similar details and instructions, 
especially on the issues of providing order and ruling with justice.  
Moreover, official documents since the Second Reign had stressed the 
problems of piracy and the illegal opium trade. Occurences of piracy increased 
considerably after the fall of Ayudhya and into the Early Bangkok period. These two 
problems affected state stability and social order. Problems from opium, which were 
linked to Chinese secret societies, became the state’s great concern. These two 
issues will be discussed in later chapters.  
 
4.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter discusses the state’s endeavors in establishing and maintaining 
its authority and stability through laws concerning state affairs and state authority. 
These laws demonstrate the ruling philosophy of the state as they instituted codes 
of conduct for officials, such as prohibiting the misuse of authority, corruption, and 
arbitrary penalties that violated the law. The state enacted various laws governing 
almost all matters of people’s lives to shape society and to control the practices of 
the people. 
Furthermore, various laws reflect problems in society and in the 
administration, especially corruption, which had increased considerably during the 
late Ayudhyan period. Serious offences committed by officials and influential people 
included abuses of authority, interference in the judiciary, the misappropriation of 





manpower, and bribery. These problems echoed the competition for power among 
the ruling elites and the lack of unity of the court. Laws dealing with the perversion 
of justice, bribery, manpower, and cattle theft reflect the troubled lives of 
commoners, who were extorted both of their labor and money. The repetitive 
promulgation of similar laws also indicates the state’s lack of effectiveness in 
enforcing these laws.  
The discussion also shows the development of the state as an institution in 
its own right. In theory, the king headed the state administration. However, when 
the state grew larger, the king could no longer rule directly in every single matter. 
Nobles and officials worked in state organizations. They were close to and 
connected directly with the people. The Ayaluang thus set the code of conduct for 
them to work righteously. This demonstrates the separation between the state and 
the king in the law. Also, it may be suggested that when the people were dealing 
with officials, the commoners came to see them as people separated from the king. 
The commoners would see the officials as state agents.  
This chapter has examined the use of law in the maintenance of authority 
through enumerating offences against the state and offences dealing with the 
conduct of officials. The next chapter examines the state’s legal measures to provide 




THE STATE’S LEGAL MEASURES IN BUILDING SOCIAL ORDER 
 
 
Besides defining the state as an administrative structure, the state could also 
be defined as laws. This chapter discusses legal measures of the state in providing 
justice and social order for the people. Various decrees in the Ayaluang and Ayarat 
demonstrate the state’s concern with bringing social order to the people. Many laws 
were thus enacted to deter and punish offences such as robbery, theft, battery, 
detention, arson, and vandalism. Officials were prohibited from abuses of authority 
and arbitrary punishment. Some offences against social order were defined as harsh 
crimes and tantamount to acts against royal and state authority, because they 
affected the stability of the state. Crimes described in this chapter show that they 
impacted the state’s stability. The failure in punishing criminals and restoring 
khwam yusuk yenchai (pleasant livelihood and happiness to the people)1 and 
khwam yuttitham (justice) to the people and society would undermine the stability 
of state.  
This chapter examines offences dealing with state affairs and officials who 
abused or implemented those laws, as well as crimes that impacted social order and 
people’s lives. It also examines the state’s responses to the cases through the 
promulgation of new laws to respond to the changes, improve judicial procedures 
and uphold justice as much as possible. The discussion indicates that there were 
both internal and external factors that influenced state stability and social order. 
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Besides crimes that usually happened on land and in urban centers, it also explores 
piracy, which affected the state’s authority and the security of coastal people, and 
cases concerning the spread of opium and Chinese secret societies. 
 
5.1 The Laws and Offences Concerning Security and Social Order 
 
According to the laws, offences against social order can be defined as 
offences against moral values and proper social norms and practices. Some offences 
were against Buddhism. Types of crimes against social order mentioned in the 
Ayaluang, Ayarat, and PKK could be divided into offences against the reputation, 
freedom, property, and body of an individual. They were offences found in everyday 
life, such as the robbery of property and cattle, detention, the destruction of other 
people’s property and Buddhist symbols, plunder, battery, slander, quarrels, as well 
as offences such as the abuse of power by influential persons or officials.  
The law is an important tool of the state in bringing and maintaining social 
order and stability. Various decrees in traditional Thai law show the state’s 
endeavors in preventing offences and disputes among the people, protecting the 
people, and punishing offenders. The laws on public order governed offences 
against the reputation, freedom, property, and physical well-being of people. 
According to the Ayarat, for example, anyone who abducted the wife or daughter of 
another person to become his wife or servant, or raped them, was to be beheaded.2 
Anyone who defamed, detained, or arrested other people arbitrarily was required to 
pay a fine; if the offender was an official, the punishment would be heavier than 
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that for a commoner because he would have abused his authority.3 Anyone who 
extorted other people’s property or destroyed their crops or houses, or attempted 
to injure others, needed to pay a fine; if the offence caused the death of the king’s 
subjects, the offender would be put to death or forced into slavery.4  
Traditional Thai law reflects a system of communal responsibility, as seen in 
the Three-Sen Law on Robbers. This law was enacted during the Ayudhyan period to 
require people living within an area of three sen or 120 meters of the scene of a 
crime to help the state in the criminal’s capture.  Other decrees also required the 
participation of villagers in looking after their village; if there were crimes in a 
village, the villagers needed to help in arresting the criminals. If a criminal was one 
of the villagers, the criminal’s family needed to bring the criminal to justice. Officials 
and villagers were required to cooperate in patrols to prevent crimes.5 These 
measures reflect the shared responsibility of people in the community. 
Moreover, the laws show an emphasis on the family institution in Thai 
society. Parents would be held accountable for the behavior of their kids. A 
criminal’s family members were accountable for delivering him to the state or they 
would be punished or jailed until he was arrested. This principle of Thai law was 
similar to that practiced in traditional China.6 
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Robbery was an offence that happened frequently. Preventing robberies had 
usually been the king’s concern.7 As seen in the law, town governors were required 
to organize inspections to prevent robberies; village headmen were required to 
inspect strangers who came to his village to prevent crimes being committed by 
outsiders; outsiders going to other villages were required to inform village leaders.8 
Cattle theft was a common crime. The state endeavored to prevent the crime as it 
affected the livelihood of villagers. Several laws concerning this crime were enacted 
in different periods, with different punishments assigned. According to the Act of 
2266 BE (1723), this crime was punishable with a fine or imprisonment.9 Then, in the 
Act of 2270 BE (1727), the punishment was increased – other than punishing the 
criminal, his family members were also arrested.10  
The fact that a decree was further issued in 1736 to increase the punishment 
for the crime yet again shows that this offence was in serious regarded and that 
previous laws might not have been effective. Now, the punishment for the first 
instance of committing this crime was a fine and the branding of a cattle’s image on 
the criminal’s chest. Being branded would subject the criminal to public scorn 
because in the past, Thai males, especially commoners, bared their chests. The 
punishment for a repeat offender was branding, 25 lashes, and a fine. The third time 
a criminal committed the same offence, he would be branded, publicly humiliated 
for three days, given 30 lashes, and forced to tend to royal elephants. For a fourth 
offence, the criminal’s face would be branded and the fingers of his right hand cut 
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off. A fifth time would warrant the amputation of both hands.11 Later, the state 
issued another decree in 1756 that specified that cattle thieves be put in a pillory, 
chained and bound and exhibited in front of a jail to be exposed to public scorn; if 
officials were behind the theft, they would be beheaded.12  
Several acts dealing with cattle theft indicate that this offence happened 
regularly. It may be assumed that people violated the laws without fear of 
punishment. This leads to questions of the state’s effectiveness in the suppression 
of offences and in the implementation of the laws. It also implies the dereliction of 
duty by officials, bribery, and other forms of corruption in state affairs. The above 
demonstrates the state’s measures to maintain social order and security in society 
and among the people. The state attempted to solve problems that affected 
people’s lives. 
Since the Ayudhyan period, laws on security and social order had been 
introduced and amended. The Law on Banditry, the Law on Kidnapping, and the 
Three-Sen Law on Robbers were promulgated to bring order and to suppress crime. 
The incidence of robberies increased after the fall of Ayudhya due to the decline of 
administration and security. In the Thonburi period, French missionaries recorded 
that there were a lot of bandits and people needed to carry weapons when going 
out.13  
The fact that a decree concerning banditry and social order was issued in the 
first year of Bangkok implies that this crime was the big problem seriously affecting 
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social order.14 It shows that the maintenance of social order was very important to 
the state. The degree of punishment was increased for plundering, murder, and for 
the followers of bandits and officials who accepted bribes from bandits. Bandits who 
plundered and murdered proprietors were to be punished with public humiliation, 
having their property seized, and having their heads cut off and publicly displayed. 
The wives and children of bandits were to be punished with 50 lashes each, and 
forced to be slaves. All bandits in the same gang received the same punishment 
even if they committed different crimes. Officials who received bribes were to suffer 
the same punishment as the bandits.15 The stiffening of the punishment suggested 
the seriousness and frequency of this crime, and that existing laws and penalties 
were inadequate.  
Robberies affected the safety of people and their assets; hence there were 
numerous laws that aimed to protect the people. For instance, a decree relating to 
the security of people was enacted in 1788. It reflects the state’s concern about 
people’s lives and property, especially the kidnapping and murder of young children 
whose parents adorned them with precious ornaments. Parents were warned not to 
let their children go out in public unaccompanied and wearing precious objects as 
they would risk attracting criminals and endanger their lives. If such crimes 
happened, the child’s parents would be punished.16 Perhaps, this law reflects a focus 
on those who were boastful of, and careless with, their wealth. Similar decrees were 
re-issued in the Fourth and Fifth Reigns. A few criminal cases occurred in the Fifth 
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Reign where children were kidnapped and murdered for their valuables, which 
contributed to legislation severely warning parents and threatening them with 
punishment.17 
A decree of 1835 indicates that plundering had increased considerably 
despite the enforcement of several laws.18 As mentioned in the decree, both monks 
and laypersons carried arms, plundered villages and robbed travelers. The ministry 
of Nakhonban and Krom Phratamruat (the Police Department) were blamed for 
their failure in arresting criminals and stemming crime. Both officials and villagers 
were criticized for their failure to police their neighborhoods and help catch 
offenders. Thus, the state passed a decree to prohibit the possession of weapons in 
public places such as the market, and forbade people from traveling at night without 
carrying lights with them. Also, such criminal cases were required to be tried within 
15 days. The acceleration of judgment was clearly aimed at punishing wrongdoers as 
quickly as possible in order to frighten other criminals and people. This decree 
aimed to prevent crimes before it caused further problems.  
Furthermore, this law ordered the conducting of censuses of the inhabitants 
of each district in order to have accurate records of the numbers of villagers. It also 
demanded that visitors or strangers inform a village headman when entering and 
leaving the village. This regulation was to prevent outsiders from committing crimes. 
Village heads and district chief officers had to set up patrols to maintain safety, 
especially at night. Villagers were also required to bear responsibility for the arrest 
                                                          
17
 Ratchakitchanubeksa Ratchakan thi 5, lem 5–6, Cho. So. 1240–1241 (Royal Gazette of the Fifth 
Reign), Vol. 5–6, CE 1878–1879 (Bangkok: Tonchabap, 1997). 
18 





of criminals. If a villager’s negligence led to the escape of criminals, he would be 
flogged five times. If the runaway criminal was a member of the village, his family 
members were jailed in his place. A criminal’s family members were required to help 
the state in arresting the criminal. If the criminal’s master (munnai) and family failed 
in delivering him to the state, they were to be punished.19  
Besides reflecting the system of communal responsibility, this act illustrates 
the social relationships within Thai society in the past. Villages were usually made up 
of a small number of villagers, most of whom were related and hence knew each 
other. Thus, it was easy to notice strangers or outsiders in a village.  
The 1835 Act might not have successfully reduced the number of offences 
concerning security and order. A big robbery near the Bangkok area in 1837, in 
which about 30 people were arrested, led to the amendment of the previous law on 
robbery, the Three-Sen Law on Robbers. The revised law of 2370 BE (1837), called 
the Five-Sen Law on Robbers, reiterates the mutual responsibility system by 
regulating that people living within an area of five sen or 200 meters from the scene 
of a crime were required to participate in the arrest of the criminal. This was a larger 
area than the 120 meters set by the earlier Three-Sen Law. 
According to the Five-Sen Law on Robbers, the state formally appointed a 
village chief, called the kamnan, to take official responsibility for the security of a 
village. The law also emphasized the responsibility of each family in inspecting the 
behavior of family members to prevent them from committing crimes. Moreover, 
villagers who failed to capture the criminals would be fined. It can be seen that the 







laws expected the villagers to play a huge role in fighting crime. Besides the criminal, 
his family members were also punished.  
Numerous court cases from 1830 to 1851 show that robbery was a prevalent 
problem. There were around 60 recorded cases of cattle theft, the most common 
kind of robbery.20 The rest included the theft of elephants, boats and rice, and 
plunder. Although cattle theft might not be a crime as severe as plunder or murder, 
it directly implicated the livelihood of villagers. In some cases, officials or influential 
persons accused others of stealing cattle, or abused their power to seize the cattle 
of commoners and then demand ransom from the owners.21 The records indicate 
that this crime occurred in both Bangkok and the provinces. Offenders included both 
commoners and officials. Royal cattle were also stolen.22 Many cases committed by 
officials were sent for trial in Bangkok.  
The laws concerning security and social order reflect the conditions of 
society at that time in several specific ways. First, they show that crimes concerning 
the security of people’s livelihood, such as robbery and cattle theft, happened 
commonly. 
Secondly, the occurrence of numerous cases of robbery suggests that law 
enforcement was ineffective and the state’s surveillance, judicial and law 
enforcement were not as strict as they needed to be. However, because there was 
no record of crime rates in this period and court cases are one of the main sources 
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of this dissertation, it cannot be conclusively argued that the state was ineffective in 
providing social order or implementing the law.   
Thirdly, the laws and court cases indicate that these crimes were serious 
threats that affected social order, people’s livelihoods and their daily lives. Robbery 
and theft occurred frequently, especially involving property that affected 
livelihoods, such as cattle, boats, and farm tools.  
Fourthly, it reflects the system of administration of the traditional state. That 
is, the state’s theoretical function was to maintain social order, but in practice, the 
maintenance of internal security was conducted by local officials, rather than the 
central government. Provincial governors, sheriffs, village leaders and villagers took 
responsibility in maintaining social order and security, including upholding justice. 
 Lastly, the laws show that, other than bearing collective responsibility, 
individuals with higher rank (sakdina) had to receive heavier punishments for crimes 
and infractions than lower-ranking persons. For example, if a noble and a commoner 
committed the same crime, the noble received a heavier punishment than the 
commoner. This was because high-ranking persons possessed more privileges than 
lower-ranking people; they were thus expected to bear more responsibilities. This 
law aimed to prevent high-ranking persons from abusing their authority, and to 
inculcate responsibility in them.  
The above discussion mentions the state’s use of laws of social order and 
security to restore “khwam yusuk yenchai” to the people. In this sense, the state 




5.2  Piracy 
 
A threat to the state’s authority and the security of coastal inhabitants was 
piracy, referred to in Thai as salat. The term originates from a Malay term, “orang 
selat” or “men of the straits”, referring to maritime Malays who resided along the 
Straits of Malacca and became pirates during periods of Malay political disunity.23 
During the Ayudhyan period, when the state’s power over provinces was stronger, 
there was stricter security enforcement over coastal areas. Moreover, maritime 
trade was very important during the Ayudhyan period. Ayudhya and other cities in 
the south were significant ports in Southeast Asia. Therefore, the security of the 
coastal areas under its authority was high priority. However, piracy sometimes 
occurred in the coastal areas of Songkhla and Nakhon Sithammarat.  
The threat from piracy increased considerably after the fall of Ayudhya. 
Political unrest and chaos led to neglect of the policing of territorial waters. The 
state of Thonburi and the Early Bangkok period attempted to assert control over 
Ayudhya’s provinces in the south, and the Malay states. Other than the political 
objective of territorial expansion, the new Thai state was also concerned about 
piracy in the south. Records from the First Reign mention piracy in the east coast of 
the Malay states.24 The threat encouraged Bangkok to increase its control over the 
south. Ensuring the security of this region was one of the main aims of the state.  
Furthermore, contemporary sources of the Early Bangkok era show the 
activeness of the junk trade off the west and east coasts of Siam. The junk trade 
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with China had increased considerably both from Siam’s tribute missions to China, 
and private trade ran by royalty, officials and individuals. A record in 1813 tells of 
the activeness of the junk trade between ports in the south of Siam, and Indian 
ports which were under the responsibility of the governor of Nakhon Sithammarat. 
Siamese merchants bought various kinds of Indian white fabrics and sold tin and 
elephants to Indian merchants.25  
Henry Burney, an official representative of the British government, recorded 
that junks from the southern ports of Siam, such as Nakhon Sithammarat and 
Songkhla, shipped to ports in the Malay Peninsula. Exports included rice, salt, and 
sugar, and imports included tin, shark fin, and bird’s nest.26 During the Third Reign, 
ships from Chantabun in the east coast and Songkhla and Nakhon Sithammarat in 
the south usually sailed to Penang and Singapore. There was also a regular ferry 
service between Bangkok and Chaiya, a port in the south.27  
However, the lively junk trade and the safety of inhabitants in coastal areas 
faced threats from piracy. Piracy was reported to have occurred almost every year 
between 1813 and 1820. Pirates attacked and plundered cargo ships, abducted 
coastal residents, and attacked the ships of officials. According to official records, 
the pirates were of various nationalities, such as Malay, Chinese, Vietnamese, and 
Thai.28  
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In 1813, the governor of Songkhla reported to Bangkok that in south 
Thailand, Malay pirates pretended to be traders from Saiburi, Kelantan, or 
Trengganu and attacked ships, especially those that banded and sailed together for 
mutual protection.29 Rama II subsequently complained about the increasing threat 
from piracy and the weakness of inspection: 
 
…..Protecting our territories and all inhabitants, including the merchants of 
all nations is important….the plunder by Khaek salat (Malay pirates) causes 
distress to inhabitants and traders, and leads to my displeasure. This is 
because of the lack of surveillance of the Malay rulers. From now the rulers 
of these cities must inspect the coastal areas strictly to prevent piracy and 
prohibit their subjects from being harmed by piracy.30  
 
This record reveals Rama II’s displeasure with the Malay tributary rulers for 
their lack of vigilance and diligence in the inspection of security and the suppression 
of pirates. Gesick comments that Rama II’s reaction to the Malay rulers reflected his 
role as protector.31 This also demonstrates clearly the strong influence of Buddhist 
conceptions of kingship. In addition, this could have been an excuse for Bangkok to 
tighten its own control over Malay tributary states through blaming Malay rulers for 
their inadequacies in combating piracy. This was similar to how the Western powers 
pointed to the inability of local rulers to provide for their security to justify the 
expansion of their power and influence. 
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Thus, a new decree was issued in 1813 which specified that all ships visiting 
Siamese ports must have a sealed letter of recommendation from the Krom Tha (the 
Ports Department), and traders needed to inform the port officials in advance, 
through written correspondence, that they were visiting. If there were no official 
certificates or letters, the crews of those ships would be arrested and sent to 
Bangkok.32  
However, these measures against piracy might not have been effective. 
Official documents between Bangkok and the governors of Nakhon Sithammarat 
and Songkhla from 1817 to 1820 reveal the state’s continued worry about piracy. 
Traders, officials, and inhabitants of coastal areas continued to be attacked and 
killed.33 In 1817, around a hundred pirates in five ships attacked Chinese junks near 
islands off the east coast. The minister of kalahom commanded the governor of 
Nakhon Sithammarat to send out inspectors to patrol coastal areas and suppress 
pirates. 170 official inspectors and seven ships were sent to arrest the pirates, but 
they failed to contain the problem.  
The next year, the minister of Kalahom still complained to Nakhon 
Sithammarat’s governor about the increase in piracy. The governor was commanded 
to escalate his response to the threat and improve the effectiveness of inspection 
and suppression. Town governors in the coastal areas were also threatened with 
punishment if pirates attacked or kidnapped people.34  
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Nevertheless, a significant case of piracy happened in 1819 that underlined 
the pirates’ disregard for the authority of the state. Pirates attacked the ship of the 
governor of Rayong in the coastal area of Chonburi province while he was returning 
from an audience in Bangkok. The governor and all of the crew were killed, except 
for the governor’s brother who was knifed but fled underwater in the dark. 
According to the testimony of the governor’s brother, around 15 pirates speaking 
Thai and Chinese attacked around 3 am. They killed the governor and others, and 
looted goods such as silk, tea leaves, tin, and red lime.35 Although 150 patrolmen 
were sent to capture them, the pirates escaped.36  
In 1820, the minister of Kalahom repeatedly ordered Nakhon Sithammarat’s 
governor to capture Malay pirates who operated in the coastal areas of Chumphorn, 
Chaiya, and Phatthalung, and to cautiously inspect the credentials of ships to 
prevent pirate assaults. The minister also complained that piracy had increased 
immensely because of the negligence of Nakhon Sithammarat’s governor and 
officials. He thus threatened the governor with punishment if piracy occurred 
again.37 Acts of piracy were mentioned in many manuscripts at various times, 
showing that piracy was a common threat and that efforts at suppression was 
unsuccessful. Piracy became a serious problem that threatened the state’s authority 
and the security of traders and inhabitants in coastal areas.  
The ineffectiveness of efforts at piracy suppression may reflect the lack of 
unity of the provinces in these areas, such as Nakhon Sithammarat and Songkhla, 
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that would have in turn contributed to the failures in preventing piracy. Internal 
disputes within the Malay tributary states in southern Siam undermined the security 
of Thai areas and led to an increase in piracy.38 Important provinces in the south, 
namely, Nakhon Sithammarat, Songkhla, and Patthalung, competed with each other 
with an eye on gaining a closer relationship with Malay leaders, so as to increase 
their trade benefits in the Malay tributary states.  
Moreover, as the two main mueang (city) in the south, the rivalry between 
Nakhon Sithammarat and Songkhla would sometimes have an effect on efforts to 
suppress piracy. Nakhon Sithammarat used to be the only first-rank mueang in the 
south and its authority stretched over other mueang as it exercised chief 
responsibility over Malay vassal states. However, since 1791, control of the Siamese 
vassal states of Pattani and Trengganu had been transferred to Songkhla because of 
Bangkok’s desire to limit the power of Nakhon Sithammarat and to consolidate 
control over Malay vassal states.39 Nakhon Sithammarat and Songkhla competed in 
gaining endorsement and authority from Bangkok to control other mueang in the 
south. This competition would have impacted their inspection and suppression of 
piracy as they would not give each other full support. This would be a reason why 
piracy increased and went on uninhibited. 
During the Third Reign, the threat of piracy decreased, given the fewer 
number of cases mentioned in contemporaneous sources. Only a few records 
mention cases of piracy during this period, as compared to many during Rama II’s 
reign. A record written in 1849 describes a pirate attack on an official’s ship at 











Lumphuk (or Talumphuk) Cape in the vicinity of Nakhon Sithammarat. An official and 
his followers were murdered and the pirates escaped. In next few months, three 
ships of pirates fought with official and merchant ships in the surrounding area of 
the Cape. The minister of Kalahom thus reiterated the decree enacted in 1813 to 
check the credentials of passing ships; all ships that arrived without the relevant 
certificates were to be investigated. 
The decrease in piracy might have been due to the substantial growth in 
overseas trade and Bangkok’s expansion of power to the south. The considerable 
growth of the junk trade was accompanied by an increase in the number of ships 
traveling from the coastal areas in the south to Bangkok. The presence of a larger 
number of ships would then reduce opportunities for pirates to strike.  
The inspection and suppression of piracy during the Third Reign was also 
more intense than during Rama II’s reign. Other than the growth in the junk trade, 
Bangkok’s control over the Malay vassal states in the Third Reign was tightened due 
to unrest in the area. In the 1830s, uprisings in Malay vassal states happened several 
times, such as in 1830, 1832 and 1838. There were also disputes between the 
leaders of Malay states in 1838 and 1839.40 The Bangkok government needed to 
suppress disorders and reassert its authority in Malay vassal states. Thus, the 
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5.3 Opium and Chinese Secret Societies 
 
In the Early Bangkok era, there were two new serious problems that 
significantly affected state stability and social order, namely, the expansion of the 
illegal opium trade, as well as uprisings and crimes committed by Chinese secret 
societies. These two problems were inter-connected and had great impact on both 
state and society. 
 
5.3.1 The Expansion of Opium Consumption and Illegal Trade 
 
Thai legal and foreign records indicate that the Siamese people had known 
opium since the Ayudhyan period. The Thai name for opium is fin. This term may 
have been derived from “afyun” or “afin”, the Arabian terms for opium. Thus, opium 
was probably introduced to Siam via Arabian or Indian Muslim traders.41 In The 
Suma Oriental (1515) written by Tomé Pires, a Portuguese apothecary who lived in 
Malacca from 1512 to 1515, opium was imported from Malacca. However, it can be 
presumed that opium was recognized as a medicine, not a narcotic drug, because in 
those days most Siamese were betel nut addicts. Contemporaneous records, such as 
the writings of French envoys and missionaries in the Ayudhyan period, also did not 
mention opium consumption among the people. 
However, the laws of Ayudhya show that in later periods, Siamese people 
smoked, consumed, and became addicted to opium. In Article 43 of the Ayaluang, 
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the nobility was forbidden from consuming spirits, smoking opium, and assembling 
for unlawful purposes; offenders were charged as rebels.42 Article 81 of the Banditry 
Law states that smoking, selling, and consuming opium would invite heavy 
punishment, namely, dismissal from official posts, confiscation of property, public 
humiliation, and imprisonment. Drug addicts would be kept in jail until they kicked 
their addiction. Their families also needed to monitor them to prevent them from 
consuming opium again.43  
Although there is no information on when the Siamese people began to 
smoke or consume opium, it can be presumed that Siamese people might have 
learnt to do so from Chinese immigrants. François Turpin, a French traveler who 
came to Siam in the Thonburi period, mentioned that the people in Siam were 
addicted to opium and also noted the physical or psychological afflictions of opium 
addicts. Opium addiction became so severe that one of the last Ayudhyan kings, 
which might have been King Uthumphon (r. 1758) or King Ekkathat (r. 1758 – 1767), 
sentenced opium traders to death.44 
The expansion of the consumption of opium in the Early Bangkok era would 
have been worse than that during the Ayudhyan period. At the beginning of the 
Bangkok era, Rama I saw the severe threat of opium addiction. However, combating 
opium trade and addiction was not the main priority at that time as the security of 
the state and the people was at stake elsewhere. Thus, the state’s response to the 
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problem of opium during this reign was only the issuing of a royal proclamation to 
the people to prohibit opium consumption.  
Serious steps toward the elimination of opium began in the Second Reign. A 
decree was enacted in 1811 to declare opium trade and smoking a capital crime and 
specified heavy punishments for traders and consumers.45  This law refers to the 
state’s prohibition of opium consumption since the Ayudhyan period. Nevertheless, 
the law was ineffective. The mass distribution of opium affected the security and 
order of society because of the increase in crimes committed by opium addicts.  
The 1811 decree narrates clearly the disadvantages of opium consumption, 
that is, the harmful effects to the economy, social order, and health of the opium-
smokers. The law strongly prohibited opium consumption and trade and introduced 
heavy punishments. A deadline was set for the eradication of opium; all opium had 
to be destroyed before the 3rd of August, 1811.46 
However, the 1811 law was clearly not very effective. Hence, a second law 
banning opium consumption was legislated in 1819. The new decree was also sent 
to foreign traders. Nevertheless, the laws could not restrain the illicit drug trade. 
John Crawfurd, the second Resident of Singapore and the British envoy to the 
Siamese court, estimated that in 1823, 200 chests of opium from Bengal were 
smuggled into Siam; each chest of opium sold for around 5000 baht. The total value 
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of opium smuggling at this time was one million baht, while Crawfurd calculated 
that the annual income of the Siamese government was about 2,226,000 baht.47  
The profits from opium smuggling were very high. Records show that British 
traders from Singapore shipped opium to sell along with other goods. At that time, 
in Singapore, the cost of one chest of opium was 200 Spanish dollars.48 The high 
profits turned many to smuggling opium, thwarting attempts by the state to 
suppress the trade. The increase in numbers of Chinese immigrants also drove the 
annual increase in the demand for opium. Therefore, the state increased its 
suppression efforts, especially during the Third Reign. 
The considerable growth of Siamese maritime trade and the spread of 
famine in China led to the immigration of countless Chinese into Siam from the late 
1830s, worsening the illicit opium trade situation. Chinese people had become a 
significant source of hired labor. After the Opium War (1839 to 1842), the number of 
Chinese immigrants in Siam increased substantially. In 1822, there were about 
31,000 Chinese in Bangkok. This number doubled to 60,000 in 1839, 81,000 in 1849, 
and 200,000 in 1854.49 
These figures only accounted for the number of Chinese in Bangkok. If 
Chinese in other provinces were included, their numbers would be far larger. 
Opium-taking was a common habit of many Chinese at that time. The large number 
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of Chinese workers in Siam increased the demand for opium, resulting in the vast 
spread of opium consumption and the illegal opium trade.  
Because of the increase of the illicit opium trade, the state needed to 
eliminate opium trading and consumption. In 1824, the state issued a decree 
forbidding the opium trade and requiring the inspection of foreign traders’ ships to 
prevent opium smuggling. Heavy punishments were meted out to offenders and 
officials who gave aid and support to smugglers.50 This law focused on patrolling the 
coastal areas, which were rife with opium smuggling. In 1839, the state reiterated 
the earlier decree on prohibiting opium trading, and also prohibited the 
consumption of opium. The announcement stressed the harmful effects of the 
consumption of opium, especially to social order and economy. An amnesty was 
offered to those who handed over opium to the state. Those who did not would 
suffer 10 times the usual fines imposed, or even execution.  
The announcement was also aimed at foreign traders dealing in opium. 
10,000 copies of the announcement were printed and spread to foreign and Chinese 
traders. It was also translated into English and published in the Singapore Free Press 
on 13 June 1839.51 Three significant and influential people in the Siamese court 
were appointed to lead the suppression efforts, especially in the coastal provinces. 
Before using strict measures, the state offered pardons to those who willingly 
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handed opium to the state. The result of the measure was pleasing; 3,700 chests of 
opium were seized and burnt.52 
Records concerning opium suppression in 1839 indicate the state’s 
impressive efforts to eliminate the opium trade and resolve problems dealing with 
opium addicts. An example was Phra Wichit who was meant to be appointed the 
governor of Phatthalung, but he was an opium consumer. A high-ranking noble was 
thus sent to advise Phra Wichit to stop smoking opium. If he could kick the habit and 
recover, he would be appointed governor.53 
Several records also mention the abolition of opium in the southern 
provinces and the inspection of foreign trade vessels, especially ships of Chinese and 
British traders.54 In the suppression of opium in 1839, the opium merchants arrested 
were mainly Chinese. They confessed that they had bought opium from British 
traders. At this time, inspectors found opium in all ships arriving and departing from 
Songkhla and Patthalung. The governor of Songkhla was blamed and he was 
required to swear that he had no connection with opium traders and that he had 
intended to abolish the opium trade.55   
The mass growth of the illegal opium trade in the south gravely concerned 
the state, because illegal opium was sent to Bangkok and other cities which in turn 
led to the spread of opium to other parts of the kingdom. The state thus increased 
its inspection and suppression efforts. When troops were sent to suppress revolts in 
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nine Malay cities in 1839, suppressing the opium trade in those areas also became a 
main burden of the army leader.56  
Interestingly, 1839 was the year that the Chinese government was also 
active in the suppression of the opium trade. Lin Zexu, the imperial commissioner, 
was sent to administer the suppression at Canton, the main trading port, and 
blockaded foreign communities in March 1839 to force foreign traders to stop the 
import of opium. Only three months later, in June, the Singapore Free Press 
published the proclamation of the Siamese state regarding opium. 
Before the outbreak of the Opium War in November, Lin Zexu wrote a letter 
to Queen Victoria of Britain by narrating China’s generosity in allowing trade with 
Britain and complaining about British traders bringing in “the poisonous drug to 
injure the Chinese people.”57 By seizing and destroying opium belonging to foreign 
traders, Lin’s method was aggressive and became a justification for the British to 
wage war. The Siamese government’s actions showed similarities with China’s 
suppression of opium.   
Lin’s letter to Queen Victoria and the proclamation of the Siamese state 
published in the Singapore Free Press were similar in details. Both mention clearly 
that opium was taken into their countries by foreign traders and caused harm to 
people’s health, the economy, and order in the kingdoms. The Siamese 
proclamation was dated 18 April 1839, around 10 days after Lin’s letter. According 
to these dates, it may be assumed that the Siamese government was not influenced 
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by Lin’s letter. However, these two similar events provide a better understanding of 
the seriousness of the opium situation in both China and Southeast Asia. The results 
of Chinese and Siamese suppression of opium were different. China’s defeat led to 
other serious repercussions for the country, while the opium trade remained. Siam’s 
efforts were more successful, but the illegal opium trade also remained. 
  Thai documents from 1840 to 1850 indicate that the growth of the illegal 
opium trade and opium consumption increased considerably despite the state’s best 
efforts. The cases mentioned in the records also show that the illegal opium trade 
and crimes concerning opium addicts had spread throughout Bangkok and to its 
border areas, especially in the areas with many Chinese laborers, that is, Nakhon 
Chaisi,58 Samut Sakhon, and Chachoengsao. These provinces were full of Chinese 
laborers working in the sugar industry. Thus, they were rife with opium addicts, 
Chinese secret societies, and crimes committed by these addicts and society 
members. For example, in 1842 in Nakhon Chaisi, Chinese opium addicts who 
belonged to a Chinese secret society robbed and murdered landowners.59 A record 
tells about a Chinese drug addict who threatened and injured his employer for 
money to buy opium.60 
 
5.3.2 Chinese Secret Societies 
 
The emergence of Chinese secret societies in Siam accompanied the rise in 
opium consumption. These problems had expanded substantially during the first 
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half of the 19th century and undermined the security, order and authority of the 
state. The suppression of opium caused an unexpected increase in offences 
committed by the angyi. Angyi or douhia (literally means big brother in Teochew) 
refer to Chinese secret societies and their members.61   
The term “angyi” is usually translated as “secret society” because these 
organizations had some kinds of rituals for membership. Members of these secret 
societies were normally divided by their dialects, such as Teochew and Hokkien. 
Most Chinese immigrants in Siam came from Guangdong and Fujian in southern 
China. They divided themselves into groups based on their hometown, dialect, 
surname, congregation and connections, for instance.62  
The first Chinese societies started appearing in Siam from the early 18th 
century.63 An aim of these societies was to protect the economic interests of 
members, which Chinese traders joined and gained benefits from revenue farms.64 
Besides being tax-farmers and traders, some wealthy Chinese merchants in Siam 
also invested in gambling, brothels, and the illegal opium trade.  
Other than Bangkok, the Chinese mainly settled in Ayudhya, Nakhon Chaisi, 
Samut Songkram, and Chachoengsao, places where the sugar industry was 
concentrated. Chinese immigrants also worked as merchants, peddlers, laborers in 
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farms, the sugar industry, and in underground jobs such as the opium trade. There 
were also countless Chinese in the south, especially in Songkhla and Phuket, who 
worked as merchants, mining laborers as well as participants in the illegal opium 
trade. 
A large number of Chinese in Siam which joined the societies and 
participated in illegal work encouraged the growth of the angyi’s influence. The 
increase in their influence and memberships also meant an increase in offences 
committed by angyi. Robbery and murder occurred frequently, especially in the 
outlying districts. 
Opium suppression led to the growth of crimes committed by the Chinese in 
the societies. The first record of angyi’s offence in this reign was in 1824, when a 
group of Teochew angyi in Chantaburi province robbed a wealthy Hokkien Chinese 
provincial noble.65 It should be noted that the relationship between Chinese in 
different dialect groups was not good. Sometimes, crimes might have arisen from 
their conflicts.  
Chinese secret societies caused growth in the illicit opium trade and other 
crimes that affected security and social order. The great suppression of opium in 
1839 could have led to the increase of offences committed by angyi. Between 1825 
and 1838, there were no records of crime by angyi. From 1842 to 1850, however, 
the records began to mention offences by the angyi, both minor and major. In some 
cases, more than a thousand Chinese died from the state’s crackdowns. For 
instance, in 1842, three Chinese secret societies, numbering almost 3,000 strong, 







revolted in the areas of Nakhon Chaisi and Sakhonburi, which is now Samut Sakhon 
province, to the west of Bangkok.66 Another serious case occurred in 1847 at 
Sakhonburi where an uprising of angyi saw around 500 Chinese killed. In 1848, while 
the suppression of the revolt in Sakhonburi was still ongoing, angyi at Chachoengsao 
revolted and killed the governor. The uprising spread throughout the city.  
The main cause of the 1848 uprising was conflicts between local officials and 
angyi. In the provinces, local officials were influential people. In Chachoengsao 
province, which was a center of the sugar industry, the industry was monopolized by 
local officials, which included both Thai and Chinese officials. Chinese workers were 
forced to pay “protection money” to officials in exchange for their chance to work 
and live. The Chinese laborers who were dissatisfied with their oppression by local 
officials joined Chinese secret societies. They needed to pay protection money to 
the societies for protection and membership. The competition for protection money 
from Chinese workers caused conflict between local officials and angyi. Living under 
the oppression of local officials thus led to a violent uprising from the Chinese. The 
government appointed Chaophraya Badindecha, who was coming back from 
Cambodia, to supervise the suppression of the revolt in Chachoengsao.  
The arrest of the angyi’s leaders caused chaos among its members. Villagers 
who escaped the angyi into the jungle returned to the city and killed any Chinese 
they met, resulting in a massacre. Many thousands of Chinese, be it members of the 
angyi or not, were killed and their properties confiscated. Members of angyi were 
captured and punished. The leaders were executed, while others were branded on 
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their faces.67 Nidhi comments that one of the reasons of the massacre was feelings 
of dissatisfaction, envy, and hostility from the local people towards the Chinese’s 
privileged position in the Siamese economy – for example, receiving exemptions 
from corvée labor, and their relative wealth compared to the Thais.68 Thus, many 
Chinese were killed and their money or precious belongings were looted. In 
addition, it can be assumed that since the Siamese state did not consider these 
Chinese as their subjects, they did not care that a lot of people were killed or treated 
severely.   
Problems from the illegal opium trade and Chinese secret societies in this 
period were the worst in Siamese history and they drastically affected the state’s 
stability, social order, people’s livelihoods, as well as the economy. The state 
attempted to address these problems, firmly and conscientiously; however, it 
seemed that the problems only became worse. It was because the high profits of the 
opium trade tempted offenders. It may be concluded that opium was one of the 
biggest problems of the state and could not be completely eliminated.  
The threat of opium to the stability of the state worsened during the last 
years of the Third Reign. Britain tried to take advantage of the opium trade and 
forced the Siamese state to release ships and traders arrested for smuggling opium 
into Siam.69 In 1850, Britain requested for the free trade of opium in Siam, but the 
















Siamese government strongly disagreed.70 In the Fourth Reign, a decree was issued 
in 1851 to declare opium a controlled good. A tax-farmer or noble coming back to 
Siam from an overseas trip could buy only up to 400 kilograms of opium.71 
Presumably, the state finally accepted that efforts to abolish the illegal 
opium trade and consumption were not working, and that it stood to lose a large 
sum of money in the illicit trade. Thus, this declaration allowed the state to control 
the amount of opium imported into the country and impose an opium levy. At the 
end of the Fourth Reign, Chinese secret societies became tax-farmers and controlled 
major sources of revenue, namely, gambling, liquor, and opium. For individuals who 
refused to join them, their influence obstructed them from putting in higher bids for 
tax farms.72 The Chinese secret societies gained influence by controlling major 
sources of revenue. Their influence can be seen later when they staged more 
uprisings against the state during the Fifth and Sixth Reigns. The frequency of 
uprisings by secret societies decreased during the Fourth Reign after opium was 
designated a controlled good. However, at the beginning of the Fifth Reign, a group 
of angyi in Bangkok fought with opium tax-farmers. Later, angyi in outer provinces 
revolted many times. The state thus enacted a law on angyi in 1897. This law aimed 
at controlling both the Chinese and other foreign groups in Siam. It prohibited the 
assembly of five or more persons and other crimes.  
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One of the causes of angyi uprisings was opposition to oppressive local 
officials. The Chinese who caused trouble were treated differently from “subjects” 
of the state; they were threatened and discriminated against by officials. They thus 
resisted the state. Many laws were enacted to prohibit and punish angyi uprisings; 
however, problems concerning this still recurred.  
In addition, during the Third to Fifth Reigns, the numbers of Chinese 
immigrants dramatically increased. The Siamese state thus had to deal with large 
numbers of influential migrants. After the 1851 Bowring Treaty, the Siamese state 
had to address the issue of whether the immigrants were Siamese or Western 
subjects, which was entangled with the issue of extraterritoriality, which had 
become a serious problem of the state. The Siamese state had to “include” the 
foreigners into the political, social and economic structures of Thai society.  
Furthermore, before the 1911 Chinese Revolution, the idea of Chinese 
nationalism spread to overseas Chinese. This notion separated overseas Chinese 
from other people in Southeast Asia. It also impacted the sentiments of the Chinese. 
Many of them had no bonds with the lands that they were sojourning in. During this 
period, uprisings by angyi happened many times in Siam. Besides the 1897 law on 
angyi, in 1909, the state required foreigners in Siam to register as aliens. The 
Chinese people needed to choose between receiving Thai nationality or remaining 
as aliens, who did not enjoy the same rights as nationals. For example, aliens could 
not own land. In 1932, Thai-Chinese people were required for conscription like other 
Thai people. These were examples of the state’s measures to resolve problems 
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concerning angyi and to bring Chinese people into the structures of Thai society 




This chapter has examined the state’s legal measures in ensuring its stability 
and bringing about social order. It shows that the state attempted to achieve these 
aims through legislation in response to various situations and problems, such as laws 
concerning robbery, piracy, and the illegal opium trade. The state was concerned 
about both its authority and security, and that of the people. The system of 
communal and familial responsibility required in the laws illustrates how people 
helped each other and the reason why the state would intervene in the personal 
spaces of individuals and families. However, in some instances, such as the disorder 
caused by Chinese secret societies, the state could not resolve the problems through 
laws alone. The main method employed by the state to suppress the secret societies 
was force.  A point that should be considered is the legal status of the Chinese 
people in Siam and the Siamese state’s response to their actions, particularly those 
of the secret societies. Chinese immigrants were not considered Siamese subjects 
then, a sentiment shared by some immigrants themselves. They had been classified 
as immigrants who had to pay a poll tax, called nguen phuk-pi, of three baht every 
three years to the Siamese government. Many Chinese immigrants had no 
connection with Siam and the local Siamese. They only came to Siam to work for 
money and aimed to return to their hometowns. Normally, laws mainly applied to 
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the “subjects” of a state. Therefore, the state used force instead of laws in the 
suppression of Chinese secret societies.  
Moreover, Chapter 4 and the discussion above suggest that one of the more 
critical problems for state governance were official abuses of authority – actions by 
officials that could fundamentally disrupt either people’s livelihoods or the existing 
social order. The people might be wronged or penalized by official abuses of power 
in judicial duty, such as delays in judgment and bribery. Official abuses of authority 
could also disrupt order in society, as seen in cases involving the angyi.  
This, and the preceding chapter, have both examined the establishment of 
the authority of the king and the state through laws. The next chapter will discuss 





LAWS ON THE CONTROL OF MANPOWER 
 
The key to Southeast Asian socio-political and economic systems was the 
efficient control of manpower, as they were needed for labor, revenue, and war. In 
the pre-modern Southeast Asian state, ordinary men were bonded to the king 
through the corvée system, to a monastery or religious foundation (called khaphra 
or “the monks’ servant” in Thai), or to a wealthy or powerful man.1 The power of a 
ruler depended on the amount of manpower under his control. Political rivalries 
within a polity, or wars between pre-modern mainland Southeast Asian kingdoms, 
tended to take the form of struggles “for more men than for land.”2 An abundance 
of land, but a shortage of population, required a state to create and improve 
methods to control manpower, as it was the “key to authority and power.”3 
Manpower had to pay taxes and perform manual labour, so they usually ran away to 
avoid servitude.4  
Previous scholars have discussed the management of manpower in 
Southeast Asian states. In the introduction of Slavery, Bondage and Dependency in 
Southeast Asia, Anthony Reid reviews the definition of slavery and bondsmen in 
various traditions and hierarchies in Southeast Asia in particular. According to him, 
slavery is defined as a man who is the property of another, performs compulsory 
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labor, and is of lower political and social status.5 A slave was bonded to and 
depended on his master, but he could be redeemed. Reid observes that the word 
“slave” is frequently misused.6 Some scholars refer to commoners under state 
supervision as “state slaves”. Instead, these commoners should be referred to as 
royal bondsmen, or phrai luang in Thai, as they were not slaves, but registered 
freemen under royal supervision. Phrai som, on the other hand, were registered 
freemen under the supervision of princes, nobles, or other individuals. 
The difference between the phrai and the that (slave) in traditional Thai 
society was that the phrai were registered, while the that were not. The that was 
the lowest class in Thai traditional society. According to Reid, the legal status of 
different types of slaves in Southeast Asian countries was not clearly defined – with 
the exception of the Thai.7 In Thai law, there were seven kinds of slavery such as 
that nai rueanbia or the “absolute” slaves’ children (a that whose parents were 
that), that sinthai (debt bondage), and that chaloei (a that who was a prisoner of 
war). That was exempted from the tattooing of manpower and served only his 
master, except during wartime. He was a property of his master; his life belonged to 
his master and could be passed on as an inheritance to his master’s heir. A that lived 
in his master’s house, worked for his master, and had no autonomy over his own 
life. If two that married; their children became that under their parents’ master. 
A that could become free through entering monkhood, being redeemed, 
being rewarded with freedom in return for wartime contributions, or escaping. 
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Being that was acceptable in Thai society. The lives of that in Thai society would not 
be bad and his tasks would not be as hard as that of the phrai luang. As recorded by 
La Loubère, a French envoy who came to the Ayudhyan court in 1687, being that 
was popular in Siam. Siamese people could sell themselves in exchange for money.8 
Thus, many phrai luang escaped from tattooing by selling themselves as that, as 
mentioned in the laws.  
James C. Scott discusses the importance and concentration of manpower in 
pre-modern states in mainland Southeast Asia. His book focuses on the peoples of 
Zomia in the upland regions of mainland Southeast Asia, and analyzes why they 
avoided the state and migrated into the mountainous areas. The reasons for 
ordinary people’s avoidance from becoming subjects of the state included avoiding 
being forced labour, slaves, excessive taxes, and war. These were also reasons for 
the escape of manpower in Siamese states.9  
The study of laws on manpower in Thai cases reflects the nature of 
traditional Southeast Asian states in that the control of manpower was key to the 
power of the state. The study will demonstrate the state’s management of 
manpower, problems of manpower control in the state’s view, and burdens of 
ordinary people that triggered their escape. As described in Slavery, Bondage and 
Dependency in Southeast Asia, the heavy burden of royal corvée in Burma, Siam, and 
Cambodia caused the flight of ordinary men. 
Moreover, several scholars have also studied the phrai system of pre-
modern Siam. Khachorn Sukphanit, Chai Rueangsin, and Akin Rabibhadana discuss 
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the origins and development of the phrai system, and its effects on Thai society.10 
Studies by Piyachat Pitawan, Anchalee Susayanha, and Wutdichai Moolsilpa focus on 
the changes and end of the phrai system during King Chulalongkorn’s reign.11 
Andrew Turton provides a typology of different categories of bondage.12 B.J. Terwiel 
explores the relationship between slaves and freemen in the Early Bangkok era and 
the development of the state’s management of manpower. He also provides details 
of the ranking of phrai and that in the sakdina system, and kinds of slaves in Thai 
law.13 This dissertation differs from previous studies in the sense that it focuses less 
on the typology and terminology of bondage and more on the laws on manpower 
issued in the Early Bangkok period and the state’s use of law to enhance the 
effectiveness of its control of phrai, and to respond to problems concerning the 
phrai.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, a factor that threatened royal authority was the 
structure of the state administration where munnai (or “master”, referring to the 
princes and nobles) shared the king’s power in the administration and control of 
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both the phrai luang and the phrai som. This control could be quite fluid. The 
munnai’s control of manpower was necessary, since the ruler himself could not 
directly manage his own bondsmen, but it worried the ruler because it was not 
difficult for phrai luang to be shifted out of his control to become phrai som. Various 
laws were issued to make the control of manpower more effective and prohibit the 
misappropriation of manpower.  
This chapter examines legal measures to increase the effectiveness in the 
registration and control of manpower, as well as the prohibition of misappropriation 
since the Ayudhyan period. In addition, it assesses the effectiveness of law 
enforcement. The discussion reveals the king’s worries about the control of 
manpower by princes, nobles and foreigners. It analyzes the issues of biracial people 
in relation to manpower and the competition over the control of manpower 
between the king and munnai. Finally, it assesses the effectiveness of law 
enforcement. 
 
6.1 The Control of Manpower Through Laws in the Ayudhyan Period  
 
Many decrees on manpower enacted during the Ayudhyan period were 
manifestations of the state’s concern over the management of manpower. Effective 
control of manpower contributed to the stability of the state. Therefore, the state 
introduced legal measures to control manpower and to prevent their escape. The 
legislations specifically addressed the registration and control of manpower, the 




6.1.1 The Laws on Manpower  
 
The system of the registration of phrai appears to have been established 
since the first reign of Ayudhya (r. 1350 –1369). The law of 1899 BE (1356 CE) 
required commoners to register themselves with munnai. Those who skipped the 
registration forfeited rights such as legal protection from the state.14 Subsequently, 
other laws were created to enhance the effectiveness of manpower control. In 
1518, for the first time, a law commanded a census of the phrai in order to estimate 
the number of phrai in the kingdom.15 The law of 2080 CE (1537 BE) required 
munnai to compile censuses of the phrai under their control and submit the lists to 
the state.16 This regulation was repeated in 1690.17 The record of van Vliet also 
mentions that censuses of phrai were conducted in the capital, provinces, and vassal 
states.18 In 1727, another law was issued to order the registration of phrai and the 
arrest of runaway phrai.19  
The misappropriation of manpower was also one offence that received 
heavy punishment. The munnai’s misappropriation of royal manpower was a vital 
problem for both the state and individual rulers. Many laws suggest that the munnai 
were misappropriating royal manpower, deploying them under their command, and 
concealing the true extent of their forces.20 As discussed in Chapter 3, the control of 
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phrai was a difficult task by nature for the state, as the munnai could also control 
the phrai. The munnai controlled both their own phrai (phrai som) and the phrai 
luang registered under the state departments to which individual munnai were 
attached. According to several acts in the Ayaluang, offences that were to be heavily 
punished included the concealment or alteration of registration lists, fleeing from 
registration, helping phrai flee from registration, and sending family members or 
relatives to live in other places to evade registration.21 
These laws explicitly reflect attention on the control of manpower and the 
influence of munnai. In addition, the censuses and lists of phrai allowed the state to 
be aware of the number of phrai under the state and munnai. In the first half of the 
18th century, there were more laws pertaining to manpower than there were in 
previous periods. It may be assumed that the growing number of laws was 
influenced by a three-way contest for power among kings, princes, and nobles. As 
Manop suggests, the period between 1708 and 1733 under the Banphuluang 
dynasty, where there was no political struggle and general peace, saw the influence 
and power of the princes and nobility restored.22 The kings were dissatisfied and 
concerned with the excessive power the princes and officials held both in politics 
and the economy, especially manpower. The competition within the court over the 
control of manpower, and manpower offences during the late years of Ayudhya, led 
to the introduction of new legislation, such as in 1723, 1725, and 1748 to chastise 
princes and officials for the committing of fraud in the registration of manpower.23  
                                                          
21
 “Ayaluang”, Articles 41, 42, 65, 89, 106, the TSC, Vol. 2, 394–395, 401, 404, 408. 
22
 Manop, Khunnang, 265–273. 
23
 “PKK”, Articles 22, 23, 48, the TSC, Vol. 2, 982, 1018–1020. 
215 
 
The later years of the Ayudhyan era saw an increasing number of laws 
related to the control of manpower. According to the laws, the munnai forged and 
concealed accurate lists of phrai luang in order to gain their own manpower at the 
expense of the state. Thus, measures to prevent future losses were implemented 
through legislation. Crimes concerning manpower were charged as offences against 
royal authority and the punishment was execution. Gathering manpower without 
the king’s command was deemed a capital offence tantamount to rebellion. The Act 
of 2265 BE (1722) in the Law on the Division of People recounts the problems the 
state encountered in verifying true numbers of the king’s manpower, and the 
munnai’s misappropriation of manpower. This Act called for the return of phrai 
luang registered under the state and emphasized punishment for those who did not 
comply.24 However, the laws show that munnai usually violated the laws by 
concealing the real number of phrai luang under their official duties and changing 
lists of manpower to transfer phrai luang to their personal control. These laws 
strictly prohibited princes and nobility from intervening in the registration of 
manpower.25  
The repeated issuing of these laws over a longer period of time shows that 
they were aimed at preventing princes from accumulating power and wealth. On the 
one hand, the frequency of such violations by the munnai reveals their attempts to 
do so. On the other hand, it indicates the ineffectiveness of law enforcement. The 
repetitive details of these decrees express the king’s persistent worry about the 
influence of princes and nobles. Their growth in power in the late Ayudhyan period 
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caused factionalism and power struggles in the court. This led to bloody conflicts 
and the participation of princes and nobles in political struggles. 
 
6.1.2 The Issue of Biracial People in Relation to Manpower  
 
Besides the king’s worry about the influence of princes and nobles, he was 
also concerned about the kingdom’s security and manpower in relation to the 
presence of various groups of foreigners in the kingdom. Since the early 16th 
century, many groups of foreigners, such as the Portuguese, Dutch, British, Persian, 
and Japanese, had come to Ayudhya. The cohabitation between Thai or Mon 
women and these outsiders led to problems concerning the security of the kingdom, 
Buddhism and manpower, especially pertaining to the issue of biracial people.  
These concerns were illustrated in an Act promulgated in 1633. This Act 
prohibited the cohabitation between Thai and Mon women, and other ethnic groups 
and groups of foreigners who were non-Buddhists, such as the Farang26 Angkrit 
(British), Wilanda (Dutch), Khula,27 Chawa (Javanese), Malayu (Malays), Khaek,28 
Kuay,29 and Kaew.”30 Offenders were considered enemies of the state. There were 
six different levels of punishments for offenders, such as execution, confiscation of 
property, and fines. The punishments applied to both men and women. The reasons 
for this law pertained to religion and the fear of spies.31  
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The 1633 Act reflected a problem concerning early Dutch and English 
merchants, the only two groups of Europeans mentioned. Other groups were not 
mentioned. The Spanish came to Ayudhya in the late 16th century, but departed. By 
1633, the French had not arrived in Ayudhya yet. The Portuguese came to Ayudhya 
in 1511. Portuguese mercenaries first participated in the war between Ayudhya and 
Chiang Mai in 1546 and 120 Portuguese mercenaries were rewarded land to settle 
down in Ayudhya. It may be assumed that their descendants were not seen as 
farang because they were métis – no longer of pure European blood, and many of 
them worked under state sections: Krom kenhat yang Farang (the division of 
Western military) and Krom Farang manpuean (the division of snipers).  
The 1633 Act reflected the king’s worry about the potential loss of 
manpower since mixed-race children were not considered phrai due to their foreign 
paternity.32 This point was illustrated in the case of van Vliet’s request to send his 
children to Batavia. When he was in Ayudhya from 1633 to 1641, van Vliet lived with 
a Mon woman called Osoet and had three daughters with her.33 After he left 
Ayudhya, van Vliet asked for the king’s permission many times between 1645 and 
1658 to bring his daughters to Batavia. Religion was the reason given by van Vliet 
and other Dutch people in their desire to take away their half-Dutch and half-Thai or 
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Mon children, as seen in van Vliet’s letters and letters of the head of the VOC at 
Batavia to King Prasatthong. They did not want these mixed-raced children to grow 
up as “heathens”.34 
However, Osoet was an influential woman and her connections to the court 
obstructed van Vliet’s desire for the return of his children against their mother’s 
wishes. Moreover, permitting mixed-race children to depart the kingdom meant the 
king’s loss of subjects. Thus, the king did not give permission. After the death of 
Oseot in 1658, the governor-general of Batavia asked King Narai to permit the 
sending of Oseot’s children to Batavia. Finally, the king allowed Oseot’s children to 
go to Batavia.35 
The issue of mixed-race people was examined again in 1663 when King Narai 
repeated the 1633 Act. He emphasized the prohibition of cohabitation between Thai 
or Mon women and Khaek, British, Khula and Malays who held mitcha thithi nok 
satsana (or those who had “erroneous” beliefs and were non-Buddhists).36 Tamara 
Loos proposes that this law indicated the Buddhist nature of Thai law.37 This 
comment is partly true; however, it may be argued that the issue of non-Buddhists 
was emphasized for socio-cultural reasons because Buddhism was the main religion 
of the population in the kingdom, and the king was traditionally its main patron. The 
conversion of Thai and Mon people to Christianity not only affected the issue of 
manpower, but also impacted the stability of Buddhism and the king’s legitimacy. 
According to traditional beliefs, the rise and fall of Buddhism was considered the 
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king’s responsibility (See Chapter 7). Hence, the ideals of Buddhist kingship, where 
the king was regarded as the bodhisattva and his making of merit had to be 
supported by his subjects, might have influenced the king’s legislation.  
Moreover, Loos proposes that the law suggests that religion became a line of 
division between “us” (Buddhists) and “them” non-Buddhists) in the early Ayudhyan 
period, which was mapped onto ethnic differences, as Chinese immigrants were not 
included in the law.38 This gels partly with Scott’s comment. According to Scott, 
other than bringing various ethnic groups into the administration, all states have 
attempted to encourage and insist on their linguistic, cultural and religious 
integration with the majority population.39 In this sense, other ethnic groups in 
Siam, such as the Mon, Lao, Khmer, and Chinese, who were Buddhists and had a 
similar culture, were brought in to become part of the “Thai” population, which was 
the majority ethnic group. Furthermore, Loos’s focus on the division between Asian 
and European groups in Thai law is partly valid. However, it can also be argued that 
the law did not include the Portuguese and there were numerous Portuguese metis 
in Ayudhya. The Portuguese descendants were not considered farang like other 
European groups.  
In 1664, King Narai signed a treaty with the Dutch after the Dutch-Siamese 
crisis of 1663 and 1664, when two VOC ships blockaded the mouth of the Chao 
Phraya and Siam’s eastern sea route. Thus, the treaty bequeathed advantages to the 
Dutch. On the issue of mixed-race people, the king allowed half-Dutch children 
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under the age of seven to leave Siam for Batavia.40 This agreement was in 
accordance with the Law of the Division of People, which required male children to 
be registered upon reaching the age of nine.41 The agreement meant that the 
legislative authority of the Siamese government would not be undermined, leaving 
many other half-Dutch children for which the VOC still had to appeal to the king for 
permission to send to Batavia.42  
With regard to the issue of manpower in the 1663 Act, a reason for Narai’s 
enactment of the act was to separate Thai manpower from foreigners.43 Narai had 
help from foreign mercenaries when he overthrew and usurped his uncle’s throne.44 
He realized the potential usefulness of foreign mercenaries. Narai was extremely 
worried about the munnai’s control of manpower, because it would undermine his 
power. Foreign mercenaries and foreign officials reinforced his authority. Therefore, 
he avoided bringing these groups into the manpower system, because they would 
have been registered as phrai som, bringing them under control of the munnai 
instead. 
Hence, Narai’s promulgation of the Act was arguably for his own benefit, 
rather than to uphold the kingdom’s authority.45 This could be proven again by 
examining the Siamese-French Trade Agreement of 1687. According to the 
agreement, French people who married Thai or Mon people were allowed to take 
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their families and properties with them when leaving Siam.46 While this resulted in a 
loss of manpower for the king, it was a favor to the French, as the king needed their 
support for his authority, which was then being challenged in his court. This treaty 
was signed just after the Makkasan Rebellion in 1686 that aimed to overthrow the 
king and replace him with one of his brothers.47 At that time, the competition for 
authority in the court was serious. It can thus be argued that the king felt more 
threatened in 1687 than he had in 1663. He was thus more willing to make 
concessions to the French now than 24 years earlier. Nevertheless, Narai’s reign 
ended in 1688 and French influence declined. The agreement was also aborted.  
Cohabitation between foreigners and local women remained a concern of 
later rulers. In the late years of Ayudhya, a decree was enacted in 1763 to re-
emphasize the prohibition of cohabitation between Thai and Mon women, and non-
Buddhists. The reasons enumerated in this decree include two points. The first was 
religious: to protect the people from sins and vices. The second dealt with the 
distribution of phrai luang to work in state sectors.48 The king, as the protector of 
Buddhism, might worry that local people, after living with foreigners, would 
abandon Buddhism. Manpower was also one of his main concerns, because other 
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laws enacted from the 1720s to the 1740s also reflect the king’s concerns about 
registration and the control of manpower.49 
In 1774, King Taksin gave a royal command to prohibit Thai and Mon people 
from converting to Christianity or Islam. Offenders would receive the death penalty. 
However, this command did not mention marriages with non-Buddhists. It should be 
noted that there was no new laws on this point in the Early Bangkok period. Sources 
from the Early Bangkok do not mention problems about biracial people. This might 
be due to fewer numbers of foreigners and metis in Bangkok at the beginning of this 
period. Most of the Europeans in Siam departed after the fall of Ayudhya.  
 
6.2 The Control of Manpower in the Early Bangkok Era  
 
The control of phrai and the increase of the numbers of phrai luang were 
goals of the state, especially during wartime and the revival of the kingdom in the 
Thonburi and Early Bangkok periods. A royal decree of Rama I of Bangkok shows 
that in the Thonburi period, both phrai luang and phrai som were strictly controlled. 
The state required both categories of phrai to work for a whole year,50 while in the 
Ayudhya period, only phrai luang worked for the state for only six months a year. 
Wutdichai Moolsilpa notes that it is possible that conscription in the Thonburi 
period may be the first instance of conscripting phrai som to work for the state, 
because of the exigency of wartime.51 The royal decree mentions clearly that, during 
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Taksin’s reign, having to work without a break caused the phrai luang and phrai som 
to become heavily dissatisfied, and they sent many petitions against the munnai.52 
This decree provides no detail about the six-month corvée requirement.  
At the beginning of the Bangkok era, the stability of the new kingdom and 
dynasty was still uncertain. Besides the instability of internal politics, another threat 
was Burmese military aggression. The efficient registration and control of phrai were 
thus necessary. Phra Aiyakan Banphanaek (the Law on the Organization and the 
Division of People) and other laws on manpower were implemented to organize and 
control the phrai. Through these laws, a census and registration of both categories 
of phrai were carried out and their deployment to state divisions and to individual 
munnai was continued. 
However, during the Early Bangkok era, the state faced many problems 
concerning the control of phrai, the escape of phrai, and the munnai’s 
misappropriation of phrai luang. These were mainly caused by the state’s demands 
of corvée labor during the Thonburi period. The Bangkok rulers realized these 
problems and thus increased the strictness in the registration of, and control over, 
the phrai, and introduced the tattooing of phrai to take them into the system and 
prevent their escape. This section examines these problems and the state’s 
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6.2.1 Problems on Manpower  
 
Problems with manpower in the Early Bangkok era were similar to those 
during the Ayudhyan period, as analyzed from the laws of Rama I.53 In 1783, the 
second year of his reign, Rama I introduced three acts on manpower. These acts 
shared similar underpinning concerns and reflected the problems of the state’s 
control of manpower, namely, concealment and cheating in the registration of 
phrai, the transfer of the phrai luang to be princes’ servants, as well as attempts by 
the phrai luang to escape or be exempted from labour.54 The king, in the laws, 
complained that these problems caused the loss of phrai luang, which affected his 
authority and the progress of the state’s projects. Moreover, the issue of 
misappropriation of phrai was frequently mentioned. This indicates that this 
problem was difficult to resolve though there were many laws to prevent the further 
loss of manpower.  
The phrai’s avoidance of official work, and illegal transfers from phrai luang 
to phrai som were the two main problems the state faced. Phrai luang evaded their 
duty and ran to the protection of influential princes or nobles who could conceal 
their escape and falsify the registers of manpower. Many of them escaped into the 
jungle, became slaves, or entered monkhood as slaves as monks were exempted 
from registration. The measure of tattooing effectively hindered the phrai luang 
from turning themselves into the phrai som because they could not hide their 
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tattoos. Thus, the two remaining practicable ways of avoiding official duty were 
escaping into the jungle and becoming a slave.55 
 
6.2.2 The State’s Measures to Control Manpower  
 
During the Early Bangkok period, many measures were taken to make the 
registration and control of phrai more effective. They included tattooing, legislation, 
and various steps to compromise with the phrai, such as reducing the annual corvée 
requirement, pardoning runaway phrai, allowing the phrai to change their munnai, 
and improving the livelihood of the phrai. These measures indicate attempts of the 
state to improve control of the phrai. Subsequent sections examine these measures 
and the effectiveness of state laws.  
 
6.2.2.1 The Tattooing of Phrai  
 
The tattooing of phrai was an important matter for the state, as it seemed to 
be the most effective measure to control and help the identification of phrai and the 
calculation of the manpower available to the state. This measure was called sak lek 
in Thai (sak means “tattooing” and lek was used to refer to an unregistered phrai). 
The sak lek began in the Ayudhyan period. At the beginning of each reign, senior 
officials were sent to supervise the tattooing of the phrai in important provinces.56 
Royal chronicles tell that the state sent official tattoo needles to provincial 
governors for use in the tattooing in order to prevent false tattooing and the use of 
counterfeit tattoo needles. It is not clear from the records just how official and 
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counterfeit tattoo needles differed, but the existence of this law reflects that the 
state was considerably concerned about the tattooing, and tried to create various 
methods of conscripting manpower efficiently. During the Ayudhyan period, the 
phrai was tattooed with signs on his neck, leg, or shin.57 Since the Thonburi period, 
the phrai was also marked on his wrist with the name of his master and the town in 
which he lived.58 A phrai who lived through a few reigns might thus be tattooed a 
few times on different parts of his body, on his wrists and upper arms.  
The decline of the state administration after the fall of Ayudhya led to 
attempts by the state to restore the control of manpower. In the reign of Taksin, the 
kingdom, having fought a war, required a period of restoration, so large numbers of 
manpower were required to work for the state all year-round. Since the Thonburi 
period, King Taksin commanded the tattooing of all phrai. A record from the Fifth 
Reign reveals that, in the Ayudhyan period, only phrai luang who were palace 
guards were tattooed as they worked for the king’s security.59 Turpin, who was in 
Siam during the Thonburi period, wrote that, besides the palace guards, those who 
worked as policemen and bailiffs were also marked.60 
The policy to tattoo all phrai began in Taksin’s reign because of the need for 
manpower. The tattooing helped in the identification of phrai and partly resolved 
the problem of the escape and hiding of phrai. Taksin also specified the death 
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sentence for anyone who duplicated the official tattoo needle.61 Although there 
were attempts to violate the law on tattooing, the tattooing was an effective 
measure that helped make the registration more effective.62 
However, it should be noted that some people, such as low-ranking officials, 
the khun and muean,63 and Portuguese descendants, were exempted from tattooing 
and the annual corvée requirement.64 The state gave them a document of 
protection, called nangsuephim khumsak. This document could only be used for an 
individual phrai and could not be transferred to his family members. However, 
historical records show that there were cases in the Fourth Reign where the munnai 
did not return the document to the state after the holder of the document passed 
away. The munnai made profits for themselves by selling the document to others.65 
This was at the expense of the state as the state lost manpower or money that it 
could have received from the registration of the document. 
 
6.2.2.2 Legal Measures on Manpower  
 
Increasing the numbers of phrai luang was a goal of the state and had been 
achieved through the phrai’s registration and legislation. At the beginning of the 
First Reign of Bangkok, a few decrees were regulated to convert phrai som into phrai 
luang. In 1783, Rama I legislated that phrai som who brought charges against their 




 Akin, Thai Society, 57. 
63
 Low-ranking officials of the sakdina, below the rank of 400, were exempted from the annual 
corvée labor or tax due to the state. Some of them thus had the protection document for the 
exemption.  
64
 Wutdichai, “Phrai lueak nai”, 274. 
65




munnai (master) was automatically absorbed into the phrai luang.66 This regulation 
was clearly aimed at increasing the amount of phrai luang. However, it is possible 
that this kind of case might be rare, because no phrai som wanted to be phrai luang. 
In addition, beginning from this reign, phrai som were legally converted into phrai 
luang after their munnai passed away.67 Although the existing records do not 
mention any case of the conversion of phrai som, it can be assumed that this sort of 
cases might be very rare, as no one wanted to be phrai luang. The phrai som might 
change their munnai illegally, and ask for protection from influential munnai. 
Concealing or altering the lists of phrai som could happen through bribery or abuses 
of authority.  
The years from 1783 to 1792 saw the state placing even more importance on 
the control over phrai through the legislation of seven acts. These acts cover the 
control of phrai, the improvement of the lives of phrai, the abandonment of official 
duty and the misappropriation of phrai, to name a few. In order to stop the escape 
of the phrai and to improve the phrai’s livelihoods, Rama I reduced the working 
period of phrai luang from six to four months per year. As mentioned above, during 
Taksin’s reign, the phrai needed to work for the state for one whole year. Rama I 
reduced the levy to six months when he came to power. This reduction was to allow 
phrai to work for themselves and their families during the rest of the year, so as to 
persuade them to remain part of the system. However, these problems remained, as 
seen in the decree of 1785. This decree tells of the phrai’s avoidance of official work 
and the state’s problem of manpower scarcity.  
                                                          
66
 “PKM”, Article 4, the TSC, Vol. 2, 705–706. 
67
 Khachorn, Thanandon Phrai, 38–39. 
229 
 
In dealing with these problems, the king tried to compromise by allowing 
escaped persons to return without punishment.68 In 1787, a new decree was 
introduced to punish munnai who underreported the number of registered phrai 
and failed to tattoo phrai in order to hide them from the state.69 Decrees were 
legislated in 1788 and 1792 to prohibit the ransoming of phrai luang70 and the 
conversion of a phrai luang into a prince’s servant respectively.71 They show the 
state’s substantial concern over the control of manpower.  
Tattooing was the most effective measure to identify phrai as phrai could 
not hide their tattoos. Thus, many phrai tried to avoid the tattooing. As mentioned 
in the decree of 2330 BE (1787), many people escaped the tattooing by fleeing into 
the jungle or seeking harbor with the munnai who would conceal his phrai and help 
them avoid getting tattooed. Some phrai also lied that they were that with the 
support of the munnai because a that was exempted from official work.72 These 
were prevalent practices that made the state lose manpower. Therefore, a decree 
was legislated in 1788 to make the purchase of phrai luang as slaves illegal and 
invalid.73  
However, it can be concluded that the law was not very effective. Although 
the official known numbers of phrai who escaped official duty are scant, laws 
legislated during the First Reign and the state’s many attempts to resolve the 
problem in later reigns illustrate that it remained a serious concern for the state.  
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Problems concerning the registration and escape of phrai that plagued the 
First Reign spurred the state in the Second Reign to increase the strictness of the 
control of phrai. In 1809, the first year of Rama II's reign, the state conducted a 
complete census of manpower, and tattooing. Later, in 1810, three acts on 
manpower were introduced. The first act aimed to enforce old obligations of the 
previous reign. It repeated the prohibition of munnai’s misappropriation of the 
king’s manpower. In this act, Rama II stated that previous kings had attempted to 
eliminate this offence and make the registration of phrai more effective; however 
the offence remained. He hence strongly prohibited this offence.  
Furthermore, the king clearly acknowledged that the difficult lives and taxing 
labour the phrai luang experienced were fundamental reasons for their escape 
attempts. Thus, measures were implemented to compromise with the runaway 
phrai. In April 1810, a decree was issued to reduce the period of service of the phrai 
luang from four months to three per year.74 Then, another decree was legislated in 
December 1810 to convince runaway phrai to return into the system by giving them 
pardons and allowing them to select their own patron, while those who still hid in 
the jungle, or persisted in running away, would be arrested and imprisoned.75 In this 
act, the king explained that in the previous reign a large number of phrai escaped 
into the jungle because of their tough jobs. Some fugitive phrai ganged up and 
committed crimes that caused disorder to society. Hence, to remedy the problems 
                                                          
74
 Sathain Lailuck, ed., “Kotmai chamra lek” (the Decree on the Registration of Manpower), 
Prachum kotmai pracham sok lem 4 (the Annual Collection of Laws, Vol. 4), (Bangkok: Daily Mail, 
1934), 1–7. 
75
 “Phraratchakamnot sak lek CS1172” (the Decree of Tattooing Manpower, 1810), PRP R.2, 32. 
231 
 
both for runaway phrai and for social order, the king gave pardons to all fugitive 
phrai and permitted them to select new masters.76  
Reducing the annual corvée requirement and permitting phrai to choose 
new patrons were the state’s measures to persuade commoners to remain in their 
status as phrai luang and convince runaway phrai to return to the system. It was the 
first time that the phrai could change their munnai. The phrai in Bangkok seemed to 
have more choices than those in the provinces because there were numerous 
munnai in Bangkok, whereas the number of munnai in each province was limited. 
Provincial phrai needed to select a new munnai who was in the same town, as they 
were not allowed to move to other towns and affect the numbers of manpower in 
each town.77  
The state during the Third and Fourth Reign still allowed the phrai to change 
munnai, and there is evidence that the phrai could now move from one location to 
another. In 1845, during the Third Reign, a phrai luang of Lopburi province asked to 
move to Ayudhya.78 Wutdichai comments that a request for a move might have 
been considered on a case-by-case basis, as the phrai’s change of munnai might 
cause problems for the state’s management of the phrai. This is visible from King 
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Mongkut’s worry in 1857 that commoners were evading the tattooing and their 
moves to other towns were causing a lack of manpower in some provinces.79 The 
movement of the phrai inevitably made it difficult for the state to administer or 
update the registration of the phrai in each town and caused confusion for the state.  
In addition, the state further compromised with people who still took refuge 
in the jungles by permitting tang song, the setting up of fugitive villages in the 
jungles and remote areas.80 This practice began in the Ayudhyan period. The song 
were a kind of halfway house to facilitate the reincorporation of the phrai. Song can 
be understood as an example of what James Scott has described as “zones of refuge 
for peoples not yet fully incorporated into states,” although in this case they were 
actually fleeing the state under which they had been previously living and were thus 
“actively resist*ing+ incorporation.”81 However, the existence of the song caused a 
lot of problems. It was thus cancelled by the decree of 1812. In this decree, the 
problems of the song were explained. For instance, the heads of the song were 
corrupted, and the song gave refuge to many criminals who escaped into the jungle 
with the support of their leaders.  
Nevertheless, a record written in 1824 shows that song remained in 
existence throughout the Second Reign. Rama III thus revoked this practice in 1824. 
He complained that having song in the jungle was useless and increased crimes 
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because criminals escaped to these song.82 This begs the questions of why the state 
still allowed song to exist even though it was prohibited by law; how much did state 
law enforcement restrict their activities; whether or not it was because of the value 
of these song in allowing the state to control the fugitive people that led to the state 
neglecting to enforce its own laws; or if the existence of the song was the only way 
the state could gather the runaway phrai. All the compromises that the state had 
attempted to use to deal with runaway and unregistered phrai show that there still 
were a lot of  runaway phrai in the jungle, and also problems concerning the control 
of manpower, especially mistakes in registration. Some phrai sought protection 
from munnai. Others bribed officials to avoid being registered or to be reclassified in 
the registers.83 
The serious problem that affected the king’s authority was the munnai’s 
misappropriating of the phrai luang. A record written in the Fifth Reign indicates 
that in the Second Reign, the number of the tattooed phrai luang decreased. Many 
commoners chose to be tattooed under munnai or changed their status to be slaves 
to avoid service as phrai luang.84 Rama II promulgated a decree in 1810 which 
repeated this prohibition. In this decree, the king complained considerably about 
this offence. He stated that previous kings attempted to resolve the offence and 
make the registration of phrai more effective, but the offence remained. He thus 
firmly prohibited the misappropriation of phrai.  
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Nevertheless, the offence could have persisted, because two years later in 
1812, Rama II promulgated a new decree which addressed the same issue of the 
misappropriation of phrai luang. In this decree, however, the king suggested 
measures to improve the livelihood of phrai luang to prevent their escape into the 
jungle. This decree also restated the law of Rama I, which emphasized the 
prohibition of the redemption of phrai luang and warned munnai and phrai to avoid 
misrepresenting phrai luang as phrai som.85  
The laws on manpower tell us that the offences concerning phrai were 
serious in the eyes of the rulers. The king complained of munnai committing these 
offences and blamed offenders for breaking the laws and ignoring the punishments. 
These crimes impacted the king’s authority, the kingdom, and Buddhism. In the 
king’s view, the decreasing number of phrai luang affected the stability of Siam as a 
whole since, as Rama II explained, the phrai luang worked for the state and they 
were also soldiers for the state. The instability of the state and the loss of phrai 
luang, he argued, also had an impact on the king’s support of Buddhism and might 
lead to the fall of the religion.86 He thus increased punishments for offenders.  
Although the state attempted to resolve the escape of phrai and improve 
the living standards of phrai, the decrees regarding tattooing in 1824 and 1825 show 
that the loss and escape of phrai were serious problems for the state.87 The two 
main factors that caused the escape of phrai were the heavy burdens the phrai 
luang bore and the personal interests of the munnai. Since the beginning of the 
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Bangkok era, there were many state projects that required the free labor provided 
by the phrai luang.  
In the Third Reign, the burden of the phrai luang was harder than in previous 
reigns because of the 14-year war between Siam and Vietnam, the sending of 
Siamese troops into Cambodia, and the increase in the overseas trade of Siam.88 
Such activities demanded large numbers of phrai and led to the escape and 
abandonment of duty of both phrai and officials. In an official document in 1844, the 
names of officials who deserted their duty during warfare were recorded and the 
king complained about the phrai luang’s escape and conversion into phrai som.89  
The problems of the conversion of phrai luang into phrai som and the 
misappropriation of phrai seemed difficult to resolve. The loss of phrai luang meant 
the increase of phrai som. A large number of phrai som increased the influence and 
wealth of munnai. In particular, the expansion of the junk trade during the Third 
Reign increased the significance of and need for corvée labor. In the early 19th 
century, the volume of Siamese exports was high. Besides the high demand for 
forest goods, the requirement of rice and sugar cane also increased immensely.90 
Phrai were important as free labor in producing these products. The control of phrai 
was thus strict. Besides the direct benefit of having corvée labor at their personal 
disposal, munnai also gained benefits from taxes levied from phrai. Tax in the form 
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of money was used to buy goods for export and tax in kind became exports. The 
problems concerning phrai thus remained and increased. 
Rama III’s reign saw numerous cases concerning the phrai, such as the 
escape of phrai luang,91 the munnai’s false accounting of phrai,92 the munnai’s 
neglect in the tattooing of phrai, and false tattooing.93 These laws tell us that 
offences concerning manpower remained and were serious problems for the state. 
The repetitive nature of many royal decrees indicates the state’s efforts to force the 
population to stay in the system. However, these laws also hint at the 
ineffectiveness of law enforcement.94 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that the state during the Early Bangkok era 
was at least partially successful in tightening its control over manpower. The 
increasing numbers of phrai luang and taxes levied on them from the 1820s to the 
1850s back up this argument. For instance, the total number of phrai luang under 
the Krom Lom Phraratchawang (The Department of Royal Palace Guards) in the 
middle of the 1820s was 2,300 men. This increased to 3,000 at the beginning of the 
1840s, and 5,800 in the 1850s.95 
Therefore, although many decrees show that the escape of phrai luang 
occurred regularly and that there were many offences involving phrai, the 
aforementioned increase in numbers indicates that the state’s control of manpower 
was at least partly successful. It is ironic that on one hand, it was clearly the heavy 
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hand of the state on its phrai luang which motivated them to flee its service, yet on 
the other hand, that hand was not heavy enough to completely prevent their 
escape.  
Other than discussing the legal measures employed to control the phrai, the 
above discussion demonstrates the state’s adaptation to changing situations. Some 
measures, such as offering pardons to runaway phrai, allowing phrai to choose new 
masters, and reducing phrai’s official duties, can be considered as the state’s 
compromises with phrai. It can be seen that once the state offered pardons, it 
would appear that most of the people returned home – except for hardened 
criminals.  
 
6.2.3 Examples of Court Politics and the Misappropriation of Phrai 
 
In the Third Reign, there was a serious case of misappropriation of phrai that 
became entangled with court politics, and was considered an act of rebellion. This is 
because Prince Chuthamani’s name came up in an investigation involving the 
misappropriation of phrai. The prince was the second son born to Rama II’s highest-
ranking queen. He was Rama III’s younger half-brother and full younger brother of 
Mongkut, the future Rama IV. His royal rank was Chaofa, the highest rank among 
princes. He later became vice-king to Mongkut.  
In 1836, Chaomuang Nongkhai (the governor of Nongkhai in the 
northeastern region) informed the Minister of Mahatthai about the gathering of 
phrai luang in the provinces of Nongkhai and Nonghan by Phra Lakhon, a provincial 
official of Lao descent. Phra Lakhon claimed that he had gathered the phrai for 
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Prince Chuthamani. The prince regularly traveled to cities in the northeastern region 
and constructed a palace at Saraburi. He also spent several months living outside 
Bangkok. He had his own manpower in the region. Phra Lakhon’s mobilization of 
manpower in the prince’s name was not obstructed when he engaged in it. 
However, it was prohibited by law and the investigation found that he had intended 
to hatch a conspiracy to overthrow the king. Hence, he was executed.  
Chuthamani was not punished after the investigation. The Annals of the 
Third Reign provide no detail of the investigation;96 however, Phra Lakhon might 
have confessed that he committed the crime without authorization from the prince. 
He might have said that the prince was unaware of his act and that it was his own 
initiative to serve the prince in this manner. This case was recorded in the Annals to 
warn princes and nobles to adhere to the law.  
Although this case eventually did not get the prince into trouble, it was a 
serious case and worried the court because the prince’s name came up in the 
offence. Chuthamani was a strong candidate to inherit the throne from Rama III 
because he and his elder brother, Mongkut, were the only two  chaofa princes 
among Rama II’s sons. Their half-brother Chetsadabodin (who would become Rama 
III), although older than them, was the son of a concubine and was thus of lower 
princely rank. However, as Rama II’s first-born son, Chetsadabodin had worked in 
state affairs for many years. He was Rama II’s representative and was an influential 
prince. 
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Rama II had not appointed a successor, and thus there had been a 
succession dispute between Chetsadabodin and Mongkut. Some supported the 
former because of his seniority in age, influence, and experience as Rama II’s 
representative. Others supported Mongkut because of his rank as chaofa and 
because his mother was the senior queen. Mongkut realized that the possible 
succession crisis would endanger his life if he persisted in his claim to the throne. 
Therefore, even though he was ordained into the monkhood just before Rama II’s 
death, he decided to remain in the Sangha for the entire 27 years of his half-
brother’s reign.  
When the name of Chuthamani was brought into the case of Phra Lakhon, it 
can be assumed that Rama III suspected the possibility of a conspiracy involving 
Chuthamani (since Mongkut was still in the monkhood), which would have 
exacerbated the severity of the case. Had the prince acknowledged or confessed his 
involvement, he would have been executed. This would have led to conflict between 
political groups in the court that supported the two Chaofa. This event would have 
brought confusion and uncertainty to the political situation at that time. Although 
this case was smoothly resolved, it would have shaken the stability of the kingdom 
for a time.  
 
6.3 Conclusion  
 
The large number of manpower laws, and the kings’ attempts to improve 
enforcement of these laws, clearly show the significance of manpower to the king’s 
authority and state affairs. The laws described in this chapter demonstrate the king’s 
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concern about the loss of royal manpower, the influence of the munnai, and their 
violation of laws. Most of the laws on manpower were also clearly aimed at 
addressing the conduct of the officials rather than the phrai themselves. These 
documents indicate that there were many changes in the Early Bangkok period; at 
the beginning of the new kingdom all men, either phrai som or that, became forced 
labour. Later, the corvée period was shortened. 
During the Early Bangkok period, numerous measures were applied by the 
state to refine the phrai system. Some were new measures such as choosing new 
patrons, and allowing phrai to move from one town to another. Seksan argues that 
the Bangkok rulers tried to create a new phrai system, aiming to increase its 
effectiveness as a state tool, but the result was that the state’s control over 
individuals lessened, while the nobles gained a number of phrai under their control. 
This is because of the weakness of the state’s control over individuals. The Bangkok 
state was still in its infancy then, and the phrai continued to resist. Hence, the phrai 
sought escape from the state’s control by running away or seeking private 
protection.97 Seksan’s argument is partly true; however, it can be argued that the 
infancy of the Bangkok government was not a convincing reason for its weaknesses 
in controlling manpower. The phrai system had existed for centuries during the 
Ayudhyan period but the Ayudhyan state had also been unable to fully control the 
phrai and munnai, as evinced by the many manpower laws in the Ayudhyan period. 
Thus, the longevity of the state did not guarantee the strength of its authority.  
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The repetition of the laws on manpower in the Early Bangkok period shows 
the ineffectiveness of the laws. Although some historical evidence show the state 
partly succeeded in the registration of phrai, and that the number of phrai luang 
under state sectors increased, the number of escaped phrai also rose. This meant 
the state could not completely prevent the escape of phrai. Although commoners 
were needed to exchange their labor with the legal protection of the state, they 
usually sought to move away from state control and avoid being subjects. Some 
preferred to work under the munnai, not the state. Many others chose to flee into 
the jungle or become slaves to avoid being registered.  
Moreover, the laws on manpower dealt with foreigners in the kingdom, 
foreign relations, and the politics of the Siamese court. Thais, immigrants and 
prisoners-of-war were required to register under the manpower system, and Thai 
and Mon women were prohibited from cohabiting with some groups of foreigners 
considered as outsiders to prevent the king’s loss of manpower. However, the law 
was sometimes not enforced, as seen in the cases of VOC employees. Besides 
religious reasons, another important reason for the prohibition was to separate local 
manpower from foreigners. These laws illustrate the significance of manpower and 
the state of Thai society at that time.  
The growth of capitalism and the rice trade after signing treaties with Britain 
and other European countries after 1855 eventually brought about the end of the 
phrai system. The phrai system obstructed the growth of free trade in Siam. The 
control influential nobles had over manpower during the reign of Mongkut, and at 
the beginning of Chulalongkorn’s, undermined the king’s authority. Thus, 
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Chulalongkorn tried for many years to cancel the phrai system by enacting laws in 
1887, 1897, 1899, 1900, 1901, and 1905 to convert the phrai som into phrai luang in 
order to strengthen royal authority, weaken the power of noble munnai, establish a 
professional military institution, and convert phrai into state soldiers. The 
distribution of phrai som to munnai was cancelled by the 1901 law and replaced 
with monthly allowances to munnai. This law finally ended the phrai system that 
had existed in Thai society for hundreds of years.98  
The next chapter discusses the building of the state’s authority via monastic 
laws. The discussion will highlight the various methods the state used to assert its 
authority over the Sangha. The reorganization of the Sangha during the Early 
Bangkok period was not only for the state’s authority, but also for the reform of the 
Sangha which had declined greatly after the fall of Ayudhya. 
______________________ 
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The monarchy and the Sangha are two vital institutions in Thai society. The 
relationship between these institutions can be seen throughout Thai history. 
Buddhist conceptions of virtuous kingship had a significant role in shaping political 
ideology and providing legitimacy to the Thai monarchy. Thai kings were expected to 
carry out the vital duties of supporting Buddhism and ruling with dharma. Hence, it 
was believed that the rise and decline of Buddhism in the kingdom was connected 
with royal legitimacy. In this chapter, the discussion will reflect the rulers’ view of 
the restoration of Buddhism and the Sangha as it was crucial for the legitimacy of 
the defender of Buddhism. Also, the rulers needed to support the Sangha which was 
the transmitter of dharma.1 Therefore, the discussion concerning the laws will be 
narrated as direct expressions of the king. However, in this chapter, the terms 
“state” and “king/ruler” will be used interchangeably. I will argue that although the 
two institutions can be separated in some contexts (a central argument of this 
dissertation), when it comes to Buddhism they overlap. As the head of the Buddhist 
state, the king was the main patron of Buddhism. The laws to revive the Sangha and 
Buddhism were legislated on behalf of the king, and there was arguably much less 
separation in significance between the state apparatus and the king in terms of 
enforcing those laws.  
                                                          
1
 Ishii, Sangha, 40–47. 
244 
 
 Some previous studies, such as Ishii’s Sangha, State, and Society and 
Reynolds’s “The Buddhist Monkhood”, have examined the socio-political role of the 
Sangha in Siam, as discussed in Chapter 1. The perspectives on the role of royal 
power in Theravada Buddhism in these two works and in this dissertation are 
similar. However, this work differs from previous studies in focusing mainly on the 
restoration of the Sangha and Buddhism as seen through the lens of the Sangha 
Laws. Reynolds and Ishii also refer to some Sangha Laws in their discussion, but this 
study explores in-depth the 10 Sangha Laws along with attempts to revive the 
Sangha and rationalize Buddhism and religious practices in the Early Bangkok era. 
This chapter focuses on the extension of state authority over the Sangha in 
the First Reign of Bangkok through the Kot Phrasong or the Sangha Laws. It extends 
the important point of Chapter 2, offering an instrumentalist discussion of the use of 
Buddhist authority to bolster Rama I’s legitimacy. The discussion also demonstrates 
the relationship between law and religion, and the kings’ use of laws to manage 
religion. Law is a tool and religion had instrumentalist value because it stabilized a 
king’s authority. 
The first section examines the relationship between the monarchy and the 
Sangha before the reign of Rama I, where the Sangha enjoyed independence from 
state authority. It also provides a conceptual discussion of how the ruler’s moral 
authority is linked to the state of the Sangha. Section 2 explores the revival of 
Buddhism and the organization of the Sangha in the reigns of Taksin and Rama I. It 
shows the king’s relationship to the institution of the Sangha. Section 3 examines 
the contents of the 10 Sangha Laws, cases concerning the decline of the Sangha 
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mentioned in the Sangha Laws, and attempts of the kings to restore the Sangha. The 
last section aims to assess the effectiveness of the Sangha Laws through events 
described in the Sangha Laws and the historical sources of later periods. 
 
7.1  The Relationship Between the Monarchy and the Sangha 
 
Historical documents suggest that the idea of dharmaraja has been 
cultivated in Thai society ever since the 14th century, especially through the 
cosmological writing, the Traiphum. The monarchy and the Sangha became two key 
institutions that supported each other. The Sangha had an important role in 
supporting the king’s efforts in making merit to become enlightened. In Theravada 
Buddhism, the king was seen as the bodhisattva, accumulating merit in a cycle of 
birth and death to become enlightened in the future. Patronage of the Sangha and 
more broadly, of Buddhism, were vital duties for the king.   
This section discusses the historical relationship between the monarchy and 
the Sangha before the Bangkok era. It also examines the connection between the 
decline of the Sangha and the responsibilities of the monarch articulated in Buddhist 
conceptions of kingship.  
 
7.1.1 Historical Relationship Between the Monarchy and the Sangha 
 
As the primary political and religious institutions in Thai society, the 
monarch and the Sangha were symbiotically related. The monarchy gave patronage 
to Buddhism, while the Sangha provided instruction to the kings in both state and 
religious affairs. For instance, during the reign of Naresuan of Ayudhya (r.1590 – 
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1605), senior monks asked the king to grant an amnesty to 40 officials who had 
made mistakes during a war and had been sentenced to death, and the king 
accepted the monks’ request.2 Five senior monks persuaded three princes to 
surrender to Prince Uthumphon, who later became King Uthumphon (r. 1758), to 
halt a civil war among princes competing to succeed the monarchy.3  
Traditionally, there was a separation between the realm of the monarch and 
his subjects (Pali: raja anacakka) and the monastic realm (Pali: budha anachakka).4 
Though monks lived within the kingdom’s realm, they did so within their own sacred 
boundaries, and the two domains were also distinguished by disciplinary codes – the 
Vinaya (rules of conduct) for the monks and civil law for laymen.5 The separation 
seemed clear. The monarch was considered as the head of the secular sphere, while 
the Supreme Patriarch was regarded as the head of the religious sphere.   
However, there was an ambiguity in the relationship between these two 
realms that previous scholars might have overlooked, because they have generally 
disregarded the ways in which that relationship was articulated by and within Thai 
laws. It needs to be noted that both the separation between the monarchy and 
Sangha and their interdependent relationship were already enshrined in state laws, 
because they indicated that the Sangha was legally under the state’s authority, and 
the Thai king appointed the Supreme Patriarch and high-ranking monks.  
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The Law of Civil Hierarchies was enacted in 1478, which enumerates the 
positions and sakdina of the civil officials in all ministries and departments, and 
designates the lay department that oversaw Sangha affairs. The Sangha’s affairs 
were to be the responsibility of Krom Thammakan (the Department of Religious 
Affairs), which was a subdivision of the Ministry of Palace.6 This department was 
delegated the functions of taking care of monastic properties and supervising the 
monks’ conduct. The specific powers of the department were instituted in Article 10 
of the Phrathammanun (the Law of Procedure) promulgated in 1622. It gave the 
Krom Thammakan the authority to try and punish monks who violated discipline or 
engaged in sexual intercourse.7  
 The Phrathammanun was created in Songtham’s reign (r. 1611 – 1638). 
Songtham, literally “the king who adheres to the dharma”, was valorized in oral 
tradition as a dharmaraja who was devoted to Buddhism. Van Vliet also recorded 
that Songtham had engaged in the enactment of new laws and the purification of 
the Sangha.8 He was in the monkhood before his enthronement, and hence it may 
be inferred that he personally knew of or witnessed cases of indiscipline by monks. 
His personal experience in the monkhood might have contributed to the legislation 
of a decree which endowed upon the Krom Thammakan the authority to punish 
monks accused of breaking discipline.  
In theory, the king had the authority to punish or disrobe monks, or take 
action against the Sangha. However, according to the existing records, in the 
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Ayudhyan period, the rulers did not exercise authority over individual monks. When 
Ayudhyan rulers had realized the decline of the Sangha, especially as a result of 
monastic indiscipline, they organized religious examinations for monks, for example, 
during Narai’s reign. This measure aimed to encourage monks to concentrate on 
their monastic education and to hold fast to discipline. Conversely, in the Thonburi 
and Bangkok periods, kings defrocked and punished monks who violated monastic 
discipline and committed serious offences.  
Moreover, there were other events during the Ayudhyan era that 
demonstrated the independent status of the Sangha vis-à-vis the ruler and state. For 
example, many princes entered the monkhood in order to escape from political 
enemies, as Mongkut followed suit in 1824. Their robes preserved their lives even 
though they opposed the king. A royal command of King Phetracha (r.1688 – 1703) 
also demonstrates that the state did not intervene in the Sangha’s affairs. The king 
decreed that criminal or civil cases that occurred on the grounds of a monastery 
would be left to the monks to adjudicate.9 Considering both this decree and the 
function of the Krom Thammakan mentioned in the Phrathammanun, it may be 
inferred that the state only possessed judicial power over crimes committed by 
monks outside of temples.  
Nevertheless, a case study shows that, in fact, in many cases the state did 
not punish monks who violated or resisted its authority. In 1737, as mentioned in 
Chapter 3, an abbot in Saraburi province convinced an official to oppose the state’s 
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command and assisted him in escaping from the state’s capture. However, the monk 
was not punished by the state, probably because his actions did not constitute an 
offence under existing laws. The Krom Thammakan had judicial authority over acts 
of monastic indiscipline. In this case, however, the abbot had not broken monastic 
discipline even though his action was in opposition to the state. Thus, he was not 
punished. 
As a consequence of this incident, the king introduced a new decree to 
prohibit monks’ interference in state affairs. It clearly specified that the relatives of 
any monk whose interference in state matters caused disadvantages to the state 
would be punished in his place.10 This was the first time that legislation was passed 
to prevent monks’ intervention in state affairs, though monks remain exempted 
from direct punishment. 
Subsequently, a decree was enacted in 1740 to reaffirm Article 10 of the 
Phrathammanun, which gave this department the authority to try guilty monks and 
also mandated that serious crimes against Buddhism must be reported to the king.11 
Cases of crimes against Buddhism, such as the plunder of monasteries and the theft 
of images of Buddha and precious objects from monasteries, are also mentioned in a 
few decrees enacted after 1740.12 However, there remained no case of the state’s 
punishment of guilty monks. Perhaps there might have some cases of errant monks, 
but these examples may not have been recorded in the historical records of 
Ayudhya. 
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Presumably, in the Ayudhyan period, the secular realm of the monarch and 
the ecclesiastical realm of the monkhood were separated. Although the state laws 
indicate that Sangha affairs were under the state department, the monks were 
exempted from the punishment of the state. In the Early Bangkok period, this 
relationship changed. The Bangkok rulers exercised more power over the Sangha 
through laws. Separation between the two realms still remained in theory, but the 
Sangha was governed directly by the state.13 
 
7.1.2 The Decline of the Sangha and the Monarch’s Responsibility  
 
In Thai tradition, where political ideology was based on Theravada 
Buddhism, the ruler was regarded as the Great Elected whose virtue was related to 
the progress of the state. In addition, there was a belief that the fall of a state was 
connected with the ruler’s unjust rule and lack of dharma, as well as the decline of 
Buddhism in that society. On one hand, the king’s patronage of Buddhism was 
considered as his way of making merit to become a bodhisattva. On the other hand, 
the patronage of Buddhism legitimized the king’s authority in the eyes of his 
subjects.   
This idea was replete throughout various religious texts. The Agganna sutra 
and Dharmika sutra in the Tripitaka, religious texts such as Tamnan Munlasatsana 
(the Legend of the Origins of Buddhism), and the TSC demonstrate the belief in the 
relationship between the king’s virtue and the glory of the state. The Phengyao 
phayakon Krung Si Ayutthaya (Prophetic Verse about Ayudhya) and the 
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Sanggitiyavamsa, the religious historical writings, also explain that the king’s 
abandonment of the 10 kingly virtues would cause his loss of authority and the fall 
of the state.  
The connections between royal virtues and the rise and fall of the state, and 
the patronage of Buddhism and royal legitimacy contributed to the belief that it was 
the king’s responsibility to support Buddhism, rule through the rule of law, and bring 
social order to society.14 Perhaps this belief would have caused Taksin and Rama I 
considerable worries. The revival of Buddhism and the Sangha was necessary to 
their legitimacy and authority, but their actions brought about very different results. 
Discussions in later sections demonstrate the attempts of Thai kings to restore 
Buddhism and the Sangha. 
 
7.2  The Revival of Buddhism and the Organization of the Sangha 
 
The revival of Buddhism and the organization of the Sangha were critical 
matters that both Taksin and Rama I addressed immediately when they ascended 
the throne, though with very different outcomes. This was because Buddhism was 
important in people’s minds and it was the cultural pillar of Thai society. The Sangha 
was a key institution whose members had close contact with people every day; thus, 
any instability within the monkhood potentially bore serious ramifications for the 
country as a whole. The first section refers to Taksin’s policies towards the Sangha, 
but the focus is on the Early Bangkok period, especially during the reign of Rama I. 
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The last section analyzes the factionalism and disputes within the Sangha since 
Taksin’s reign. 
 
7.2.1 The Revival of Buddhism and the Sangha in Taksin’s Reign  
 
Historical sources of the late Ayudhyan period, such as Khamhaikan chao 
krung kao (The Testimony of Ayudhyan People), demonstrate the deepening of 
beliefs in supernatural powers and magic. Saichon argues that this was influenced by 
contestations among political cliques in the late Ayudhyan period. The disunity and 
chaos in society caused people to seek protection in influential munnai and holy 
men and their amulets.15 Monks became involved in animistic and magical practices. 
According to historical records, supernatural beliefs and animistic practices seemed 
to be common in society at that time. In the memories of commoners, some kings 
were remembered and credited as possessing great merit and magical powers.16  
Since the fall of Ayudhya, Buddhism and the Sangha went into significant 
decline. Writings by contemporary eyewitnesses show that the fall of Ayudhya was 
one main cause of the violation of monastic discipline. As recorded by French 
missionaries, monasteries were destroyed; because of famine, monks disrobed, left 
their monasteries, and violated discipline.17 The fall of the kingdom and 
administrative organizations ended the royal patronage of the Sangha. The monks’ 
sufferings during the famine resulting from war led to an increasing number of 
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monks abandoning the Vinaya, claiming to possess magical powers as phumibun, 
and lacking accurate knowledge of Buddhism.18   
The decline of the Sangha necessitated the king’s restoration of the Sangha 
and Buddhism, since the fate of the monarchy was seen as closely tied to the rise 
and fall of Buddhism. Taksin supported the construction and renovation of 
monasteries and the revival of monastic study, nominated the new Supreme 
Patriarch to administer the Sangha, and appointed other senior monks to be 
Phrarachakhana (clerical titles) to manage royal monasteries and administer the 
provincial Sangha.19  
In 1770, Taksin subdued Phra Fang, the monk-ruler at Fang in the north (now 
a district in Uttaradit province). Phra Fang claimed to possess supernatural powers 
by linking his power with the Buddha’s relic at the Fang Temple; he proclaimed 
himself the King of Fang. He gathered followers, both monks and laypeople, to fight 
with other autonomous groups after the fall of Ayudhya. Although they wore monk 
robes, the monks lived as laymen did, violated monastic discipline, and carried 
weapons and arms.20 
After the suppression of Phra Fang’s group, Taksin immediately “cleansed” 
Buddhism by defrocking convicted monks and sending 50 senior monks to be 
stationed in the north to instruct an accurate knowledge of Buddhism and ordain 
new monks.21 The group of Fang was one of Taksin’s opponents and monks in this 
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group severely violated monastic discipline. They were considered sham monks and 
were blamed for violating tradition and destroying Buddhism. Taksin, who had only 
been recently crowned, thus defrocked and punished them. Furthermore, installing 
senior monks in the north may be considered as a measure to both raise monastic 
standards and control the northern monks to prevent them from carrying out 
actions that might threaten Taksin’s rule.22  
After Taksin seized power from the governor of Nakhon Sithammarat in 
1769, he distributed alms to the Sangha, renovated temples, and performed a 
ceremony in honor of the most respected stupa of Nakhon Sithammarat. He did 
these because the city was the center of Buddhism in the south. He also reproduced 
copies of Nakhon’s Tripitaka and distributed them to monasteries.23 He also ordered 
the collection of religious texts and the Tripitaka from various places to verify the 
accuracy of the texts.  
Taksin enacted a decree in 1773 which enumerated 227 Buddhist percepts 
and the consequences of monastic indiscipline as mentioned in the Tripitaka, and 
declared prohibitions for monks. He ordered that this decree be given to monks and 
laymen for their study and adherence.24 In 1776, he ordered the reproduction of 
Traiphum. These all represented Taksin’s attempts to revive Buddhism. 
Nidhi suggests that Taksin was the first king who fully performed a dual role 
as not only the patron of Buddhism but also the effective head of the Sangha.25 
Some may argue against Nidhi’s observation as Taksin issued only one decree 
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pertaining to the Sangha in his reign. Nevertheless, he certainly intervened in the 
affairs of the Sangha more actively than previous kings. He usually gave instructions 
dealing with monastic study and discussed Buddhist doctrine with senior monks.26 
Presumably, Taksin’s instructions regarding religious affairs and the Sangha were 
aimed at both “cleansing” the Sangha and exemplifying his leading status in both the 
secular and religious realms. His reign was the beginning of the state’s expansion of 
authority over the Sangha.  
However, Taksin’s subsequent actions defied tradition and impacted the 
relationship between the monarchy and the Sangha, and the issue of religious 
authority. He was an enthusiastic practitioner of meditation. He claimed to be a 
sodaban (stream-winner) and to possess supernatural powers as a result of his 
practice of meditation, and required monks to prostrate themselves before him, as 
mentioned previously in Chapter 2. In this sense, his kingship was represented in 
terms of his individual spiritual achievement and prowess rather than the institution 
of monarchy.27 Taksin’s assertion of superiority over the monks and demand for 
their submission affected the traditional conception of the separation between the 
monarchical and religious realms. 
Taksin’s requirement caused disputes in the Sangha. John Butt comments 
that the monks did not refute his claim of being the sodaban, but they discussed 
whether they should venerate a layman because Taksin’s requirement meant that 
he was demanding the monks to acknowledge his superiority.28 Senior monks led by 
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the Supreme Patriarch refused Taksin’s request. Their reason was that the monks 
observed 227 religious precepts that were higher than the five to eight precepts of 
laypeople, hence a monk’s spiritual status was superior to that of a layman’s. The 
monks should not bow before a layman even though he was the sodaban. The 
Supreme Patriarch and two senior monks were discharged and punished by the 
angered Taksin. They and 500 other monks were flogged and sentenced to hard 
labor. Taksin then promoted the monks who obeyed his demands to venerate him. 
A senior monk was assigned as the new Supreme Patriarch and others were also 
promoted.  
Taksin’s reward of supporters and punishment of opponents intensified the 
factionalism in the Sangha that occurred at the beginning of his reign. It also caused 
disagreement in society. Factionalism was a serious problem the Sangha faced. The 
first main cause came from the rivalry between groups of monks over the 
administration of the Sangha.29 This factionalism originated from Taksin’s promotion 
of monks close to him, especially monks from the eastern region, to high positions 
at the beginning of his reign, though he later promoted monks from other groups, 
such as monks from Nakhon Sithammarat and senior monks of the previous 
Ayudhya kingdom.  
Subsequently, Taksin’s treatment and punishment of the monks intensified 
strife within the Sangha and society. It also impacted the relationship between the 
king and monks in the later part of his reign; an idea to remove Taksin was even 
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mooted. Although he was later dethroned, factionalism in the Sangha remained. It 
required a dramatic remedy, one which became Rama I’s primary concern. 
 
7.2.2 The Revival of Buddhism and the Sangha in Rama I’s Reign 
 
At the beginning of his reign, Rama I began a process of reviving and 
purifying the Sangha and Buddhism. Taksin’s handling of the Sangha was arguably 
the direct cause of Rama I’s promulgation of the 10 Sangha Laws during the period 
from 1782 to 1801, and other decrees of the PKM concerning morality. The Sangha 
Laws were intended to purify Buddhism, reverse the decline of the Sangha, control 
monks’ behavior, lead them to follow monastic rules, and punish transgressors.  
The Early Bangkok period saw attempts to rationalize Buddhism and 
Buddhist practices. It may be assumed that the Thai rulers perceived that the 
popularity of the belief in the supernatural affected both Buddhism and the stability 
of the state, as many rebellions were led by phumibun (holy men) in the past. Rama I 
attempted to revive Buddhism and supported monastic study. In the first year of his 
reign, he enacted a decree to limit the people’s practice of popular beliefs, ban the 
worship of lingas, and warn against an excessive worship of thepharak (the guardian 
spirits for villages). He instructed the people to adhere to the Triple Gems and follow 
Buddhist doctrines rather than believing in superstitions.30 Worship of lingas 
stemmed from Brahmanic influence. Therefore, this prohibition was the king’s 
attempt to change old practices and beliefs, elevate Buddhism above Brahmanism, 
and eliminate certain Brahmanic practices completely. 
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The purification and support of Buddhism was Rama I’s intention.31  He 
ordered the revision of the Tripitaka. Copies of the revised Tripitaka were 
distributed to monasteries to support monastic study. In 1803, he commissioned the 
translation of the Tripitaka and some Buddhist treatises from Pali into Thai, and 
suggested that monks preach in Thai rather than in Pali. The translation aimed to 
support monastic study and improve the understanding of laypeople when they 
read Buddhist scriptures, listened to Buddhist sermons, and engaged in Buddhist 
activities.  
The king also promoted the accurate knowledge of monastic rules and the 
Tripitaka via the Sangha Laws and the PKM. In several acts of the PKM, Rama I 
explained morality, religious principles and proper religious practices in everyday 
life. He stated that Buddhists should perform religious activities with an accurate 
understanding of Buddhism, and with their intelligence, not just based on their own 
beliefs or a blind adherence to tradition.32 
Religious writings written and revised in the First Reign thus provided 
rational explanations of religious practices and principles. In the cosmological 
writing Traiphumlok winitchaikhatha, the author emphasized Buddha’s doctrines of 
ariyasat si (Four Noble Truths)33, learning and thinking with knowledge, and logical 
consideration. This writing instructed readers to consider the causes of problems, 
explore solutions, and avoid practicing awitcha (ignorance). It also presented making 
merit as the purification of the mind of devotees to prepare for the practice of the 
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dharma,34 while previous explanations only connected one’s spiritual merit to his 
personal merit. Rama I also explained in a decree that people’s pursuit and practice 
of charity and morality would benefit both themselves and society.35 
In addition, the problem of factionalism within the Sangha necessitated 
Rama I’s reorganization of the Sangha, which he acted on immediately. Rama I 
discharged Taksin’s Supreme Patriarch and defrocked some senior monks. Royal 
Chronicles labeled these monks as khon asat sopho (“dishonest sycophants”) who 
disturbed the Sangha.36 The king reappointed the previous Supreme Patriarch 
discharged by Taksin. Some disrobed monks were Buddhist scholars. The king 
regarded their knowledge and literary skills highly, so he appointed them to work in 
state offices as layman officials, giving the position as royal scribes. One of them 
later authored the Traiphumlok winitchaikhatha.  
Rama I’s removal of the Supreme Patriarch favored by Taksin, and 
appointment of a new one, could not resolve the problem of factionalism. The 
seventh Sangha Law, promulgated in 1783, tells of an argument among senior 
monks concerning the Kathin ceremony (a Buddhist ceremony where robes are 
presented to monks at the end of Buddhist Lent). The law reveals that this conflict 
separated monks into two groups. The first group was led by Phra Thamthiratmuni, 
the former Supreme Patriarch appointed by Taksin and demoted by Rama I. He 
argued that the performance of the kathin at two temples, Nak and Kang Temples, 
was doomed to failure since the phatthasima (markers of monastic boundary, such 
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as the wall or canal) of the two temples were too close to each other. This meant 
that the sacred space in the two monasteries was not properly delineated, thus 
invalidating the ceremonies performed within that space. As every monastery must 
have its own clearly delineated phatthasima, this meant that ceremonies held 
within these two temples would not be legitimate. 
A council of senior monks discussed this case. The Supreme Patriarch judged 
that each temple possessed its own phatthasima even if its phatthasima was close 
to another’s. The two temples could perform their own Kathin ceremonies. The 
Tripitaka did not mention the issue raised by Phra Thamthiratmuni. Furthermore, 
the phatthasima of many temples were close, and some temples even shared the 
same phatthasima, such as a canal, but this had never been a problem or point of 
contention previously. Therefore, the Kathin ceremony of the two temples did not 
oppose the Vinaya. However, Phra Thamthiratmuni and two other senior monks 
refused to accept the Supreme Patriarch’s judgment.37  
Rama I reacted to this case by strongly denouncing Phra Thamthiratmuni for 
showing disrespect to the Supreme Patriarch. The king’s reason was that the 
Supreme Patriarch was the head of the Sangha; his judgment was ultimate. Phra 
Thamthiratmuni’s action caused more factionalism in the Sangha and impacted 
Buddhism. The king thus emphasized through this law the highest authority of the 
Supreme Patriarch and the finality of the Supreme Patriarch’s pronouncement. 38 
The main reason for Rama I’s dissatisfaction clearly resulted from the 
previous Supreme Patriarch’s lack of respect for the current Supreme Patriarch 
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appointed by him. This case implicated the king’s authority as it could be interpreted 
as disregarding that authority. Moreover, this event revealed conflict between the 
old and current Supreme Patriarchs and the existence of factions of monks.39 
However, as this incident occurred in only the second year of his first Reign, it is 
understandable that the factionalism and disunity that had emerged and escalated 
throughout Taksin’s reign would not have been eliminated immediately. 
The problem of factionalism within the Sangha influenced and warranted 
Rama I’s attempts to reorganize and assert control over the Sangha through the 
Sangha Laws. The existing disunity and lack of a collective will also limited the 
Sangha’s ability or desire to resist or contest Rama I’s measures to reorganize and 
control the Sangha. However, Achara’s study of the revival of Buddhism in the First 
Reign argues that the management of the Sangha in this reign was unstable as the 
reorganization of the Sangha and the revival of Buddhism were conducted by the 
state, a fundamentally secular institution, not by the Sangha itself.40 This argument 
is valid, because at that time the cause of the disunity within the Sangha was due to 
the removal of monks Taksin favored and the appointment of another group by 
Rama I.  
With regard to the authority of the Supreme Patriarch, it may be argued that 
after Rama I’s introduction of the seventh Sangha Law, the Supreme Patriarch’s 
authority was not increased. He might not have the ultimate power in the Sangha 
administration because the responsibility of Sangha affairs was under the state 
department, Krom Sangkhari (later was called Sanghakari). This department was 
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under the Krom Thammakan and administered by a senior prince. The Krom 
Sangkhari could investigate, punish, and disrobe monks. The authority of the Krom 
Sangkhari thus diminished the role of the Supreme Patriarch. By citing a record of 
Jean Baptiste Pallegoix who came to Siam in 1838, Craig Reynolds argues that the 
Supreme Patriarch never had the authority indicated by his title.41 Pallegoix 
observed that in practice, the Supreme Patriarch did not exercise his authority over 
all monks and monasteries in the kingdom. Mostly, the Supreme Patriarch only 
made reports concerning religious issues to the king and presided over assemblies of 
abbots to deal with and adjudicate over religious matters.42 
 Presumably, in the Early Bangkok era, the Supreme Patriarch could not 
exercise his jurisdiction over monks and monasteries as the Krom Sangkhari 
controlled the practical and legal aspects of Sangha affairs. The king’s appointment 
of the Supreme Patriarch was not aimed to actually distribute authority and 
responsibility to the head of the Sangha. Reynolds comments that the appointment 
was a traditional practice. The king was symbolically performing his religious duty by 
appointing the Supreme Patriarch to be the head of the Sangha.43 
 
7.3  The Sangha Laws: the Restoration of the Sangha  
 
The restoration of the Sangha and Buddhism was, in the king’s view, 
absolutely essential and expedient. Soon after his coronation, Rama I promulgated 
the first Sangha Laws, and subsequently legislated more Sangha Laws in the 
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following years. They were aimed at “cleansing” the Sangha, purifying Buddhism, 
and restoring popular respect for the Sangha. This part examines the 10 Sangha 
Laws and the decline of the Sangha mentioned in the Laws. They reflect clearly the 
crises of the Sangha, and consequently, the urgent necessity for a remedy during the 
Thonburi and Early Bangkok eras. 
They reveal problems such as monks possessing and transmitting inaccurate 
knowledge of Buddhism, believing in superstitions, acting as phumibun, and 
violating discipline. A summary of the main thrust of each Sangha Law is provided 
below: 
 
The first Sangha Law (21st September 1782): mandates that monks give 
sermons in accordance with the Tripitaka and prohibits inappropriate ways 
of preaching, such as the use of impolite or humorous words. 
The second Sangha Law (3rd May 1783): complains about monks 
receiving money and precious objects from laymen, and the unlawful 
assembly of adult novices; prohibits the giving of valuables to monks; 
commands abbots to inspect the behavior of monastic residents, ordain 
adult novices, and strictly supervise the monastic study of novices and 
monks; sets out punishments for offenders. 
The third Sangha Law (8th May 1783): censures monks for leaving the 
monastic discipline, acting as phumibun and conspiring against state 
authority; asserts control over individual monks by demanding that they 
bear identification papers stating their Pali names [assumed at the time of 
ordination and henceforth used in place of their original name], the names 
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of their preceptors, and their temples of residence in order to easily identify 
and inspect them; sets out the king’s instructions to abbots and provincial 
officials regarding the inspection of monks’ behavior, the care of monastic 
property, and the prohibition concerning belief in phumibun. 
The fourth Sangha Law (13th July 1783): criticizes the monks’ ignorance 
of monastic study, violation of discipline, participation in unlawful assembly, 
and abbots’ negligence in supervision; conveys the king’s instructions to 
monks regarding the paying of attention to monastic education and 
adherence to discipline; emphasizes that abbots should punish or defrock 
offending monks; orders the names of monks in each monastery be 
submitted to the Department of Religious Affairs. 
The fifth Sangha Law (13th July 1783): rebukes improper behavior of 
monks, such as cohabitation with females, refusal to admit wrongdoing, and 
lying; prohibits the concealment of monks’ offences; institutes capital 
punishment for transgressors.  
The sixth Sangha Law (13th July 1783): criticizes the acceptance of 
valuables by monks, improper behavior such as acting as astrologers, 
wizards, or masseurs, and shirking discipline; criticizes the improper 
practices of laypeople that harm Buddhism and the discipline of monks, 
such as giving valuables to monks and following animistic practices; 
delineates punishments for offenders. 
The seventh Sangha Law (27th October 1783): outlines the controversy 
concerning the practice of the Kathin ceremony (discussed above); presents 
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the king’s directive emphasizing the status of the Supreme Patriarch as the 
head of the Sangha. 
The eighth Sangha Law (10th February 1784): criticizes monks who 
violate discipline, ignore monastic study, involve themselves in animistic and 
magical practices, and commit crimes, as well as abbots negligent in their 
supervision of the conduct and monastic education of monastic residents; 
conveys the king’s instructions and prohibitions to monks regarding the 
inspection of monks’ behavior, monastic education, the following of 
discipline, and the avoidance of having private conversations or 
cohabitation with laywomen; warns laywomen to refrain from having 
personal or private contact with monks; sets out punishments for offenders, 
their family members, and their munnai. 
The ninth Sangha Law (15th August 1794): complains of monks 
engaging in sexual intercourse; demands that abbots inspect and supervise 
the conduct of monks; prohibits the concealment of offences; sets capital 
punishment for offenders. 
The tenth Sangha Law (9th June 1801): criticizes monks’ misdemeanors 
such as having sexual intercourse, acting as phumibun, gambling, consuming 
spirits and opium, bad conduct, visiting improper places such as markets 
and theaters, preaching in humorous words, and incorporating Chinese, 
Malay, Mon, and farang songs into their sermons. 
  
These 10 laws indicate the extensive decline of the Sangha at that time. 
Rama I promulgated eight laws on the Sangha within the first three years of his 
reign and six laws were enacted within a single year, 1783. In each law, the king 
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explained his aims to purify Buddhism and restore the Sangha, described various 
cases of monks breaking discipline, as well as instituted regulations, 
prohibitions, and punishments. The details of the laws, especially the delineation 
of the types of punishment, show that these Sangha Laws were aimed at 
resolving the problems of the Sangha by changing and managing the conduct 
and behavior of monks, partly through punishment. Subsequent sections 
analyze specific cases of the decline of the Sangha and the attempts to resolve 
them through laws. 
 
7.3.1 Monks’ Acting as Phumibun 
 
Monks acting as phumibun, or holy men, not only infringed discipline, but 
also caused concern to the state with regard to its stability and social order. 
Historical records show previous cases of monks claiming to be phumiwicha or 
phumiwicha akhom, a person who learns magic (“wicha” means “knowledge” and 
“a-khom” means “magic”). Moreover, the belief in phumibun in Thai society was 
blended with a millenarian belief regarding the Golden Age of Maitreya. Maitreya 
(Sanskrit) or Mettaya (Pali) is the Buddha-to-come, the bodhisattva who will be the 
next holder of the supreme status of Buddha, representing the Final Relief. His 
appearance in a time of chaos will be linked to dramatic, cataclysmic change. The 
Golden Age of Maitreya in Buddhist beliefs refers to the Utopian society, in which 
people will live perfect lives in a perfect society, after the time of Lord Buddha, 
which would last only 5,000 years.  
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These beliefs encouraged an increase in the number of monks acting as 
phumibun, especially in the chaotic period after the fall of Ayudhya. Some did so to 
gain personal benefits, such as money or precious things from believers, while 
others referred to their supernatural power to persuade people to be their followers 
and build political power. Examples of these are evident in the cases of Phra Fang, 
the monk-leader of an autonomous group in the north as discussed above, and 
Maha Da, a monk in Ayudhya during Taksin’s reign (see below). 
The decline of Buddhism and the Sangha after the fall of Ayudhya was 
extensive and it was difficult to immediately reverse the decline. Taksin restored 
Buddhism and the Sangha throughout his reign. However, the belief in supernatural 
power had been prevalent in Thai society for a long time, as late as the later part of 
Taksin’s reign. Then, Maha Da, a monk of Phra Ram Temple in Ayudhya, claimed to 
have magical powers and created various kinds of amulets. Many people in the city 
and surrounding areas became his followers and presented money and precious 
objects to him. Maha Da was accused of being phumibun and summoned for an 
investigation by senior monks at Thonburi. He rejected the accusation and claimed 
that he was collecting money to renovate temples in the areas of Ayudhya. The 
monk was subsequently exonerated; he then told his followers that his “escape” 
was due to his supernatural powers and great merit. His popularity consequently 
increased. The monk’s claims would later lead to a phumibun revolt. He thus was 
arrested, defrocked and executed.44 
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 Historical sources of the Bangkok era indicate that there were many cases of 
phumibun. The second and third Sangha Laws tell of four novices and five monks 
who claimed to be phumibun and urged ordinary people to be their followers in 
their plots to seize the throne.45 The Annals of the First Reign do not mention these 
two cases. However, it recounts a conspiracy that happened in the same year in the 
palace of the Upparat, the king’s younger brother and heir-apparent. The plot to 
assassinate the Upparat was planned by the two ex-monks. Their claims to magical 
power and promises to bestow royal ranks to accomplices persuaded some officials 
to join their plot. However, the plot failed and they were executed.46  
This event occurred around two to three weeks before the enactment of the 
second and third Sangha Laws. Although the laws did not mention the event, their 
contents suggest that the conspiracy influenced the legislations. These two Sangha 
Laws describe abbots’ dereliction of responsibility and duties in inspecting and 
supervising monks and novices in their monasteries, and encourage the latter to 
amass accurate knowledge of Buddhism in order to prevent them from acting as 
phumibun and assembling for unlawful purposes.47 
In 1816, there was a phumibun movement at Saraburi province, which was 
located to the north of Bangkok, involving the spread of Tamra thamnai phumibun 
(The Book of Prophecy on Holy Man). This text tells the story of an orphan who was 
a phumibun who helped people towards the Golden Age of the Maitreya, while 
wicked persons were eradicated. Eight ex-monks claimed to be phumibun, 
                                                          
45
 “Kot Phrasong” Article 2 and 3, the TSC, Vol. 2, 1009-1011. 
46
 PRP.R1, 20. 
47
 “Kot Phrasong” Article 2 and 3, the TSC, Vol. 2, 1009-1011. 
269 
 
proclaimed themselves nobles and killed other people. When arrested, they 
confessed that they had followed the predictions from the Book of Prophecy. Hence, 
Rama II issued a decree to ban monks from acting as phumibun and prohibited the 
distribution of the text. In this decree, the king blamed these eight people as 
“insane” criminals who believed in a prophecy without reason and falsely claimed to 
possess magical power, which persuaded villagers to believe in the Golden Age of 
Maitreya and abandon their livelihoods. They also harmed and killed other people. 
Thus, the king prohibited the possession and distribution of the Book of Prophecy. 
Possessors of the book had to surrender the books to officials for burning, and 
offenders would be charged and punished as rebels.48  
Interesting points can be analyzed from this case. First, it occurred in 
Saraburi, where most of the population consisted of Lao ethnic groups, such as the 
Lao Phuan, Lao Song Dam, and Lao Sung. Many of them were war captives from Lao 
kingdoms across the Mekong who had been relocated into Saraburi during the 
reigns of Taksin and Rama I. The phumibun phenomenon was particularly common 
among the Lao. Although other historical evidence surrounding the holy men of 
1816 has not been found, the eruption of movements led by holy men might have 
been related to the provincial administration, the control of manpower, and 
taxation. It is possible that provincial officials might have extorted money from the 
Lao ethnic groups and threatened them, and hence provoked their acts against the 
state.  
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Uprisings started by phumibun happened frequently and affected the 
stability of the state. Therefore, the state paid attention to the control and the 
prohibition of this practice. In the Third Reign, Rama III issued a decree to prohibit 
the laity from associating with alatchi (sham monks). In addition, since Rama I’s 
reign, the rulers’ support of monastic education had grown considerably. Forms of 
support included the organization of studies and examinations for monks, monthly 
stipends and presents for senior monks, and the provision of logistics to 
monasteries.49 The support of monastic education aimed to improve the monks’ 
knowledge of Buddhism, and reduce their practice of magic. In addition, the 
educated monks were expected to pass on accurate knowledge of Buddhism to the 
laity. 
However, a case of phumibun happened in 1840, which indicates that this 
popular belief and the Book of Prophecy remained popular among ordinary people. 
In Nakhon Ratschasima province in the ethnically Lao northeast, a man claimed to 
be an immortal orphan who came to release sinners. He claimed to have magic 
spells and presented charms to villagers. The villagers trusted and bought his 
charms. They also gave him food and gifts. The man was arrested.50 Although two 
historical records provided no information about his eventual judgment, it may be 
assumed that he was executed or imprisoned, according to the law. 
The cases of monks claiming to be phumibun that occurred in the Second 
and Third Reigns reflect an adherence to this belief among the people and the 
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ineffectiveness of the laws. They also indicate that the law could not change 
people’s beliefs. Offenders and believers disregarded the laws and still believed in 
phumibun and supported them when they appeared. They also demonstrate that, at 
that time, the Book of Prophecy was well received and distributed widely in society, 
either in the capital or provinces, and that the belief in phumibun was still popular. 
The cases of holy men in 1816 and 1840 both occurred in the northeast region and 
in two provinces that were close together. The second case happened 24 years after 
the first. Based on this, it can be argued that the laws were ineffective and the belief 
in holy men was still popular among ordinary people. Another assumption is that the 
story in the Book of Prophecy became a folk legend in rural areas.  
The above cases also reflect problems in the daily lives of ordinary people, 
which made them turn to popular beliefs and ways to better their lives. People’s 
superstitions and irrational beliefs led to the attempts to revive Buddhism. 
 
7.3.2 Monks’ Lack of Accurate Knowledge of Buddhism 
 
The Sangha Laws and other contemporaneous sources mention many cases 
concerning monks’ lack of accurate knowledge of Buddhism. This was a great 
concern for Rama I, who had mentioned this problem since the first Sangha Law. His 
complaints indicate that both high-ranking and junior monks had little mastery of 
the Tripitaka. Many of them could not understand Pali religious texts, delivered 
inaccurate sermons, and taught Buddhism incorrectly.51  
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In the first Sangha Law, the king complained of monks presenting sermons 
infused with jokes, and of the laity’s preference of such sermons.52 Rama I, 
according to Sangha Laws number 2 to 7, blamed the monks’ sparse and inaccurate 
knowledge of Buddhism for their indiscipline, practice of black magic and phumibun 
claims.53 He said that ignorant monks acted wrongly and persuaded naive people to 
believe in their words. Rama I encouraged the monks to refrain from all improper 
conduct. He explicitly mentioned that their wrong behavior weakened Buddhism 
and affected the stability of the state.54  
The second Sangha Law describes an unlawful assembly of four adult 
novices. The king complained that while these adult novices could enter the 
monkhood to learn about Buddhism, the abbots neglected to ordain and train them. 
This caused their lack of Buddhist knowledge and subsequent misconduct. He thus 
required abbots to ordain novices who had reached adult age and to be strict about 
their monastic education. Rama I emphasized that acquiring an accurate knowledge 
of Buddhism would prevent monks from practicing magic and claiming to be 
phumibun. In addition, the accurate instruction of Buddhism by monks might reduce 
the belief in superstitions.55 The cases of two men who immolated themselves in 
1790 and 1817 because of a belief that they would gain more merit from sacrificing 
their lives to Buddhism indicate the inaccurate knowledge of Buddhism present in 
society at that time. 56   
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Furthermore, an incident in 1830 underlines the people’s belief in 
superstitions and lack of a correct understanding of Buddhist teachings. This case 
also infringed both decrees in the Ayaluang and Kot Monthianban. A common girl in 
Phetburi province, named Chan, claimed that her body was possessed by Princess 
Kason’s spirit. The late princess was Rama III’s daughter. The princess’s mother was 
informed of the “possession” by Chan’s aunt, who had worked in a residence of the 
princess’s mother. The princess’s mother and provincial officials believed Chan’s 
claim and took Chan to stay in the palace. Rama III was informed of the story and 
ordered an investigation. He eventually denounced this as a nonsensical story that 
defied Buddhist teachings.57 
In the investigation, Chan and her aunt confessed that it was a plot. The 
court judged that Chan, her aunt, and provincial officials had infringed the acts of 
the Kabotsuek and Ayaluang, which prohibited engaging in practices beyond one’s 
rank or having ambitious practices, underestimating the king’s favor, and spreading 
inaccurate stories in the palace.58 The officials’ offences were the lack of 
thoughtfulness and reason in believing the absurd story that was at odds with 
Buddhist teachings. They had also transmitted the story to the princess’s mother 
and facilitated the meeting between the lady and the girl. The punishment based on 
the laws for the officials was 50 lashes of the whip, the removal of their official 
ranks, seizure of their property and demotion to become servants in the palace. The 
court sentenced Chan and her aunt to be flogged 90 times, humiliated in public for 
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six days, and beheaded. The princess’s mother was also punished because of her 
belief in rueang phit thamniam phit lak satsana (an act that goes against traditions 
and Buddhist teachings).59 She would be punished with 50 lashes.  
Nevertheless, the king mitigated these punishments by canceling the death 
penalty for Chan and her aunt. Instead, they were flogged, disgraced and 
condemned to tend to royal elephants. The princess’s mother and provincial officials 
were pardoned. However, an official who spread the story was whipped, publicly 
humiliated, and assigned to tend to royal elephants. Besides showing the king’s 
dislike of superstition and irrationality, this case indicates his role in adjudication, 
especially in the case of the death penalty. The king was the final arbitrator; he 
normally rescinded the death penalty, with the exception of cases concerning 
conspiracy. 
 
7.3.3 Monks’ Violation of Monastic Discipline  
 
The Sangha Laws express the poor state of Buddhism and the Buddhist 
monkhood then. In almost all laws, the king criticized and described many cases of 
monk misconduct, such as abandoning their monastic study, having sexual 
intercourse, consuming spirits, gambling, and visiting improper places for monks, 
such as markets, shops, and playhouses.  
In the Sangha Laws, Rama I prescribed a code of monastic discipline and 
enumerated the type of acts that violated monastic discipline. An offence that was 
mentioned in a few Sangha Laws was the acceptance of valuables from laymen. The 
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king prohibited this action and referred to the Vinaya to emphasize that it was a 
prohibition stated in the Tripitaka. Monks were to shun extravagance and lead 
solitary lives. The laws recounted the names of senior monks who accepted money 
and valuables from laypeople in exchange for amulets.60  
The fifth and eighth Sangha Law also narrated cases of monks’ cohabitation 
with laywomen and improper sexual behavior with boys and girls. The king 
proclaimed that these monks and novices were destroying Buddhism and the 
Sangha, and were not fearful of sin. He instructed senior monks and abbots to be 
strict towards monastic study and monks’ behavior. Violations of monastic discipline 
regularly happened. Rama I mentioned that, in the past, there was no law to enforce 
discipline. Hence, monks avoided punishment, which accelerated the decline of the 
Sangha and standards of monk conduct.61 The king’s comment indicates that, even 
though the laws of Ayudhya provided for the authority and function of Krom 
Thammakan in judging cases of the Sangha, the enforcement of the law would 
prove ineffective. Rama I thus needed to promulgate the Sangha Laws. 
Laymen were also charged with the responsibility of reviving the Sangha and 
Buddhism. The laypeople were required to provide for the material needs of the 
Sangha in an appropriate manner. Providing valuables to monks was forbidden; the 
king explained that this act violated monastic discipline. Some monks claimed 
supernatural powers to advance their fame and sway disciples who believed in their 
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claims and gave them valuables. Their fascination in black magic destroyed 
Buddhism. The king stressed punishment for offenders.62 
Moreover, laypeople were instructed to inform abbots or the state 
about monks’ violation of discipline, refrain from listening to inappropriate 
preaching, such as sermons including impolite or humorous words, and refrain 
from asking monks to foretell their fate and practice witchcraft. The laws also 
prohibited laywomen from being with monks in private places.63 
 
7.4 Assessing the Effectiveness of Law Enforcement 
 
The Sangha Laws aimed to address the decline of the Sangha. They focus on 
preventing monks’ violation of monastic discipline, giving instructions relating to 
Buddhist principles and religious practices, and defining punishments for 
lawbreakers. This section analyzes the political meaning of the Sangha Laws and 
evaluates the effectiveness of law enforcement.  
 
7.4.1 The State’s Control Over the Sangha 
 
The Sangha Laws were promulgated to revive and control the Sangha. 
However, it seems that the laws bore political ramifications. This dissertation argues 
that, although the revival of the Sangha was the main aim of the Laws, the Laws also 
established and expanded the king’s legitimacy and authority. Through law 
enforcement, the ruler hoped to establish genuine authority over the Sangha, and 
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this changed the traditional relationship between the secular and ecclesiastical 
realms. 
The state’s control over the Sangha might possibly have caused conflict 
between the state and the Sangha. The Sangha could have become an opposition to 
the king, as they did during the late years of Taksin’s reign. Therefore, Rama I made 
it a point to emphasize the decline of the Sangha and Buddhism as well as the 
Sangha’s failure in resolving its decline to justify his intervention. The Sangha laws 
promulgated in the first three years described the improper behavior of monks. 
Emphasizing the problems of the Sangha in the laws was arguably meant to 
legitimize his policies to revive the Sangha and Buddhism.  
Arguably, the Sangha laws changed the relationship between the state and 
the Sangha. Although the Sangha had in theory been under the state’s 
administration since the Ayudhyan period, in practice, the religious domain was 
separate from the state. The decree of 1737 in the late Ayudhyan period reflects 
that monks were not subject to the state’s punishment. On the contrary, the Sangha 
Laws provide many examples of the state’s punishment of monks. Thus, through the 
Sangha Laws, the state could now practically and legally govern the Sangha and 
punish offending monks to a degree unheard of during the Ayudhyan period.  
In addition, Rama I underlined his ultimate authority through the seventh 
Sangha Law. In this law, the king emphasized that the Supreme Patriarch was the 
highest ecclesiastical authority, and his pronouncements were to be accepted by all 
monks.64 On one hand, this law pronounced the Supreme Patriarch the head of the 
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Sangha. On the other hand, the king hinted at his supreme authority by specifying 
that if there were controversial cases between monks that needed the king’s 
judgment, the cases could be reported to the king.65 This law publicly underlined 
that it was the king who was the final authority over all realms and could resolve all 
conflicts. 
The Bangkok ruler legitimized his authority over the Sangha by referring to 
various manifestations of the decline of the Sangha and explaining the reasons 
behind the Laws to restore the Sangha and to prevent problems in the future. This 
was to preempt any opposition by the Sangha. For instance, Rama I argued that the 
decline of the Sangha was also partly due to the negligence of abbots in teaching 
and controlling monks and inadequacies in the identification of monks. Thus, abbots 
were commanded to make lists of monks in their monasteries. Each monk must be 
identified by a document bearing his Pali name, temple of residence, and his 
preceptor’s name. This document must have a seal of the phrarachakhana in the 
region. A monk traveling to learn Buddhism at other monasteries needed to take the 
document with him and present it to an abbot of the temple he stayed in. The abbot 
must check the identification document from the wandering monk and report to the 
Krom Thammakan. The king explained that this would prevent monks from violating 
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7.4.2 Assessing the Enforcement of Laws 
 
This section assesses the effectiveness of law enforcement in restoring the 
Sangha and in reducing ill monastic discipline, after their progressive introduction in 
the two decades between 1782 and 1801. The assessment is hence based on 
subsequent laws and historical records, that is, Royal Chronicles, official documents 
of ministries, and court cases. 
 However, it is to be noted that because of incomplete records, the details of 
judgment in some cases are not found. It is also impossible to expect that laws could 
absolutely control the behavior of monks or prevent them from violating monastic 
rules. Nevertheless, it is useful to assess the law’s effectiveness based on existing 
sources. This section will discuss the state of the Sangha after the introduction of 
the Sangha Laws, showing that some problems and limitations remained, and that 
attempts to revive Buddhism and the Sangha were not fully successful. 
The 10th Sangha Law, promulgated 19 years after the first Law, still 
mentions various cases of monks breaking monastic discipline and engaging in other 
kinds of ignoble conduct, such as sexual intercourse, wandering about at night, 
touching women, gambling, using improper language, consuming spirits, plundering 
and ganging up.67 128 monks were defrocked and condemned to menial labor. 
These cases indicate the existence of degenerate elements within the Sangha even 
though the Sangha Laws had been in force for almost 20 years. Violations of 
discipline by monks were still the main problem of the Sangha. 
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Rama II promulgated in 1810 a decree to prohibit ill discipline by monks and 
novices. He expressed his displeasure at the misdemeanors of monks, including 
gambling, drinking liquor, assembling for unlawful purposes, dressing as laymen 
(which would allow them to flout prohibitions on monks’ behavior), having 
relationships with women, and organizing a beauty contest among children of both 
genders.68 In 1816, a decree to forbid the consumption of opium and alcohol by 
monks was introduced.69 In the same year, a few senior monks were charged with 
engaging in sexual intercourse.70 The king thus appointed the Supreme Patriarch and 
Phra Phannarat, a senior monk, to write a text entitled Owathanusasani 
(Instructions Concerning Good Conduct), and distributed it to monasteries. This text 
delineates regulations and prohibitions for monks, codes of discipline, and precepts 
that monks were supposed to obey. Details in this text are similar to those 
mentioned in the Sangha Laws. Prohibitions against monks posing as phumibun and 
practicing magic were emphasized.  
However, in 1820, Phra Phannarat, the co-author of the Owathanusasani, 
was discharged for engaging in improper sexual behavior with a young monk. Cases 
in 1816 and 1820, as well as cases of phumibun in 1816 and 1840, demonstrate the 
decline of monastic discipline. Although the state had enacted many decrees since 
the First Reign to prohibit acting as phumibun, this crime recurred regularly. In 1842 
and 1843, almost 500 monks, including senior monks, were charged with this 
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offence.71 In addition, from 1845 to 1847, monks, both in Bangkok and other 
provinces, were punished for this crime.72  
The violation of discipline by senior monks indicates a failure in the control 
of monks’ behavior. The penalties might not have been heavy enough to deter 
them. In 1853, King Mongkut complained that monks who consumed opium and 
gambled got light penalties. They were merely disrobed and expelled from the 
monastery. Thus, they disregarded discipline.73   
It is difficult to attribute this solely to the state’s lack of effectiveness in 
restoring the Sangha. The instances of beliefs in phumibun and superstition may not 
represent the failure of official policies or the ineffectiveness of laws. These beliefs 
were mixed with Thai culture and the people’s way of life for a long time. Although 
laws were introduced to purify Buddhism and revive the Sangha, it was difficult to 
completely eradicate popular beliefs overnight, or easily change people’s beliefs and 
practices.  
The perception of the Sangha’s “decline” may also be due to the fact that 
such behavior by monks was now being reported and made known. While existing 
sources do not reveal an increase or decrease in infractions by monks, these cases 
indicate the kings’ attempts to revive the Sangha, and their responses to the cases. 
They also reaffirmed the state’s authority in controlling the Sangha because the 
offenders were tried by state officials and punished in accordance to state law. 
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Therefore, it could be argued that the mechanisms were in place for the rulers to 
exercise more control over the Sangha through the laws. However, whether these 
laws were effective in actually changing the behavior of monks and laypeople was 




This chapter argues that, although King Taksin was keen on controlling 
monks’ behavior, it was during the First Reign of Bangkok that the state’s control 
over the Sangha became more visible through the establishment of the 10 Sangha 
laws. The decline of the Sangha and the controversy within the Sangha in the later 
part of Taksin’s reign legitimized Rama I’s legislation of the Sangha Laws, which 
placed the Sangha under state authority. The discussion here reflects clearly the 
conceptual conflation between the state and the king in pre-modern Siam which, I 
have argued, remained valid where policy towards religion was concerned, since the 
former can hardly be distinguished from the latter in this context. 
This dissertation also argues that the Sangha Laws bore both ecclesiastical 
and political implications. Through the Laws, the state could assert legal and political 
control over the Sangha. The state exercised its authority to punish monks who 
committed offences and violated monastic discipline, instead of passing the cases to 
the abbots, as previously practiced.  
Moreover, the Sangha Laws reflect Rama I’s understanding of the 
connection between the rise and fall of Buddhism and the king’s legitimacy. He, in 
the third and eighth Sangha Laws, articulated clearly that the secular and religious 
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realms supported each other. The rise of Buddhism relied on the patronage of the 
monarch;74 the Sangha had the important duty to protect the purity of Buddhism; 
the king was the patron of the Sangha and Buddhism.75 Both Taksin and Rama I 
performed their religious roles as political leaders. However, they pursued different 
courses of action, which resulted in different impacts to the relationship between 
the monarchy and the Sangha. Taksin broke the traditional relationship between the 
two institutions, while Rama I’s reform of the Sangha was not radical. His reforms 
were aimed mainly at reviving Buddhism and restoring popular respect for the 
Sangha. His actions were acceptable to the Sangha. 
With regard to the effectiveness of the implementing of laws, it was 
effective in some aspects and not very effective in others. The laws were effective in 
controlling certain aspects of monks’ behavior, such as the registration of monks, 
and in punishing guilty monks. It was possible for the ruler to exercise more control 
over the Sangha. At the very least, these laws demonstrate the state’s attempts to 
revive the Sangha and the use of law to prohibit, prevent, and punish. For instance, 
the monks were required to have identification papers, which may partly help to 
prevent the impersonation of monks, and allow the easy identification of indicted 
monks. This regulation has continued to the present. The Sangha Laws also 
endorsed the state’s authority over the Sangha as offenders were tried and 
punished by law. 
On the other hand, the laws were not very effective in changing the behavior 
of monks. They could not control the monks’ moral conduct. Besides promulgating 
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the laws, the kings had implemented various measures to restore Buddhism and the 
Sangha, especially the support of monastic study. Instructions concerning Buddhist 
teachings, religious practices, and proper conduct for both monks and laymen were 
given. Nevertheless, there were many cases of monks’ transgressions and acting as 
phumibun from the First to the Third Reigns, as evinced by many cases of offences 
by monks between 1801 and 1843. These reflect the lack of effectiveness of the laws 
in controlling monks’ behavior, which was due to a number of factors.  
The revival of Buddhism involved several aspects that have to be assessed 
separately. There were a few factors that influenced the control of monks’ behavior, 
such as the strictness and determination of the abbots and the supervision of 
monastic study. Many abbots might have neglected their duty or paid less attention 
to supervising or supporting the study of the monks in their monasteries.  
The cases of phumibun behavior, and the animistic practices of the monks, 
reflect the religious belief and practices of ordinary people and the monks. It has 
been virtually impossible for a king or anybody else to “purify” popular beliefs and 
get people to change how they practiced their religion. The laws could not force 
them to change their practices. It may be regarded as a failure of the Buddhist 
reforms. Almost all cases of phumibun happened in the provincial districts. This 
shows both the localized religious beliefs and practices of villagers and the leading 
status of monks in remote areas. Those in remote areas might also have been too 
distant from the religious reforms that were introduced in the capital.  
The deteriorated state of the Sangha influenced the royal monk Vajirayana 
(the Pali name of the future King Mongkut) in establishing the Dhammayuttika 
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Nikaya, or simply, the Thammayut sect, in 1833. It was considered a Buddhist 
reformist movement to purify Buddhism and cleanse the Sangha. Vajirayana aimed 
to improve monastic discipline to make it more orthodox and remove superstitious 
elements from the Pali canon.76 The Thammayut sect focused on meditation and 
ascetic practices, adhered seriously to the Vinaya, and learnt Buddhist scriptures. It 
remained a small minority sect within the Sangha, however.77 
King Mongkut also paid considerable attention to the control of monks’ 
behavior and instructed them to follow monastic discipline. From 1851 to 1861, 
Mongkut issued 27 announcements concerning these issues. Many of them were 
announced in the early years of his reign. Seven of these pronouncements, issued 
from 1852 to 1855, deal with monks’ misconduct. They also indicate that ordinary 
people entered into the monkhood to escape from the phrai system. These monks 
thus disregarded monastic study and violated discipline. Mongkut levied serious 
blame on these guilty monks and commanded the abbots to defrock them.78 These 
show the decline of the Sangha, though attempts to restore and to control monks’ 
behavior had been pursued since the First Reign. These events reaffirm the 
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argument of the effectiveness of laws. The laws succeeded in controlling some 
specific aspects of monks’ behavior, but they could not control their moral conduct.  
Since the First Reign, the revival of the Sangha and Buddhism was the 
primary interest of numerous kings. They promulgated many laws concerning 
monks’ behavior. However, the Sangha Law of King Chulalongkorn (r. 1868 – 1910) 
totally differed from previous Sangha Laws. The law centralized the Sangha 
administration and reflected the political situation at that time. Since Mongkut’s 
reign, Siam had faced a new threat – imperialism. This threat reached its peak 
during the reign of Chulalongkorn. The concern over Siamese sovereignty caused the 
centralization of the Bangkok government and the building of a nation-state. The 
Sangha Law of 2445 BE (1902) was a result of these processes because it directly 
targeted the monkhood in the northern and northeastern regions, which 
Chulalongkorn was determined to integrate into his kingdom and keep from falling 
into British or French hands.  
Chulalongkorn issued the Phraratchabanyan pokkhrong khana song Ro. So. 
121 (the Law on the Rule of the Sangha, 1902) to reorganize the structure of the 
Sangha, centralize the administration within the Sangha, and build unity in the 
Sangha. This law organized the administration of the Sangha into levels 
corresponding to the provincial administration, and each level was supervised by a 
specific designator. For instance, an abbot controlled his own monastery and there 
were different levels of Chao khana (monk dean) for the Tambon (communes), 
Amphur (districts), Changwat (provinces), and Monthon (regions/circles).79 The 
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territorial divisions were overseen by government officials. The Supreme Patriarch 
was still the head of the Sangha, but the Sangha’s administration was headed by the 
minister of the Krom Thammakan (the Minister of Education). Since the Ayudhyan 
period, the Krom Thammakan had been under the Ministry of the Palace, but the 
Sangha Law of 1902 placed Sangha affairs under the Ministry of Education, which 
was a new ministry.80 Although the Sangha still had rights in issuing decrees or 
orders within the Sangha, these concerned only the management of monks’ 
behavior.81 Thus, we can see that by 1902, the state’s concerns regarding the 
Sangha had changed dramatically over the course of the previous century, and Rama 
V’s agenda in tightening control over the monkhood was significantly different from 
that of his predecessors. 
_________________________ 
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CONCLUSION  
 
 Historical writings on the Early Bangkok period, either in Thai or English, 
are scarce. The existing research has tended to focus on the dynastic history of a 
particular king, royal affairs, and political, economic, social, and cultural issues, but 
not on legal history. The absence of archival materials is a reason for why there are 
very few studies on the Early Bangkok period. The main sources used in previous 
studies are royal and foreign records, as well as published and unpublished archival 
sources. However, the use of unpublished records has been rare. Unlike existing 
studies, this work examined many unpublished records (chotmaihet) of the Early 
Bangkok period, that is, the testimonies of plaintiffs, court judgments, ministerial 
documents, and laws issued after the revision of the TSC in 1805. Many of them 
have never been utilized by previous studies. 
 This work studies the history of the Early Bangkok period through Thai 
laws. It has examined how the state established and maintained its stability through 
these laws, in particular the TSC. Some scholars, such as Akin, have also used the TSC 
to study the Early Bangkok period. His research on the social organization of Thai 
society, however, focuses on the laws on social organization. On the contrary, this 
study concentrates on the laws on royal and state authority. Other laws that pertain 
to the themes and subjects of the work, such as the Sangha Laws, are also 
examined.  
This study has analyzed specifically the relationship between the political 
and religious realms in the Early Bangkok period, and the influence of Buddhist 
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concepts of kingship in establishing and legitimizing the royal and legal authority of 
Thai rulers. Berman emphasizes the role of religion in endowing laws with a sense of 
divine sanction and authority, which benefited the establishment and enforcement 
of state authority.1 Brague comments that linking law with religion advances the 
sense of sanctity towards the law and its lawmakers.2 By basing this study on these 
ideas, we can investigate the ways in which ideas about the relationship between 
law and religion developed, and consequently influenced the Thai kings’ usage of 
laws as a political tool.  
Furthermore, this study converges with the aforementioned works by 
showing that Buddhism influenced the Thai kings’ approaches and perspectives 
towards governance, and correspondingly, aspects of Thai law. Buddhist teachings 
and moral percepts became the basis for judgment in some offences, and were 
essential qualities of the lawmakers and enforcers: the king and judges. The concept 
of karma was utilized in the court to persuade accused persons to tell the truth or 
keep their promises. Rama I’s use of laws on morality to legitimize his usurpation of 
royal authority is one example that reflects the influence of Buddhist concepts of 
kingship and the effectiveness of law as a political tool of the ruler. The legislations 
concerning social order, the control of monks’ behavior, and the purification of 
Buddhism in the Early Bangkok period indicate the influence of the notion of the 
connection between the rise and fall of Buddhism, the decline of social order, and 
the responsibility of the monarch.  
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Arguably, the Bangkok rulers had a distinctive approach to the law that 
differed from earlier Thai kingship. In the Early Bangkok period, the kings, especially 
Rama I, used laws on morality and Buddhism to legitimize royal authority and 
present their kingship as Buddhist-based. They enacted laws to purify Buddhism and 
to control the Sangha, monks’ behavior, and the religious practices of monks and 
laypeople. These practices were not seen in earlier periods; the kings of Ayudhya 
had never instituted any law on morality or Buddhist teachings. King Taksin, who 
exercised more personal control over the Sangha, created the first decree that was 
based on Buddhist teachings, but his decree did not define any penalty for 
transgressors.  
This work reinforces the view that Buddhist concepts of kingship and origins 
of Thai law helped in creating and enhancing the sacred authority of the law and 
Thai kings. It argues that the king possessed great authority in theory, but the facts 
show that his authority was not as absolute as it was presumed. In reality, the laws 
were usually broken; the sacred authority of the king was occasionally challenged 
and disregarded. Although the violation of law and the ineffectiveness of the 
implementation of law did not destroy the monarchy, they inevitably affected the 
sacred status of the law and the king’s authority, especially in the eyes of political 
figures such as princes and nobles. Princes and officials usually violated the laws for 
their own benefit, and sometimes plotted to undermine royal authority. 
In addition, one of the main contributions of this study is making a 
conceptual distinction between the “monarch” and the “state”. This research 
demonstrates how the king and the state were understood within legal documents. 
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The distinction may raise questions as it opposes the nature of 19th-century Thai 
politics that did not distinguish between the king and the state. The conceptual 
conflation between the monarch and the state contributed to the ambiguity of royal 
and state authority. This ambiguity can also be seen in traditional Thai law. 
Traditionally, the bulk of existing scholarship does not distinguish between the 
monarchy and the state, as mentioned in Chapter 1. It can also be argued that the 
usage of the term “state” as a substitute for “monarch” and “monarchy” only 
becomes viable in the context of the reign of King Chulalongkorn, which saw the 
Bangkok government’s successful centralization of provincial governments. Some 
scholars have thus argued that the absolute monarchy first began in this reign as 
opposed to the traditional view which pushes it back in Thai history.3 Works that 
study this period seem to conflate the state and the monarchy, and the term “state” 
is commonly used, except for discussing specific issues concerning the king, such as 
works on centralization and modernization during this reign.  
Moreover, most historians would argue that this distinction only becomes 
valid after the 1932 Revolution, an event that transformed the Thai political system 
from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy, thus clearly separating the 
monarchy and the state. However, it needs to be emphasized that this research 
defines “state” as the structure and institutions of administration and governance, 
and not as the sovereign, territorialized state defined in international law. 
                                                          
3
 These works include Chaiyan, Rise and Fall; Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of 
the Geo-Body of a Nation (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1994);  Kullada Kesboonchoo 
Mead, The Rise and Decline of Thai Absolutism (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004). 
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This study chiefly discusses the monarch and the state as two different 
institutions. It may be argued that the laws concerning the king’s authority and 
security were enacted to protect the monarch as an institution, not only the king as 
an individual. One may raise the question of how different this is from the state, 
since the king and the state were seen as one, according to the nature of Thai 
politics before 1932. One may also argue that the distinction between monarchy 
and state in this study of the Early Bangkok period may not be valid because it is 
pushing the distinction back by 150 years. Some may question why we need to see 
these as separate. The Thai laws during the periods studied, however, reveal that it 
is a valid distinction to make as they clearly demarcate the monarchy and the state 
as separate realms. 
However, it needs to be kept in mind that the distinction was not total, or 
even necessarily apparent at the time. The distinction exists only in the laws, and it 
is implicit rather than explicit. The Kot Monthianban and Kabotsuek deal directly 
with the authority, security and stability of the ruler, while the Ayaluang and Ayarat 
deal more specifically with the state. According to this classification, one might 
assume that the two categories are completely distinct from each other, but in fact, 
this is not the case. Because of the nature of state and kingship in the traditional 
period, there was an overlap in some threats, and an overlap in scope between 
some laws. Some decrees in the Kot Monthianban, Kabotsuek, and Ayaluang are 
very much the same. Several decrees in the Ayaluang cover offences against both 
state and royal authority.  
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Some issues deal with both the monarch and the state. For example, in the 
discussion of the restoration of the Sangha and the control of manpower, both the 
terms “state” and “king” are utilized when discussing the king’s personal views and 
activities such as the creation of laws. Some issues such as the control of phrai and 
warfare pertain to both state and royal authority as all phrai needed to be registered 
either under the state or the nai. The successful registration of the phrai was directly 
connected to the state’s success in the control of phrai as the phrai were corvée 
labor and soldiers for the state. To the monarch, the successful control of the phrai 
meant curbing the influence of princes and nobles. Thus, this study discusses the 
issue of manpower control both in the views of the state and the king.  
War is another topic that related both to royal and state authority. Besides 
dealing with the security of the kingdom and inhabitants as a whole, waging war to 
expand territory and demand tributes from other states in pre-modern times also 
meant the display and expansion of the king’s prestige and glory. Tributes from 
other vassal states symbolized their acceptance of the king’s authority. Moreover, it 
was the king’s duty to protect the people and the land from invaders.  
The Sangha is another issue dealing with both the king and the state. The 
rise and fall of Buddhism were connected with royal legitimacy. The king was the 
defender of Buddhism and monks were the transmitter of dharma.4 Thai states, 
beginning with Sukhothai, were Buddhist in character. It was the kings’ duty to 
patronize Buddhism and the Sangha. The Early Bangkok period saw the first state 
laws issued to control the Sangha and punish errant monks. As seen in the last 
                                                          
4
 Ishii, Sangha, State, and Society, pp. 40 – 47. 
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chapter, the king’s concern in the fall of the Sangha contributed to the enactment of 
the Sangha Laws, bringing the Sangha under state authority. Punishing the monks or 
commanding them to good behavior was on behalf of state laws, not the king’s 
command.   
Nevertheless, this study has shown that threats to royal and state authority 
were different. Topics that should be studied specifically for the “state” are threats 
concerning the state authority, state affairs, officials, and crimes against social 
order, whereas topics that specifically pertain to the “monarch” are issues of the 
king’s security and dignity, revolts, the control of influence of princes and nobles via 
the phrai control.  
Other scholars may claim that the discussion between the monarchs as 
individuals and the monarchy as an institution has not been clear, because in several 
circumstances, the king is discussed as an individual, not as an institution, such 
Rama I’s usage of the laws for his personal authority. This contribution departs from 
most of the existing scholarship. This work analyzes the king as a person rather than 
as an institution, in the case of Rama I’s use of laws on morality to legitimize his 
usurpation of power. In this case, one may argue that Rama I was legitimizing the 
authority of the monarchy; however, the argument of this study is that Rama I was 
validating his personal legitimacy because he was the usurper. In the laws on 
morality promulgated by the king, he considerably emphasized his virtuous qualities. 
He also exhibited his qualities as a Buddhist scholar, which was essential in Thai 
politics. Normally, giving suggestions concerning morality and religious practices to 
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the nobility should not be regarded as state legislation, but in order to augment the 
king’s authority, they became laws that applied to everyone.  
Distinguishing between the monarchy and the state contributes to a better 
understanding of Thai history during this period. Most previous studies look either 
specifically at the monarch or the state, but not both. The distinction therefore 
expands our views of Thai history during this period, allowing us to see both the 
factors that affected royal authority and causes that impacted the administration 
and authority of the state, as well as its responses, via the laws. Also, I argue that 
when the people were dealing with officials, the commoners came to see them as 
something separate from the king, effectively an inchoate conception of a state 
separate from the ruler. The commoners would have seen officials as state 
representatives. The people would consider the law as the state’s law, not the king’s 
law. 
 This study also analyzes the state’s use of laws in response to societal 
changes and the effectiveness of law enforcement, and argues that the law was the 
crucial apparatus for the state and the rulers to prevent and remedy problems, bring 
order to state and society, and in particular, protect royal authority. These laws 
indicate the use of laws in the administration and in response to various cases. 
Numerous laws legislated in different times also reflect sociopolitical and economic 
changes in society, social conditions, and the everyday lives of the populace.  
 Furthermore, this work differs from previous works that focuses primarily on 
discussing the contents of Thai laws and legislation, by endeavoring to assess the 
effectiveness of their enforcement. This work argues that the reiterations of 
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previous laws, promulgation of new decrees containing details similar to previous 
laws, and the gradual stiffening of penalties, indicate the use of laws to respond to 
developing situations, and state attempts to prevent and remedy problems through 
laws. At the same time, however, these laws also demonstrate the ineffectiveness of 
law enforcement. Many laws dealing with the misappropriation of manpower, the 
conduct of monks, cattle theft, and the illegal opium trade were restated many 
times and punishments in later laws were increased as existing laws were ineffective 
in preventing crimes. 
 The laws were not effective because they could not completely change or 
control people’s behavior. In cases of ill discipline among monks, as discussed in 
Chapter 7, the state could attempt to assert administrative control over the monks, 
for example, through registration, but it could not regulate their moral conduct. 
With regard to people’s preoccupation with popular beliefs, the laws could not 
change them or their religious practices. The defrocking of 128 and 500 monks who 
respectively violated monastic disciplines in the First and Third Reigns reflects the 
ineffectiveness of law enforcement in changing or controlling their conduct.  
 The study of the effectiveness of law enforcement helps one understand the 
authority of the state and the powerful expansion of Bangkok before centralization 
in the late 19th century. The use of Sangha Laws might have been intended to 
weaken the power of influential monks in provincial areas. Their influence, and 
cases of phumibun, affected the stability of the state and worried the ruler. (A few 
decades later, at the turn of the century, a series of phumibun movements on both 
sides of the Mekong were clearly linked to the disruption caused by the expansion of 
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Bangkok’s authority in the northeast and the imposition of French rule in Laos.) 
Hence, the influence of provincial, charismatic monks would ideally become weaker, 
while the state could expand its authority into distant areas. Moreover, historical 
records have shown that in Rama III’s reign the state was more successful than its 
predecessors in the use of law on manpower. The number of registered manpower 
in some state sectors increased continuously despite a large number of escaped 
phrai. Manpower in the north and northeast were conscripted in Rama III’s reign to 
join the Siamese troops in wars against neighboring states.  
 The topic of compliance and law enforcement raises an important 
question about the geographical limits of Bangkok’s authority. In the Early Bangkok 
period, Bangkok’s power in other regions waxed and waned over time. 
Presumptively, the implementing of law succeeded specifically in Bangkok and 
surrounding areas as well as in some main provincial cities. However, in distant 
regions far from the central region and not ruled directly by Bangkok’s 
representatives, very different cultures, legal traditions, religious practices, 
languages, and political systems prevailed. Cities in the north and northeast, for 
instance, had their own legal texts and used their own local languages. These texts 
indicate that they were not fully under the Code of Bangkok, the TSC. Archival 
documents in this period reveal the names of many provinces sending litigants and 
prisoners to Bangkok. Most of them were in the central region, the lower north 
region, and some cities in the northeast; all of these areas were under closer state 
control than more distant northern or northeastern areas which still enjoyed a 
greater degree of autonomy. In the south, the law of Bangkok seems to have been 
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excluded only from Malay vassal states. Also, one may surmise greater levels of 
compliance in criminal matters than in religious matters, in which laypersons were 
supposed to report misbehavior by monks.5  
 The primary idea for this study came from my involvement in the research 
project titled The Three Seals Laws: Thai Legal Code as a World Heritage, as 
mentioned in the Introduction. However, many contributions from this project do 
not discuss the historical context of each law and its enforcement. They mainly focus 
on the study of Thai society through law and ancient terms. This work hence extends 
the existing scholarship by examining all laws relating to the state and the monarchy 
and their implementation within their specific historical contexts. 
 However, this study, which focuses on the laws concerning state and royal 
authority, has not deeply examined laws on social organization and the relationship 
between individuals, such as the Law on Debt, the Law on Banditry, the Law on 
Quarrels, and the Law on Husband and Wife Relationships. These research topics 
deserve their own studies, which may provide a better understanding about 
people’s way of life, social conditions, and relationships between individuals. There 
are archival documents in this period that demonstrate people’s livelihoods and the 
relationships between individuals and between common people and officials, such 
as testimonies, records of decisions, and official documents of ministries in the 
National Archeives of Thailand. 
 One limitation of this study is the deficiency of the Thai sources themselves. 
It has been acknowledged that existing accounts of Thai history in the Early Bangkok 
                                                          
5
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era and previous periods are incomplete and scarce. The Thai sources used in this 
work include the TSC, the pleadings of plaintiffs, court judgments, and ministerial 
documents. They are both published and unpublished sources. Translated and 
published foreign language sources, especially in English, were also researched. This 
study also uses contemporaneous writings such as eulogistic verses, religious 
writings, and nirat, a poetic form combining travel, remembrance of loved ones, and 
observations of nature, such as Nirat Thadindaeng by Rama I. Examining 
contemporary literature contributes to a better understanding of the state’s and 
ruler’s views. Hence, they are useful to examine. However, there may have some 
foreign sources that have never been explored. Further studies may reveal useful 
information from these sources.  
The other limitation of this study is that the historical sources examined in 
this work are official sources only. This is because the focus of this research was 
examining the processes of the establishment of state stability through laws. Hence, 
the primary documents that have been mainly used remain the records of the state, 
or documents approved by the state, such as writings of court people and senior 
monks. However, there are manuscripts that have not been examined, such as those 
kept in provincial monasteries, and foreign records in international archives, such as 
the records of European travelers and missionaries. Since 2010, a commission 
appointed by the Ministry of Culture of Thailand has surveyed and registered 
unpublished historical manuscripts found in provinces that are both private and 
official property. They include law texts used in the provinces, local songs, medical 
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texts, treatises on war strategy, and official records concerning mining in the south, 
for example. Further research may explore and take advantage of these sources. 
Future directions for related research would be to examine the impact of the 
laws on ordinary people, such as people’s livelihoods, crimes in everyday life, and 
the judicial process in remote or provincial areas. Future research on Thai legal 
history may incorporate microhistories as they provide a fuller picture of Thai 
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